Ohman

United States v. Ohman

Good Law
13 F. App'x 568
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJune 27, 2001No. 00-10074; D.C. No. CR-97-40210-SBACalifornia2,468 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

David Ohman appeals his jury conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm, arguing that the felon-in-possession statute exceeds Congress’ power to regulate under the Commerce Clause; that he ought to have received a two-level reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility; and that the court denied him his right to allocution at sentencing. We affirm. Because the facts are familiar to the parties, we recount them only as necessary to explain our decision.

1. As we have previously explained, the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1), “requirefs] only ‘the minimal [jurisdictional] nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.’ ” United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 , 97 S.Ct. 1963 , 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977)); see also United States v. Casterline, 103 F.3d 76, 77 (9th Cir.1996). Nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence undermines that holding. United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.2001); cf. United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 513-15 (9th Cir.2000).

2. We reject Ohman’s contention that our…

Dissenting Opinion

Reinhardt, J.

dissenting.

I would reverse on the ground that the district court failed to provide the defendant, David Ohman, with his right to allocution, as required by Rule 32(c)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although it is true that Ohman spoke on several occasions during the hearing, a careful examination of the transcript leads *571 me to conclude that the right to allocution was not afforded.

Rule 32(c)(3)(C) mandates that district courts, before sentencing, “address the defendant personally and determine whether the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence.” The sentencing process also permits the defendant’s counsel and the prosecutor to first present legal arguments regarding the sentence to be imposed. The problem here arises out of the fact that Ohman appeared pro se at the sentencing hearing, as he did at the trial. Prior to imposing the sentence, the district court asked the prosecutor and the defendant: “Any comments either of you have before I announce the sentence I’m inclined to impose?” The prosecutor answered in the negative, and Ohman then made the type of legal argument a counsel would…

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