Brunson

dissenting.

While I agree with the majority’s statements regarding the necessary nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce, I do not agree that there is sufficient evidence to affirm the jury’s verdict that Brunson actually possessed the firearm in question. In my view, no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 *729 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

At the time of contact between Brunson and the police officers, the evidence shows that only one officer saw a weapon on Brunson’s person. Another officer at the scene, who was also focused on Brunson, testified that he did not see a gun, and a third officer saw a “chrome-color object” which he could not identify. When Brunson drove away from the area, the officer who followed him for several blocks did not witness anything thrown from the car.

A gun was found the next morning discarded on the street. A firearms examiner testified that it was scratched and contained some debris, but there was no way for the examiner to tell when it had actually been damaged. Moreover, Brunson’s…

MEMORANDUM *

Victor Brunson appeals his jury conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. We affirm. Because the facts are familiar to the parties, we recount them only as necessary to explain our decision.

1. We have previously rejected Brunson’s contention that 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1) requires a more substantial nexus to commerce than the one presented here. In United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir.1995), we held that section *728 922(g)(1) “require[s] only ‘the minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.’ ” Id. at 1462 (quoting Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 , 97 S.Ct. 1963 , 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977)); see also United States v. Casterline, 103 F.3d 76, 77 (9th Cir.1996).

Nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence undermines that holding. In Hanna , we stated expressly that United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 , 115 S.Ct. 1624 , 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) “does not alter our analysis.” We have since observed that our interpretation of section 922(g) remains intact after both United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 , 120 S.Ct. 1740 , 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) and Jones v. United States, 529…