Mobo

*696 MEMORANDUM **

Arnold Castro Mobo appeals his 84-month sentence following his jury-trial conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (g)(1) and 924(a)(2). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742 . We affirm.

Mobo contends that the district court erred by denying his request for a three-level downward adjustment in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. We review for clear error the district court’s factual determination whether the defendant accepted responsibility for his offense. United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 852-531 (9th Cir.2002) (observing that the “determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review” because of the sentencing judge’s “unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility”) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 5).

On our review of the record, we cannot say the district court clearly erred because, at trial, Mobo vigorously contested his guilt and he expressed remorse only after the jury returned a guilty verdict against him. See Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d at 853-54 (affirming…

dissenting.

Because I believe the district court judge clearly erred in determining that Arnold Mobo did not accept responsibility for his offense, I respectfully dissent.

Mobo, a felon, rented some firearms at a shooting range for practice. He was arrested and went to trial for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received an 84-month sentence. Throughout, he admitted that he was a felon and had used the guns. He claimed that at the time he was ignorant that renting guns at a shooting range constituted prohibited possession.

The government argued at trial that it was immaterial to the required “knowing possession” of a firearm whether Mobo thought shooting at a shooting range would constitute possession (“the knowledge element is that he knows that what’s in his hand is a gun”) Mobo eventually was convicted by a jury that must have understood that it was immaterial whether Mobo, at the shooting range, did not believe that activity constituted possession. It was enough that he knew he had a gun in his hand, and he always accepted responsibility for those required elements of the crime.

At sentencing, Mobo’s counsel pointed out that “[o]n the very day that he fired…