Burks

concurring.

I concur in the result. While I do not agree that we have jurisdiction over the sex discrimination claim, if we did the majority’s resolution of it is flawless.

MEMORANDUM *

Plaintiff Bonita Burks appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the State of Arizona’s Department of Economic Security (“DES”) on her Title VII claims alleging race and sex discrimination and retaliation. Except as explained below, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

A. Race Discrimination

We review the district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, see, e.g., Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 830 (9th Cir.2000), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Burks. Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir.1996). Under the familiar standard for analyzing a claim of race discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The district court assumed that Burks had met her burden, and so do we. The burden of production then shifts to DES to show that Burks was terminated “ ‘for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.’” Id. at 507 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.…