Opinion by Judge THOMPSON; Dissent by Judge KLEINFELD.

Harry Hurston was injured while working as a pile driver on a pier built and used exclusively for processing oil. McGray Construction Co. (“McGray”), Hurston’s employer at the time, petitions for review of the Benefits Review Board decision and order granting Hurston benefits under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 44 Stat. 1424 , as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 ed.).

This case requires us to interpret the “status” requirement of 33 U.S.C. § 902 (3). This section of the LHWCA restricts coverage to injured employees “engaged in maritime employment.”

We conclude that Hurston’s work repairing a pier was not itself “maritime employment” under section 902(3) because it did not facilitate the loading, unloading, repair or building of vessels. Nevertheless, we hold Hurston was “engaged in maritime employment” under section 902(3) by virtue of his overall occupation as a marine diver. Thus, Hurston satisfied the status requirement and we affirm the Benefits Review Board’s award of benefits under the LHWCA.

I

FACTS

In March 1985, Harry Hurston was working as a pile driver on Elwood Pier No. 1 for McGray Construction Company. He was helping to repair and replace sheet piling on the seaward sides of the pier. He was injured when a 1,000 pound sheet pile fell from a crane, landed on him, and left him permane'ntly disabled.

Hurston filed a disability claim under the LHWCA against McGray and its workers compensation insurer, Beaver Insurance Company. McGray voluntarily paid Hurston benefits under the state workers compensation law, but contested liability under the LHWCA.

To qualify for benefits under the LHWCA, an injured worker must satisfy two requirements: (1) the “situs” requirement, 33 U.S.C. § 903 (a), and (2) the “status” requirement, 33 U.S.C. § 902 (3). See Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264-65 , 97 S.Ct. 2348, 2357-58 , 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977). In a prior published opinion, we held that Hurston satisfied the situs requirement because his injury occurred on Elwood Pier No. 1, “an adjoining pier” within the meaning of section 903(a). 1 See Hurston v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs, 989 F.2d 1547, 1547-48 (9th Cir.1993). We concluded that an “adjoining pier” is any structure built on pilings extending from land to navigable water, regardless of the structure’s function. Id. at 1549-50 . Because Hurston met the situs requirement, we remanded the case to the Benefits Review Board to determine whether he also met the Act’s status requirement. Id. at 1553 .

On remand, the Board concluded that Hurston satisfied the status requirement in two different ways. First, it held that Hurston’s work on Elwood Pier No. 1 itself constituted “maritime employment” and was sufficient to confer status. Second, it held that regardless of whether Hurston’s work on Elwood Pier No. 1 was “maritime employment,” his overall employment history was sufficient to confer upon him maritime status because he spent the vast majority of his total working life engaged in indisputably maritime work.

*1028 In this petition for review, McGray contends Hurston did not satisfy the “status” requirement by virtue of his work on Elwood Pier No. 1, and that any status he may have earned by engaging in maritime work for past employers is not “transferable” to his nonmaritime employment by McGray on the day he was injured.

II

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the Benefits Review Board’s decision for “errors of law and adherence to the substantial evidence standard.” Port of Portland v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs, 932 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir.1991). Because the Benefits Review Board is not a policy making body, we give no special deference to its interpretation of the LHWCA. Id. However, we “accord ‘considerable weight’ to the construction of the statute urged by the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, as he is charged with administering it.” Force v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Dep’t of Labor, 938 F.2d 981, 983 (9th Cir.1991); Port of Portland, 932 F.2d at 838 ; McDonald v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 897 F.2d 1510, 1512 (9th Cir.1990). But, we will “not defer to an agency position which is contrary to an intent of Congress expressed in unambiguous terms.” Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 , 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594 , 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992).

III

DISCUSSION

The status requirement of section 902(3) limits coverage to “employees,” defined as those engaged in “maritime employment.” 33 U.S.C. § 902 (3). Section 902(3) provides in pertinent part:

33 U.S.C. § 902 (3). 2 By use of the term “including,” Congress indicated that the list' of specified occupations is not exclusive. Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414 , 423 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1421 , 1427 n. 9, 84 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).

