Mendoza

MEMORANDUM **

The district court did not err in admitting Mendoza’s post-arrest statements. The statements were knowingly and voluntarily made after Mendoza was informed of and waived her Miranda rights. Mendoza had the benefit of an interpreter when she was informed of her rights. She stated she understood her rights and signed and initialed a waiver of rights form. She, not the interpreter, is properly viewed as the declarant of the statements which indicated her understanding and waiver of her rights. See United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522 , 525-26 n. 5 (9th Cir.1991).

Although pre-arraignment delay may be considered by the trial court in determining whether to admit a confession, the “real test” of admissibility is *772 whether the confession was voluntary. United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1406 (9th Cir.1985) (citing United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1970)), overruled on other grounds by California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). Here, although there was a twelve-hour delay between Mendoza’s arrest and her statements, the circumstances do not show that the statements were involuntary. Mendoza had been…