Woods
Woods v. Champion Chevrolet
Opinion
Lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM **
Jeri R. Woods (“Woods”) appeals the district court’s order granting defendant Champion Chevrolet (“Champion”) summary judgment and dismissing her claims alleging sex discrimination (hostile work environment) and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Champion hired Woods as a salesperson in January or February 1997. When Woods was hired, and throughout her employment at Champion, Champion had a “No Harassment” Policy in place. The policy prohibited harassment on any grounds “relating to an individual’s race, color, sex, religion, national origin, citizenship, age, or disability.” The policy specified that “harassment” included “sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, unwelcome or offensive touching, and other verbal, graphic, or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” The policy instructed employees to report harassment to their supervisors, or, if they did not feel that their supervisor satisfactorily resolved their concerns, to report harassment directly to Jack Stanko or Stanley F. Bondick. Stan…
Dissenting Opinion
Hug, J.
I respectfully dissent. The plaintiff worked for Champion for 22 months and during that time she contends that fellow employee Jack Bearden made remarks with sexual connotations directed to her 5 to 20 times. She could recall only two of the comments. Even crediting the comments that she could not recall as being objectionable, this amounts to one comment every four months or at most one comment a month.
She testified in her deposition that Cisco Mieteran had made sexual comments to her probably more than 10 times. If this *460 were 10 times it would be less than once every other month, even if this were double that, or 20 times, it would be only once a month. Thus, the combined remarks of Bearden and Mieteran were no more than two such remarks a month. This is far short of what we have recognized as a hostile work environment. It is not “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of plaintiffs employment and create an abusive working environment.” Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir.1955).
The majority relies on Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 , 872-73 (9th Cir.2001) to identify what constitutes a hostile work environment. It…