Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps

The law firm Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP (“Luce Forward”) refused to hire Donald Scott Lagatree (“Laga-tree”) as a full-time legal secretary because he would not sign an agreement to *997 arbitrate claims arising from his employment. On behalf of Lagatree, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) sued Luce Forward for retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12208 (b), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623 (d), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). The EEOC sought make-whole relief for Lagatree and a permanent injunction forbidding Luce Forward from requiring that employees sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employment.

The district court refused to award make-whole relief and rejected EEOC’s request for an injunction based on the ADA, the ADEA, or the EPA. Relying on Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.1998), however, the district court enjoined Luce Forward from requiring applicants to arbitrate Title VII claims and from enforcing…

Dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 , 121 S.Ct. 1302 , 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001), the Supreme Court “implicitly overruled” Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.1998). Maj. op. at 996-97. For the following reasons, I would find that Duf-field remains good law.

I.

The issue in Duffield was whether employers may require their employees, as a mandatory condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate future Title VII claims. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185 . Based on an analysis of Congress’ intent when it amended Title VII through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), we held that employers may not require employees, as a mandatory condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate future Title VII claims. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189-90 .

The issue in Circuit City was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., excludes from its coverage not only employment arbitration agreements by transportation workers, but also employment arbitration agreements by 7iOTC-transportation workers. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109 , 121 S.Ct.…