County of San Diego v. California Special Education Hearing Office Grossmont Union High School District, Rosalind Fox, Counter-Defendant-Appellee

93 F.3d 1458 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6482 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA SPECIAL EDUCATION HEARING OFFICE; Grossmont Union High School District, Defendants-Appellees, Rosalind Fox, Counter-Defendant-Appellee. No. 94-55557. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Oct. 20, 1995. Decided Aug. 30, 1996. Ian Fan, Deputy County Counsel, San Diego, California, for plaintiff-appellant. Barry A. Zolotar, California State Department of Education, Sacramento, California, for defendant-appellee, California Special Education Hearing Office. Sharon Seay, Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason, San Diego, California, for defendant-appellee Grossmont Union High School. Charles Wolfinger, San Diego, California, for counter-defendant-appellee Rosalind Fox. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, No. CV-92-00424-MLH. Before POOLE and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges; MARSH, * District Judge. O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: 1 We must decide whether, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, a California county is entitled to challenge both the state's classification of a minor as…

We must decide whether, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, a California county is entitled to challenge both the state’s classification of a minor as seriously emotionally disturbed and its finding ordering residential treatment for which the county is financially responsible.

I

Enacted by Congress in 1975 as the Education of the Handicapped Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 , was renamed in 1990. Its primary objective is “to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs....” 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c). To accomplish this goal, the statute “provides federal funds to assist state and local agencies in educating children with disabilities, but conditions such funding on compliance with certain goals and procedures.” Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467 , 1469 (9th Cir.1993).

Among the substantive procedures is the development of an individualized education program (“IEP”) for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (a)(18)(D). Crafted annually by the…

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. While the majority acknowledges that there is no “principled reason upon the basis of which the County should be excluded” from the SED classification process, its holding conflicts with that acknowledgment. There is no question that the County is an aggrieved party within the meaning of the statute. The issue is whether an aggrieved party may raise an issue not raised by the parent in her civil action.

I cannot agree that the phrase “any matter relating to” a complaint as set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(1)(E) is one of limitation. “Any matter” suggests that it encompasses both direct and indirect issues raised with a complaint. Such a liberal construction is consistent with due process protections in that the County clearly has a financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding. This is particularly so where the statute is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, as is the case here. A broader construction is appropriate where prohibiting the County from raising this issue results in a deprivation of rights arising from the county’s interest. More importantly, however, restricting this right fails to recognize two critical…