Cooper

Cooper v. County of Los Angeles

Good Law
26 F. App'x 698
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJanuary 10, 2002No. 00-55830; D.C. No. CV-99-08216-RSWLCalifornia1,153 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Plaintiff-appellant Eric Cooper appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims against the County of Los Angeles (“County”), and Gil Garcetti, the District Attorney for the County. The district court determined that Cooper’s amended complaint failed to state a claim and dismissed it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We affirm.

Initially, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the underlying paternity proceedings, pursuant to the prosecutor’s request. These were public records relevant to the county’s affirmative defenses. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir.2001).

Although Cooper names the District Attorney individually, he fails to allege individual misconduct. Vicarious liability is not available under § 1983 against the District Attorney as a supervisor. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir.1989). We therefore consider the claims against both defendants under the framework of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

This action is based on a single incident of…

Dissenting Opinion

Nelson, J.

dissenting.

*700 D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge.

The majority disposes of Cooper’s appeal of the 12(b)(6) dismissal of his Monell claim in one sentence: “Cooper has not alleged anything that suggests a link to any policy to deprive persons of licenses or failure to have a policy to train and supervise employees with respect to such licenses.” Ante at 699.-Not only is this assertion inaccurate, it is also the core of an opinion that does not apply Ninth Circuit precedent, federal rules regarding notice pleading, and hornbook law surrounding motions to dismiss. I am therefore unable to join the Court’s opinion and must respectfully dissent.

This Circuit has adopted possibly the most permissive standard possible for determining when a complaint adequately sets forth a Monell claim:

It simply cannot be said that Cooper’s complaint fails to make these bare allegations.

Cooper’s Complaint, on numerous occasions, does more than enough to satisfy the notice pleading requirements for Monell claims in this Circuit. In paragraph 18 of the Complaint, Cooper states that “prior to the wrongful conduct defendants developed and maintained policies or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to…

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