Columbia Basin Apartment Ass'n v. City of Pasco

Opinion by Judge ALARCON; Dissent by Judge TASHIMA

Appellants appeal from the order granting summary judgment on the merits in favor of the City of Pasco. For the reasons stated below, we apply the Younger abstention doctrine to dismiss Bernard and Jean Shaw from this action, and apply the Pullman doctrine to vacate and remand the claims of the remaining Appellants with instructions to stay further proceedings until the Washington state courts have had the opportunity to consider the merits of the issues raised in the complaint under that state’s law.

I

BACKGROUND

Appellants Bernard and Jean Shaw (“Shaws”) and Robert and Joan Lawrence (“Lawrences”) are landlords in the City of Pasco (“City”). The Shaws rent an apartment to Robert Lee Gaines and Billie Jean Gaines (“Gaineses”). The Lawrences rent an apartment to Manuel Yala (“Vala”) and *795 Maria Galeana (“Galeana”). The Columbia Basin Apartment Association (“CBAA”) is a nonprofit organization consisting of individuals and corporations that own and manage rental housing in the City.

On July 7, 1997, the City enacted Ordinance 3231 (“Pasco Ordinance”) to ameliorate sub-standard and dangerous rental dwelling units in the…

dissenting:

Because I cannot agree with either the majority’s resolution of the jurisdictional issue or its decision to order abstention, I respectfully dissent. In my view, none of the appellants has established Article III standing, and the majority’s resolution of the abstention issue is squarely at odds with recent, controlling, en banc authority.

I.

With respect to standing, there are three classes of plaintiffs-appellants. I address the standing of each, in turn.

The majority grants Article III standing to the landlord-plaintiffs on the basis of the statement in Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 , 707 (9th Cir.1997), that “[a] person suffers injury in fact if the government requires or encourages as a condition of granting him a benefit that he discriminate against others based on their race or sex.” See maj. op. at 798 (quoting Monterey Mech.). But the reason we found injury in that case is missing in this case. We there concluded that requiring a person to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or sex caused injury because “Americans view ethnic or sex discrimination as ‘odious.’” Monterey Mech., 125 F.3d at 707 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515…