DISCUSSION

At the outset, we observe that Alvarez is not entitled to special treatment by this court even though he is representing himself without the assistance of an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Rather, we are required to hold him to the same standards as a practicing attorney. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) While the implications of this rule may be harsh, it is not intended to penalize self-represented litigants. Instead, it is necessary to maintain the stability and smooth operation of the courts. As recognized by the Supreme Court in Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, “it is settled that: ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Id. at p. 564, original italics; see also Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [forbidding reversal of judgment absent a showing of error that “has resulted in a miscarriage of justice”].) It is an appellant’s fundamental burden to overcome this presumption by affirmatively demonstrating error, which necessarily includes providing a record supporting such error. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296; Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 (Foust).) Failure to provide an adequate record requires resolution of the appeal against the appellant. (Foust, supra, at p. 187.) Here, Alvarez summarily argues the superior court acted without jurisdiction because “there’s no evidence of the tangible (a man) living in the intangible (city of

2 CLEAR LAKE, CALIFORNIA),” that “man” falls outside of the definition of “Person” under “California [Civil] Code section 1798.3(f),”2 and that the court erred in determining he was the biological father of A.A. However, Alvarez fails to provide an adequate record to review these claims. Rather, the record is devoid of any pleadings or documentary evidence offered by the Department in this matter. This alone compels denial of his appellate claims. (See Maria P. v. Riles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1295-1296; Foust, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 187.) Further, a review of the reporter’s transcript provided in the limited record compiled on appeal reveals that Alvarez provided a voluntary declaration of paternity in 2015, and admitted to the court that he lived in Clear Lake, California. Accordingly, Alvarez’s claims of superior court error necessarily fail.

DISPOSITION

The superior court ruling is affirmed.

KRAUSE , J.

We concur:

ROBIE , Acting P. J.

DUARTE , J.

2 Civil Code section 1798.3, subdivision (f) defines “ ‘person’ ” for purposes of the Information Practices Act of 1977 as “any natural person, corporation, partnership, limited liability company, firm, or association.” Even if this code section applied, we are not convinced that a “man” should be excluded from this definition.

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