A person is “engaged in maritime employment” under the Act if (1) he is engaged in maritime work at the moment of his injury, or, (2) regardless of whether he is engaged in maritime work at the moment of his injury, he spends at least some of his working time for his employer engaged in maritime work. See P.C. Pfeiffer Co., Inc. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 , 83 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. 328 , 337 n. 18, 62 L.Ed.2d 225 (1979); Northeast Marine, 432 U.S. at 273-74 , 97 S.Ct. at 2361-63 ; Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 516 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc).

A. Hurston’s Work Repairing Elwood Pier No. 1

We turn first to the question whether Hurston was “engaged in maritime employment” by virtue of his work repairing Elwood Pier No. 1. The question is difficult because Congress failed to define the term “maritime employment” in the text of the Act or its legislative history. See Northeast Marine, 432 U.S. at 265 , 97 S.Ct. at 2357-58 . Nonetheless, Supreme Court precedent and the legislative history to the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA suggest that the work Hurston was doing on the pier when he was injured was not itself “maritime employment” within the meaning of the Act.

The Supreme Court has explained that coverage under the Act is limited to those whose work facilitates the loading, unloading, repair or construction of vessels:

Northeast Marine, 432 U.S. at 266-67 , 97 S.Ct. at 2358-59 (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted). 3

Of all the Supreme Court cases to address the meaning of “maritime employment,” Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. 414 , 105 S.Ct. 1421 , is the most analogous to this ease. The Court in Herb’s Welding explained:

Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 423-24 , 105 S.Ct. at 1427-28 (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted).

In Herb’s Welding , the claimant Gray was injured while working on an oil drilling platform located in Louisiana waters. Id. at 416-417 , 105 S.Ct. at 1423-24 . He worked on a set of platforms as a welder, building and maintaining pipelines and the platforms themselves. Id. at 425 , 105 S.Ct. at 1428 . The Court held Gray was not engaged in maritime employment because:

Id.

Like Gray’s work repairing the oil drilling platforms, Hurston’s work was unre *1030 lated to the loading or unloading of ships. Ships do not dock at Elwood Pier No. 1. Elwood Pier No. 1 is a rectangular structure built on pilings extending from land to sea in the Santa Barbara, California channel. It is entirely on the beach at low tide and extends partly into the ocean at high tide. Oil well fluids produced from a nearby structure, Elwood Pier No. 2, are piped to Elwood Pier No. 1, where automated equipment separates the bulk fluid into water, gas, and crude oil. The gas is vented into the air. The water flows naturally back into hydroearbonized water. The crude oil is stored in a tank located on the pier until it is pumped through a pipeline, on a weekly basis, approximately three miles to the Elwood Marine Terminal. At the Elwood Marine Terminal, the crude oil is mixed with crude oil produced from other oil wells, and every five to ten days is pumped to an offshore barge to be shipped to Los Angeles or Benicia to be refined.

The pier is used exclusively for processing and transporting oil, a nonmaritime activity. As noted in Herb’s Welding , “there is nothing inherently maritime” about repairing a structure used for processing oil, even where the structure is a pier. See id.

Nor did Hurston’s exposure to the sea while working on the pier confer maritime status upon him. In Herb’s Welding , the Court stated that to the extent Gray was on or near the water and faced maritime hazards, “it is relevant to ‘situs,’ not ‘status.’ ... [T]o classify Gray’s employment as maritime because he was on a covered situs or in a ‘maritime environment’ would blur together requirements Congress intended to be distinct.” Id. at 425-26 , 105 S.Ct. at 1428 (internal citations omitted).

Hurston would be covered under the Act if he had been a “harbor worker” at the time of his injury. He was not a “harbor worker” within the meaning of the Act, however, because only a worker who builds or repairs a structure used to facilitate maritime commerce or navigation is such a harbor worker. We look to whether the structure being worked on had any functional relationship to maritime commerce, navigation or construction. See Laspragata v. Warren George, Inc., 21 BRBS 132, _ (1988), 1988 WL 232727 , *3 (Ben.Rev.Bd.); Rhodes v. Healy Tibbits Construction Co., 9 BRBS 605 (1979). Here, it did not.

In sum, Hurston’s work repairing Elwood Pier No. 1 was not itself “maritime employment” under the Act.

