Fink
Fink v. Nourse
Opinion
Lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM **
David M. Fink (“Fink”) has filed two separate appeals in connection with the district court’s March 9, 2001 sanctions order and the denial of his recusal motion.
Judge Real did not abuse his discretion in denying Fink’s motion to recuse Judge Letts under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Under both recusal statutes, the standard for disqualification is “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir.1986)). Fink’s motion was neither timely, as it was made nearly three years after the events that Fink claims most vividly illustrate the judge’s bias and prejudice, nor was it legally sufficient. The district court did not apply the wrong standard in reviewing the motion for recusal. On the basis of Fink’s affidavit, the district court reasonably concluded that Fink’s complaint stemmed not from the judge’s bias or prejudice, but from Fink’s dissatisfaction with some of Judge Letts’ ruling, in particular the decisions on sanctions.