Vangala
Vangala v. St. Mary's Regional Medical Center
Opinion
Lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM **
Dr. Venkat Vangala appeals the district court’s dismissal of his antitrust action for failure to allege an “antitrust injury.” We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.
DISCUSSION
The district court dismissed Dr. Vangala’s amended complaint on the ground that he failed to allege “any actionable injury.” The court explained that the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 , requires plaintiffs to “plead and prove a reduction of competition in the market in general and not a mere injury to their own positions as competitors in the market.” We agree. A claim under § 1 requires a plaintiff to prove (1) an agreement, conspiracy, or combination; (2) intended to harm or unreasonably restrain competition; (3) which actually causes injury to competition, “beyond the impact on the claimant....” See Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728 , 738 (9th Cir.1992). Thus, “the plaintiff must show an injury to competition, rather than just an injury to plaintiffs business.” See Sicor, Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Austin, 979 F.2d at 739 (noting that plaintiff “was required to show not merely injury to himself as a competitor, but rather…
Dissenting Opinion
Ferguson, J.
dissenting.
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge.
Dr. Vangala has satisfied the “antitrust injury” pleading requirement, and I therefore respectfully dissent.
The majority asserts that Dr. Vangala merely alleged that the defendants’ conduct damaged his ability to compete in the market, thereby reducing and injuring competition. The majority states that this conclusory allegation was insufficient to satisfy the injury-to-competition pleading requirement. However, in doing so, the majority makes the pleading requirement insurmountable by failing to recognize that the complaint need not provide detailed facts that illustrate injury to competition. Rather, in determining whether a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must ask whether a plaintiff “‘could show any set of facts, consistent with the allegations of its complaint, that would constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.’ ” Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 735 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 924 (9th Cir.1980)); cf. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 , 122 S.Ct. 992, 997 , 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (the…