Ricciardi

MEMORANDUM *

Ricciardi contends that the district court erroneously denied his in limine mo- , tions to exclude evidence of his interactions with school administrators prior to 1994. 1 The crux of Ricciardi’s argument is that the pre-1994 evidence was propensity evidence barred under Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Rule 404 generally prohibits the admission of evidence of a person’s character for the purpose of proving that the individual acted in conformity with that character on a particular occasion. Cohn v. Papke, 655 F.2d 191, 193-94 (9th Cir.1981). Nor may such evidence be admitted to show a propensity or proclivity to commit bad acts. United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 605 (9th Cir.1993). The pre-1994 evidence should have been excluded under this rule. Robb’s pretrial papers, and her briefs to this Court, make clear that the pre-1994 evidence was offered as propensity evidence. For example, Robb argued in her opposition brief to Ricciardi’s in limine motions that “[t]his evidence of a long history of Plaintiff’s conflicts and turmoil with administrators is ... highly probative of the simple proposition that it is his obstreperous tendencies…