Whittle

Whittle v. Social Security Administration

Good Law
22 F. App'x 852
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitDecember 7, 2001No. 01-35282; D.C. No. CV-97-00715-HOCalifornia334 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 , 113 S.Ct. 2625 , 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993), *853 Plaintiff Cheryl Whittle is a “prevailing party” with a “final judgment” within the meaning of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). In Schaefer , the Supreme Court held that a party who secures a remand under “sentence four” of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) is a “prevailing party” for purposes of the EAJA. Id. at 302 . A party may prevail for this purpose without having obtained an award of benefits. Id. The 30-day clock for filing for EAJA fees begins to run upon a sentence-four remand, which is a final judgment for this purpose unless the district court retains jurisdiction. Id,.; see also Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 379-80 (9th Cir.1994).

In this case, the EAJA clock began to run with the district court’s first remand. Whittle’s lawyer properly applied for EAJA fees at that time. We turn, then, to the merits of the fee request.

The question is whether “the position of the United States was substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A). The government’s position must be substantially justified at each step of the proceedings, Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir.1988),…

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