Jacobs

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs appeal from an order denying them leave to file a third amended complaint and an order granting summary judgment in favor of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“IBEW”), Local 48 (“Local 48”) in their action for violations of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411 and 459, and the union’s duty of fair representation.

The magistrate judge had jurisdiction to enter final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c). Plaintiffs and Local 48 all filed unambiguous written consent forms in the district court. Because Christenson Electric, Inc., and Friberg Electric Company orally consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction while they were before the magistrate judge and later completed the record by filing their written consent forms in the district court, the magistrate judge had jurisdiction to enter final judgment, and this court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . See Kofoed v. IBEW, Local 18, 237 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.2001).

I.

Plaintiffs argue that the magistrate judge abused his discretion by denying them leave to file a third amended complaint. We disagree. At the time…

dissenting.

I would vacate the judgment entered by the magistrate judge, dismiss the appeal, and remand to the district court for reasons explained in my dissent in Kofoed v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 48, 237 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.2001). Here, the magistrate judge exercised civil trial jurisdiction and entered “final” orders without the consent of two parties. Without it, the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to enter an appealable final judgment. See Jaliwala v. United States, 945 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.1991).