Morgan

MEMORANDUM **

I

The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings because Morgan’s claims based on conduct prior to March 24, 1997, 45 days before Morgan sought EEO counseling, are time barred. 1 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (a)(1). The district court also did not “refus[e] to hear” Morgan’s argument in support of her motion for reconsideration. The district court invited argument and Morgan’s attorney stated that he had “nothing further to add to the moving papers.” The district court did not abuse its discretion, therefore, by denying Morgan’s motion for reconsideration of the order granting judgment on the pleadings. Shalit v. Coppe, 182 F.3d 1124,1126 (9th Cir.1999).

II

Morgan conducted no discovery during the nearly two years prior to the summary judgment hearing. Because Morgan “fail[ed] to pursue discovery diligently before summary judgment,” Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439 , 1443 (9th Cir.1986), and did not allege specific facts that would have precluded summary judgment, 2 the district court did *700 not abuse its discretion by denying Morgan’s Rule 56(f) motion. See Maljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 887…