Ramirez

MEMORANDUM **

Daniel Santiago Ramirez (“Ramirez”) argues that his motion to suppress should have been granted by the district court because he was under arrest when removed from his vehicle, was not subject to an investigatory Terry stop, and that this arrest was not supported by probable cause.

There is no need to determine whether the police conducted a Terry stop or made an arrest because there was probable cause to arrest Ramirez at the time he was stopped. See United States v. Harvey, 3 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir.1993) (performing Terry analysis unnecessary where ample probable cause exists).

Probable cause exists when police officers have “reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense,’ ” United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir.1988)), and “must exist from facts and circumstances known to the officers at the moment of arrest. ” Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d at 1298 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, probable cause may be based on the collective knowledge of the police officers…