Schneider
Schneider v. San Diego County
Opinion
Lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM *
A.
In order to preserve her federal claims, Schneider needed to file her complaints such that her state proceedings were terminated within 300 days after the last alleged unlawful act. See EEOC v. Dinuba Medical Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 585 (9th Cir.2000). Schneider’s complaints with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) were filed on June 30, 1997 and she received a right to sue letter terminating state proceedings on July 1, 1997 — over 300 days after the last alleged unlawful act. Accordingly, her claims under the federal statutes may go forward only if equitable tolling is applied.
Schneider argues that her failure to meet the 300 day deadline for completion of state procedures was because: (1) the *746 EEOC advised her over the telephone in February 1997 that the statute of limitations for her claim had already passed; and (2) in March 1997, she took her complaint to an attorney who kept her file for a month and then declined to represent her. Schneider does not cite any authority supporting the proposition that delay by an attorney deciding whether to take a case may support a grant…
Concurrence in Part
Fernandez, J.
Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with the majority regarding the statute of limitations bar to Schneider’s federal claims. I dissent as to the state claims because it appears with the veriest clarity that those are also barred by the statute of limitations, even if they were otherwise viable.
The longest statute of limitations that could apply here is California’s one year statute for Fair Employment and Housing Act claims. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960. Schneider asserts that the county treated her badly, and that resulted in her being placed on leave on December 30, 1993. When that term expired, she was given another one year of leave with the right to return to work. And when that period expired, she was given still another one year of leave, starting March 14, 1995, under which she had no absolute right to return to work, but could obtain an open position upon giving notice. What did she do during that two year period? Nothing at all! She did not call, she did not write, she did not make contact; nothing. As a result, a termination letter finally issued on about July 3, 1996; it is without dispute that the letter issued virtually automatically when her two year period ran…