B. Hurston’s Work History

Because Hurston’s particular work on the pier was not itself “maritime employment,” whether Hurston satisfied the Act’s “status” requirement depends on whether he was “engaged in maritime employment” by virtue of his overall employment history. It is settled law that a worker regularly assigned both maritime and nonmaritime tasks by the same employer has maritime status under section 902(3) even if the worker’s activity at the moment of injury was not maritime in nature. See Northeast Marine, 432 U.S. at 273 , 97 S.Ct. at 2361-62 ; Schwabenland v. Sanger Boats, 683 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir.1982); Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 516 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc).

We have never considered, however, whether a worker may satisfy the Act’s requirement of maritime status by virtue of his overall work history, including his work for past employers, when his injury occurs while working at a particular nonmaritime job.

The ALJ and the Benefits Review Board determined that Hurston’s overall employment history, ninety percent of which consisted of marine diving, was sufficient to satisfy the maritime status requirement under the Act even though Hurston was injured while performing nonmaritime work. We agree.

When interpreting the meaning of a statute, we begin by examining its language. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 , 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056 , 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). The language of section 902(3) states that the LHWCA covers “any person engaged in maritime employment” who is injured on a covered situs. It is unclear from this language whether a worker is “engaged in maritime employment” only if he has at least some maritime job responsibilities for his *1031 employer at the time of his injury, or whether he is also “engaged in maritime employment” if he has no maritime job responsibilities for his employer at the time of his injury, but maritime employment is his profession and he regularly and customarily performs maritime work for other employers. The Director of the OWCP urges us to adopt the latter, broader interpretation.

The statute’s language is ambiguous. As a result, “[w]e accord ‘considerable weight’ to the construction of the statute urged by the Director ... as he is charged with administering it.” Force v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Dep’t of Labor, 938 F.2d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 1991). If an ambiguous statute “is easily susceptible to the Director’s interpretation, we need go no further.” Id. at 984 . Here, the language of the statute is not “easily susceptible to the Director’s interpretation.” Accordingly, we go further.

The Supreme Court directs us to interpret coverage under the Act expansively. “The language of the 1972 Amendments is broad and suggests that we should take an expansive view of the extended coverage.” Northeast Marine, 432 U.S. at 268 , 97 S.Ct. at 2359 . “The Act must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.” Id. at 268 , 97 S.Ct. at 2359 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has been consistent in this approach.

After Congress extended LHWCA coverage in 1972 to certain land-based workers, the Court held that a worker need not be engaged in maritime employment at the time of his injury to be covered under the Act so long as at least some of his employment was maritime in nature. See P.C. Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 83 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. at 337 n. 18; Northeast Marine, 432 U.S. at 273-74 , 97 S.Ct. at 2361-63 . The Court reasoned that a different interpretation would “revitalize the shifting and fortuitous coverage that Congress intended to eliminate” because an employee might be covered while performing one task and excluded from coverage while performing another task that same day. Northeast Marine, 432 U.S. at 274 , 97 S.Ct. at 2362-63 .

The Director’s broad interpretation seems particularly appropriate here because Hurston, like many marine workers, was hired by McGray out of the hiring hall of the Carpenters, Pile Drivers, Rig Builders, Tenders, and Divers Union. Marine workers hired in this fashion regularly work for different employers in short stints, some maritime some not. There is no reason why workers with essentially maritime occupations who work one-day or short-term jobs should not be entitled to the same consistent coverage as those with long-term jobs. Hurston’s regular occupation was deep sea diving. He dove in the North Sea, the Coral Sea, the South China Sea, the North and South Pacific, the Bay of Bengal and Cook Inlet, Alaska. Most of his diving, however, took place in and around the waters of the Santa Barbara Channel off the coast of California. He was injured the fourth day he worked on the pier. Immediately preceding this job, he had been engaged in his regular marine employment as a diver, and he was scheduled to begin another diving job when his work on the pier ended.

We have recently held that to determine whether someone has “seaman status” for the purposes of the Jones Act, we consider all work performed by the claimant during the entire relevant period, not just the work he was doing at the time he was injured. Papai v. Harbor Tug and Barge Co., 67 F.3d 203, 206 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 36 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1996). We explained:

Papai 67 F.3d at 206 .

This same analysis applies in determining whether an injured worker has maritime status under section 902(3) of the LHWCA. Because the marine diving work Hurston customarily performed is maritime employment under section 902(3), 4 he should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry operates under a daily assignment system.

