Juan Manuel Morales v. City of San Rafael and Daniel Hulett

96 F.3d 359 65 USLW 2178 , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6687 , 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10 ,941 Juan Manuel MORALES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SAN RAFAEL and Daniel Hulett, Defendants-Appellees. No. 94-15523. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Submitted May 6, 1996. * Decided Sept. 6, 1996. As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Jan. 13, 1997. ** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Robert H. Schnacke, Senior District Judge, Presiding. *** D.C. No. CV-87-05277-CW. Peter B. Brekhus, Linda J. Philipps, Brekhus, Williams, Wester & Hall, Greenbrae, CA, for plaintiff-appellant. Gregory M. Fox, Dana L. Soong, Bertrand, Fox, & Elliot, San Francisco, CA, for defendants-appellees. Before D.W. NELSON, REINHARDT and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges. REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: 1 This case involves a dispute as to the proper method of determining a reasonable attorney's fee for a prevailing civil rights plaintiff. The history of the case is as follows: 2 Morales sued the City of San Rafael ("City") and a San Rafael police officer, Sergeant Daniel Hulett, alleging that Hulett unlawfully arrested Morales without an…

This case involves a dispute as to the proper method of determining a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing civil rights plaintiff. The history of the case is as follows:

Morales sued the City of San Rafael (“City”) and a San Rafael police officer, Sergeant Daniel Hulett, alleging that Hulett unlawfully arrested Morales without an arrest warrant and without probable cause in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and state law. Based upon Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the district court dismissed Morales’ § 1983 claim against the City and granted summary judgment as to that claim in the City’s favor. The City remained a defendant with respect to Morales’ state law claims. At trial, the jury returned a special verdict in Morales’ favor and awarded $17,500 in damages.

*361 Hulett and the City moved to set aside the verdict. The district court granted the motion and entered a JNOV. Morales appealed and this court found that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict and reinstated the verdict in a memorandum disposition. We remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Morales on the jury’s verdict and for…

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent with regard to the attorney’s fees award. A lawyer’s fee of $139,788.25 for getting a client $17,500 is obscene. The district court properly determined that the amount was inappropriate under controlling law and cut the fee to $20,000. We should affirm that discretionary determination.

The majority purports to limit Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), to nominal damages cases. Farrar applies to all 42 U.S.C. § 1988 cases. We have already established that interpretation of Farrar , and it is inescapable in the context of the line of Supreme Court decisions of which Farrar is a part. The district court applied Farrar correctly and exercised discretion appropriately:

That exercise of discretion was in accord with controlling law.

Farrar considered whether a civil rights plaintiff who receives only a nominal damages award is a prevailing party. The Fifth Circuit had held that plaintiffs who win only $1 are not prevailing parties, so attorneys’ fees cannot be awarded under Section 1988. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 107-09 , 113 S.Ct. at 571 . The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of fees, but on a different theory. The…