This appeal is the final chapter in a long saga of trial, appeal, review on certiorari, and remands and again appeals. In a sense the case made new law — Congress disapproving the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII in this case changed the law — but explicitly made it inapplicable to further proceedings in this case. 1

Justice White’s summary in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 , 109 S.Ct. 2115 , 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) for the Court of the factual setting that gave rise to this litigation is succinct. We quote it here:

Id. at 646-648 , 109 S.Ct. 2115 (footnotes omitted). 2

On remand from the Supreme Court a panel of this court confirmed that despite the change in the statute, our court remains bound by the Supreme Court’s ruling. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 10 F.3d 1485 (9th Cir.1993). In essence the Supreme Court held that although our court had determined that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of disparate impact disfavoring minorities in hiring both in the skilled and unskilled non-cannery positions, that it erred in relying on plaintiffs’ statistics to reach that result.

Our court had relied solely on a showing that a high percentage of non-whites held the cannery positions while a low percentage of minorities held non-cannery positions. The Court held that the proper comparison must be between the racial *801 composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified population in the relevant labor market. It remanded for further proceedings. Upon remand, the district court found that the statistics that plaintiffs advanced had the same flaws that the Supreme Court had found. Their statistics did not make out a prima facie case of disparate impact. On appeal our court concluded that the district court was not clearly erroneous.

Similarly the district court held that certain practices— nepotism, subjective hiring criteria, segregated messing— were not the cause of adverse impact on minorities in the at-issue jobs. We found no clear error. Along the way the claim of disparate treatment was dropped. It is no longer an issue.

Ultimately, our court held in Atonio v. Wards Cove, 10 F.3d at 1504 , that the following were the sole remaining issues to be remanded to the district court for further review and determination:

It is the district court’s determination on those issues, based on the record made at the bench trial, that we now review. The district court in its August 9, 1999, order dismissed all remaining claims with prejudice.

In respect to separate hiring channels the court held that:

District Court Order at 47.

We conclude the district court’s holding in this regard was adequately supported by the record. Plaintiffs’ evidence was solely anecdotal, relying on the affidavits of nineteen claimants. The district court found that:

District Court Order at 20-21.

In respect to race-labeling, the district court held that it did not cause a significant disparate impact. The district court expressed “a deep concern about the race labeling that took place at the canneries,” District Court Order at 42, as do we, but the district court after examining all of the evidence concluded that it did not operate as a “headwind to minority advancement.” Id. It noted,

District Court Order 40-42.

We agree that the district court’s holding is supported by the evidence.

On the last issue, the district court held that the plaintiffs’ suggested alternative to segregated housing “would be an unnecessary burden and resulting cost to the Defendants and would not be as efficient in meeting Defendants’ legitimate business goals as housing the workers by department, work hours, and arrival time.” District Court Order at 46.

We hold that its finding was not clearly erroneous.

The law of the case is that there was business justification for the segregated housing by job category that resulted in *803 substantial segregation by race. The plaintiffs’ suggestion in essence is that employees who are already present when the cannery crews arrive be reassigned to different bunk houses in order to mix crews and provide racial balance. The court found that housing by job category had important advantages; different duty-reporting times in a bunk house would be disruptive (for example, cold storage workers report at 4:00 AM; cannery workers at 8:00 AM). Uninterrupted sleep is important because everyone works long, intense shifts. Requiring the moves after workers had settled in also would be disrup- tive in itself. We conclude that the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.

CONCLUSION

This appeal is not about, as the Supreme Court said in Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 649 n. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2115 , 104 L.Ed.2d 733 , “whether we'approve’ of [Defendants’] employment practices or the society that exists at the canneries, but rather, whether [Plaintiffs] have properly established that these practices violate Title VII.” Nor is this appeal about how this litigation would have concluded had the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp.III, 1991), been applicable. Nor is it about how this litigation might have concluded had the treatment claim not been dropped or the evidence of causation been better marshaled.

This last appeal turns on whether the district court’s findings and conclusions on three narrow issues — the final shreds left after the dismissal of much more meaningful claims — were clearly erroneous. We conclude that they were not. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.

AFFIRMED.

. The salient changes to Title VII are set forth in Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 10 F.3d 1485 , 1491 (1993):

105 Stat. at 1099, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note at 717 (Supp. Ill 1991). The case before us is the only one that appears to meet the criteria prescribed by section 402(b) for exemption from the statute.

. Justice White in footnotes elaborated on the process of delivering fish, see Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 646 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2115 ("Independent fishermen catch the salmon and turn them over to company-owned boats called 'tenders,' which transport the fish from the fishing grounds to the canneries. Once at the cannery, the fish are eviscerated, the eggs pulled, and they are cleaned. Then, operating at a rate of approximately four cans per second, the salmon are filled into cans. Next, the canned salmon are cooked under precise time-temperature requirements established by the FDA, and the cans are inspected to ensure that proper seals are maintained on the top, bottom and sides.”) (citations omitted) and described the noncanneiy positions at issue in the litigation. See id., at 647 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2115 ("The noncannery jobs were described as follows by the Court of Appeals:'Machinists and engineers are hired to maintain the smooth and continuous operation of the canning equipment. Quality control personnel conduct the FDA-required inspections and record keeping. Tenders are staffed with a crew necessary to operate the vessel. A variety of support personnel sire employed to operate the entire cannery community, including for example, cooks, carpenters, storekeepers, bookkeepers, beach gangs for dock yard labor and construction, etc.’ ”) (citations omitted).

. The district court erroneously found, contrary to the law of the case that there were no separate hiring channels and consequently did not consider the consequences of the practices thereby engendered.

. Although the cannery showed business necessity as the reason for its segregated housing, the plaintiffs were entitled to show alternates to the segregated housing that would be feasible and cost effective. One of their suggested alternates was not evaluated by the district court. We held that plaintiffs were entitled to consideration of that alternative.