Crenshaw

MEMORANDUM

Ralph Crenshaw appeals the district court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AED-PA”) one-year statute of limitations. We affirm.

Crenshaw filed his second habeas petition outside of the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period for state prisoners to file habeas petitions in federal court. He contends that his second petition is timely because it relates back to an earlier habeas petition that was filed within the one-year period. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2) provides for the relation back of an amended pleading *621 to the date of the original pleading when “the claim ... in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2). "When an original habeas petition has been dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, however, the filing of a second petition does not relate back under Rule 15(c)(2) to the filing date of the original petition. See Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000); Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.2000). When an original habeas action is…

concurring.

I concur in the result. I write separately to suggest the wisdom of adopting a mandatory warning requirement for pro se habeas litigants regarding AEDPA’s one-year limitations period.

*622 As even the most seasoned of lawyers knows, AEDPA is a confusing, at times impenetrable statute. It imposes stringent procedural rules on habeas petitioners, with often harsh results. To alleviate the burden on pro se litigants, our Circuit has followed the Second and Third Circuits in requiring district courts to provide mandatory prophylactic “notice” measures to advise pro se petitioners of the consequences of certain AEDPA procedural provisions that may foreclose consideration of their claims on the merits. See United States v. Seesing, Nos. 98-30233, 98-36189, slip op. at 1232 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2001) (mandatory warning regarding consequences of “second or successive petition” rule when recharacterizing motions under § 2255); Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582, 584 (2nd Cir.1998) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 646, 652 (3d Cir.1999) (same), Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir.2000) (same, under § 2254). The Second Circuit has suggested the…