Blackhurst

concurring.

I concur in the result of the majority disposition. I part from the majority because it holds that Blackhurst has failed to demonstrate that he was mentally ill during the relevant time period. To the contrary, the district court held, “The court does not doubt that petitioner suffered from an antisocial and/or mixed personality disorder during the relevant time period (1996 and 1997).” The district court did not clearly err, and so its finding of fact cannot be reversed. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999). Surprisingly, the majority determines that the district court itself found that Blackhurst was not mentally ill. Because I am bound by the district court’s explicit findings to the contrary, I cannot join.

In footnote 3, the majority points out that the district court stated that it accepted the magistrate judge’s factual findings. But what do we do with this general statement when the district court makes its own specific finding that plainly contradicts the magistrate judge’s finding? We are not at liberty to pick and choose which finding we shall review. 1 Are we to assume that the district court did not mean what it stated? I suggest we must…

MEMORANDUM **

Michael Blackhurst, a state prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial as time-barred of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.

Blackhurst is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because he has failed to show that his failure to file a timely petition was due to anything other than his own neglect. 2 See Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir.1998) (stating that equitable tolling focuses on the plaintiffs excusable ignorance of the limitations period and is “not available to avoid the consequences of one’s own negligence”). Blackhurst has submitted no evidence and made no allegation that his ignorance of the AEDPA filing deadline was “caused by circumstances beyond [his] control.” Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); cf. Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that “it is well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing’ ” of a habeas petition) (quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174…