Fithian

MEMORANDUM **

The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of this ease, and they need not be repeated.

Appellants contend that the District Court erred in holding that the divorce decree provisions for bonus payments in lieu of property did not satisfy the termination requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 71 (b)(1)(D) and, therefore, did not meet *701 the definition of alimony in § 71(b)(1). 1 The District Court determined that the bonus payments failed to satisfy § 71(b)(1)(D). It found the “Money Judgment” section of the divorce decree, which contained no language terminating the payment obligation in the event of Ms. Richard’s death, to be controlling.

Prior cases considering the same question have conducted a two-part inquiry. First, courts have looked for an unambiguous termination condition, initially as expressed in the plain language of the divorce decree itself, and then as imposed by operation of state law. 2 Lovejoy v. Comm’r, 293 F.3d 1208, 1212-13 (10th Cir.2002); Hoover v. Comm’r, 102 F.3d 842, 847-48 (6th Cir.1996). Second, where there is no unambiguous termination condition, courts have independently evaluated “the language of the decree” as a whole to…