Waldron

MEMORANDUM **

Marcel Waldron appeals his jury conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1).

I. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress

Waldron argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm and the crack cocaine. Waldron does not challenge the district court’s determination that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him but argues that the frisk was unconstitutional.

The standard for justifying a frisk is whether a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his or her safety or that of others was in danger. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080,1086 (9th Cir.2000). The officer does not have to be absolutely certain that the individual is armed. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 . If the stop is based on founded suspicion and the officer has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a limited weapons search. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). To determine whether the…

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In light of Waldron’s concession that the events occurred in a high crime area, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion for a frisk. However, I believe that the district court clearly erred in applying a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5).