Ove

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , RICO, unfair business practices, and battery claims. The claims arise from blood tests taken after plaintiffs’ arrests for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the § 1983 claim because plaintiffs failed to allege a constitutional violation. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the RICO claim because plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite elements. Finally, we hold that the district court acted within its discretion when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

1. Background and Proceedings

Between late 1998 and early 1999, San Diego police arrested plaintiffs Ove and Forest, and San Diego County sheriffs department arrested plaintiff Brown, for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. Ove, Forest, and Brown consented to blood tests. Plaintiffs’ blood samples were drawn by American Forensic Nurses (“AFN”) employees Samson, Kaston, and Sansoucie. San Diego City and County contracted with AFN to withdraw blood as directed by law enforcement from persons arrested on…

dissenting:

I agree that Heck does not bar Appellants’ § 1983 claims and that they do not state a cause of action under RICO. I dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that Appellants failed to state a claim under § 1983.

According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff states a claim by providing the court “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). See also Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir.1997) (“[T]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail[,] but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”) (citation omitted). Although we need not consider conclusory allegations of law, the Rules “do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 , 113 S.Ct. 1160 , 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.1996); Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1996). By requiring the invocation of the magic word “unreasonable,” the majority…