United States v. Williams

MEMORANDUM **

I

The district court did not err in denying Williams’s suppression motion because the search of the trunk of his car at the Pine Valley checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment. A vehicle attempting to pass through such a checkpoint can be sent on to the secondary inspection area “in the absence of any individualized suspicion.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 , 96 S.Ct. 3074 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); see also United States v. Barnett, 935 F.2d 178, 181 (9th Cir.1991). Williams’s erratic flight behavior at the secondary inspection area, together with other factors, provided the “minimal showing of suspicion” necessary to justify the dog-sniff. The totality of the circumstances, particularly the “alert” given by the drug dog, gave rise to reasonable suspicion for the search of the trunk. See United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 896-97 (9th Cir.1985). Because we find that reasonable suspicion existed to search the trunk of the car after the dog sniff, it is unnecessary to decide whether Williams’s consent was valid.

II

Joinder of the charges against Williams was proper under Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a), which provides that “[t]wo or more *507…