Richland Calabasas L.P. v. City of Calabasas

Good Law
45 F. App'x 661
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitAugust 22, 2002No. 00-55490; D.C. No. CV-99-04882-RAPCalifornia557 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Richland Calabasas L.P. and Oakville Stokes Canyon L.P. (collectively “Rich-land”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of their complaint for lack of standing. We have jurisdiction over Richland’s timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we review de novo the district court’s decision on standing. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1997). We affirm.

Richland admits that it is not a party to the Development Agreement (“Agreement”) and that it did not purchase the Goodman Property or its option on the Ackley-McLeod Property from any party to the Agreement. In addition, Richland concedes it is not an assignee or transferee of any party to the Agreement. Nor is Richland a third party beneficiary of the Agreement.

Furthermore, Richland is not a successor-in-interest to Micor. Richland has not acquired any rights or property directly from any party to the Agreement. Nor has Richland fulfilled the conditions set forth in the Agreement to become Micor’s successor-in-interest. Richland did not seek the City’s approval to succeed Micor, and it is not a Micor-eontrolled entity or its wholly-owned subsidiary. Richland is an entity distinct…

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