Madrigal-Rodriguez

MEMORANDUM **

1. Although the delay between defendant’s indictment and arraignment triggers Sixth Amendment scrutiny, his right to a speedy trial was not violated: The delay was not exceptionally long; it did not affect the fairness of defendant’s prosecution; defendant was already incarcerated as a result of his state sentence; and he didn’t miss the chance for a concurrent sentence because he wouldn’t have gotten one anyway, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.B, cmt. n. 6. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992).

2. Defense counsel’s request for a continuance, which saved the government from violating the Speedy Trial Act or the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, was not objectively unreasonable under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), because we can think of a strategic reason, consistent with the current record, as to why counsel might have made the request: Moving to dismiss could have jeopardized the “fast track” plea offer, which the government might have removed from the table, had defendant been re-indicted after a possible dismissal without prejudice, see 18…