Schaffer

MEMORANDUM **

Mary Beth Schaffer appeals the summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Verizon Data, 1 and supervisors Roger Schueller, and Chris Poehlman. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Subject matter jurisdiction.

At the time of removal to federal court, Schaffer’s complaint had alleged a violation of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. Because Schaffer’s complaint presented a federal question on its face, the removal of both her federal and state law claims was proper. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a) & (c).

Schaffer’s subsequent amendment of her complaint to eliminate the federal question did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over Schaffer’s state law claims. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209 , 1213 (9th Cir.1998) (providing that “a plaintiff may not compel remand by amending a complaint to eliminate the federal question upon which removal was based”). Accordingly, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.

Summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

A. Schaffer’s second cause of action

Schaffer’s second cause of action…

Dissenting.

I dissent from the majority’s affirmation of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Verizon on Schaffer’s second cause of action for gender discrimination. I do so because the majority incorrectly applies the law.

First, the majority incorrectly relies on Thomas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 77 Cal. App.4th 507 , 91 Cal.Rptr .2d 770, 772-73 (Ct.App.2000), to reject Schaffer’s gender discrimination claim because “Schaffer neither alleges facts nor adduces evidence showing how [Verizon’s] conduct had any material, let alone substantial and detrimental, effect upon her employment.” (Emphasis added.) The Thomas court, finding no California or Ninth Circuit authority, relied exclusively — and without comment or reasoning of its own — on out-of-circuit authority for the proposition that employer conduct must “be both detrimental and substantial” and “result in a material change in the terms of [the employee’s] employment” in order to qualify as an adverse employment action. 91 Cal. Rptr.2d at 772-73 (noting that “most circuits” required this). But shortly after Thomas was decided, we held that “[w]hile some [employment] actions that we consider to be adverse…