Montero-Martinez

Gregorio Pedro Montero-Hernandez and Hector Montero-Martinez (Petitioners) seek review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA determined that Petitioners were statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal as non-permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) because neither had a qualifying relative for the purposes of § 1229b(b)(1)(D). We dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

I. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.

Montero-Hernandez and Montero-Mar-tinez are father and son. They are natives and citizens of Mexico who entered the United States in 1986.

In April 1997, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) served upon Petitioners a Notice to Appear, alleging that Petitioners were removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i) because they had entered the United States without inspection. Petitioners admitted the allegations contained in the Notice and conceded remova-bility. As they had no other viable options for remaining in the United States, they applied for cancellation of removal pursuant to § 1229b(b)(1).

Petitioners appeared before an Immigration Judge (IJ) in April 1998. At the hearing, they both conceded…

dissenting in part, concurring in the result:

I.

Congress might have written INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(B)(i) to state: “There shall be no appeal from the denial of INA §§ 212(h) and (i) waivers, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, or adjustment of status.” But that’s not what the statute says. Instead, § 242(a)(2)(B)(i) eliminates our jurisdiction over “judgment[s] regarding the granting of [the enumerated forms of] relief.” Why did Congress use the word “judgment” in this provision? It turns out that Congress uses the word “determination” or “decision” in almost every single other jurisdiction-limiting provision in the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), and § 242(a)(2)(B)(i) is the only jurisdiction-limiting provision that uses the word “judgment.” What accounts for this difference in wording?

It also turns out that Congress only uses the word “judgment” throughout the INA to refer to the exercise of discretion or discretionary decisions. 1 Doesn’t this suggest that the word “judgment” in § 242(a)(2)(B)(i) also refers to discretionary decisions? If Congress really wanted to limit all appeals from denials of certain forms of discretionary…