Burris

Burris v. Barnhart

Good Law
59 F. App'x 973
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMarch 21, 2003No. 01-36110; D.C. No. CV-00-01789-ALA(CO)California357 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s step four determination that the claimant is not disabled because she has the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. Because we affirm the denial of benefits at step four, we need not reach the question whether the ALJ erred at step five in the sequential analysis.

The ALJ provided specific, cogent reasons for rejecting Ms. Burris’ subjective pain testimony and these reasons are both clear and convincing. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.1996) (as amended). As a result, the ALJ was not required to include Ms. Burris’ subjective limitations in the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir.2001). The ALJ also was not required to take account of any psychological factors that may exacerbate Ms. Burris’ pain, “because pain is subjective and depends on the credibility of the claimant.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir.2002).

The ALJ did not err in finding that Ms. Burris has past relevant work experience as a community resource aide. The record supports the…

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