This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s consideration of the injured claimant’s overall employment history in Northeast Marine. There, the claimant, Ralph Caputo, was a member of a regular longshoring “gang” that worked for one employer. Northeast Marine, 432 U.S. at 254 , 97 S.Ct. at 2352 . When his gang was not needed, Caputo went to the waterfront hiring hall, where he was hired by the day by other stevedoring companies or terminal operators. Id. at 254-55 , 97 S.Ct. at 2352-53 . On the day of his injury, Caputo was hired by Northeast Marine as a terminal laborer. Id. A terminal laborer may be assigned to load and unload containers, lighters, barges, and trucks. Id. When Caputo arrived at the terminal, he was assigned to help load consignees’ trucks with cargo that had already been off loaded from ships at Northeast’s terminal. Id. Caputo was injured while rolling a dolly loaded with cheese into a consignee’s truck. Id.

The Court held that, whether or not transporting cheese from the dock to the truck was itself maritime employment, Caputo was clearly covered under the act by virtue of his overall occupation as a longshoreman. The Court explained,

Id. at 273-74 , 97 S.Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis added). Thus, in considering Caputo’s rele *1033 vant “employment,” the Court considered both his actual work and his potential duties with his employer at the time of his injury, as well as his “regular” duties with his stevedoring gang which were performed for a different employer.

■ Applying the Northeast Marine analysis, Hurston is entitled to coverage. While his job duties with McGray on the particular occasion of his injury were limited to nonmaritime duties, since 1958 Hurston spent 90% of his working time as a marine diver and 10% as a pile driver. All but one of his pile driving jobs (the job during which he was injured) were performed afloat.

Further, McGray had reason to know Hurston was engaged in the profession of maritime work when McGray hired him. McGray hired Hurston out of the marine divers union hiring hall. Hurston was regularly eligible for assignment through the hiring hall to indisputably maritime employment. Indeed, he had worked for McGray on a prior occasion as a deep sea diver, an indisputably maritime job. See Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. at 324, 103 S.Ct. at 650-51. When the union had no diving job to dispatch him to, Hurston accepted this job with McGray. He should not be denied coverage under the Act because he happened to be injured while temporarily engaged in non-maritime work. Hurston’s overall occupation was clearly maritime in nature.

McGray argues it is unreasonable that a land-based employer such as itself should have to pay longshore benefits to an employee hired to perform exclusively nonmaritime work, simply because the employee has spent most of his working time engaged in an indisputably maritime occupation. We disagree. The goal of the 1972 amendments was to provide consistent coverage for those who spend some portion of their employment in indisputably maritime work and those engaged in maritime occupations. Northeast Marine, 432 U.S. at 273-74 , 97 S.Ct. at 2361-2363 . This goal would be undermined if maritime workers such as Hurston, who customarily spend the vast majority of their working lives in indisputably maritime work, lost coverage under the LHWCA simply because on a given day — the day of an injury— they happened to be engaged in nonmaritime work. Such “walking in and out of coverage on a daily basis” would be particularly inappropriate here where the employer, McGray, hired Hurston from a hiring hall that regularly dispatched workers to marine employment jobs, and the employer knew Hurston was a marine diver.

IV

CONCLUSION

We conclude Hurston satisfied the status requirement of 33 U.S.C. § 902 (3) and is therefore eligible for benefits under the LHWCA. Although Hurston’s work on Elwood Pier No. 1 at the time he was injured was not itself “maritime employment” because it had no relationship to the loading, unloading, repair or building of vessels, Hurston was “engaged in maritime employment” under the Act by virtue of his overall occupation as a marine diver.

AFFIRMED.

. Section 903(a) of the Act, which defines the situs requirement, provides:

33 U.S.C. § 903 (a).

. Section 902(3) goes on to list several examples of individuals who are not engaged in maritime employment, none of which is relevant here. See 33 U.S.C. § 902 (3).

. The Committee Report referred to provides:

H.R.Rep. No. 1441, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.1972, p. 4708. (Emphasis added).

. Deep sea divers are "engaged in maritime employment” under the Act because the Supreme Court has held that "when a worker is injured on the actual navigable waters in the course of his employment on those waters, he satisfies the status requirement in § 2(3), and is covered under the LHWCA.” Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 324 , 103 S.Ct. 634, 650-51 , 74 L.Ed.2d 465 (1983). This assumes, of course, that he is the employee of a statutory "employer” and is not excluded by any other provision of the Act. Id.