Brown

MEMORANDUM ***

We ordinarily give wide berth to district courts in imposing sanctions, consistent ■with the Supreme Court’s approval of the inherent power of district courts to assess attorney’s fees “when a party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’ ” Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 , 111 S.Ct. 2123 , 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 , 95 S.Ct. 1612 , 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975)); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 , 100 S.Ct. 2455 , 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980).

The government argues that we should follow United States v. Seltzer, 227 F.3d 36 (2d Cir.2000), that bad faith is only required when a court imposes attorney’s fees, in particular, as a sanction, or when counsel is sanctioned for “conduct that is *166 integrally related to the attorney’s role as an advocate.” Id. at 40 . However, we have consistently held that bad faith is required whenever courts invoke inherent powers to sanction, regardless of the form of the sanction or whether the conduct in question was advocacy-related. See Fink v. Gomez, 289 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.2001) (“In reviewing…