Lawson

Opinion by Judge TALLMAN; Dissent by Judge BETTY B. FLETCHER.

OPINION

This civil rights case turns upon whether Gregory Lawson was constructively dis *802 charged from his employment as a cadet in the Washington State Patrol Academy's 82nd Trooper Basic Training Class. Lawson brought this action against the State of Washington, the Washington State Patrol, Chief Annette Sandberg, and Captain Lowell Porter (collectively ‘WSP”), pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , and Revised Code of Washington 49.60, alleging religious discrimination and failure to accommodate. 1 The district court granted the WSP’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

I

We discuss the relevant facts in the light most favorable to Lawson, as we must when considering an adverse summary judgment. See Draper v. Coeur Rochester, 147 F.3d 1104 , 1105 (9th Cir.1998).

Lawson was hired by the WSP in 1998. His basic training as a trooper cadet commenced at the WSP Academy in Shelton, Washington, on July 13, 1998. Lawson was issued a manual entitled Procedures, Rules and Regulations: 82nd Trooper Basic Training Class (“Manual”) as part of his…

dissenting:

The majority affirms the summary judgment dismissal of Lawson’s Title VII and § 1983 claims, concluding that Lawson was not constructively discharged by the Washington State Patrol (“WSP”). I respectfully dissent. The majority couches Lawson’s struggle with the WSP as a simple voluntary resignation and not a constructive discharge. But this is a case about the fundamental right to religious freedom. It is the story of a conscientious young man who aspires to a career in law enforcement; a young man who also is profoundly religious. His religion does not allow him to swear under oath or salute the flag. He is committed to rendering public service in law enforcement. The only barrier to service in the state patrol is *807 the WSP’s failure to accommodate his religion.

I.

Title VII Claim

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee in employment matters because of the employee’s religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). For summary judgment purposes, Lawson established a prima facie case of religious discrimination. The majority concedes that Lawson satisfied the first two elements of the prima facie case: (1)…