Plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendant the sum of $909 for the reason set forth in the complaint as follows:

As and for a Separate, Further and Second Cause against the said defendant, the plaintiff alleges:

*Supp. 847 The defendant answered as follows:

The municipal court made findings as follows:

Prom the foregoing Pacts the Court concludes:

The court then entered judgment for the defendant. The appellant appeals and as grounds of appeal, the appellant claims first that the defendant was not available for work as required by law. Second, by reason of his engaging in a part-time beehive business and selling some honey and probably making a little profit and wilfully misrepresenting or suppressing these facts as to his income. Also, something is claimed about the defendant being, an independent contractor. We will dispose of this matter first because we do not think by any stretch of interpretation he could have been an independent contractor. See syllabus, R. W. Riskin v. Industrial Acc. Com., 23 Cal.2d 248 [ 144 P.2d 16 ]. “An independent contractor is one who renders service in the course of an independent employment or occupation, following his employer’s desires only in the result of the work and not the means whereby it is to be accomplished, whereas the relationship of employer and employee exists whenever the employer retains the right to control or direct how the work shall be done as well as the result to be accomplished.”

It is elementary that evidence must support the findings and that the findings must support the judgment. In this ease as the facts have shown by the findings there is practically no conflict in the evidence. The defendant did engage in the part-time bee business. However, the court found that notwithstanding that he was available for work as required by law. In deciding whether the evidence supports the findings we can only consider the evidence most favorable to the findings together with every inference to be reasonably drawn therefrom. As Mr. Justice Me Comb stated in Marson v. Rand, 107 Cal.App.2d 466 [ 237 P.2d 18 ], “It is not the province of a reviewing court to present, by way of opinion, a detailed argument on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment. ’ ’ A reviewing court will- not hold unsupported the trial court’s findings merely because it might reasonably draw different inferences from those the trial court reasonably drew. The question in this case, at least on this branch, is factual. There is evidence argued, at length here by the appellant, that would have supported contrary findings, but we may not review the find *Supp. 851 ings of the trial court and substitute findings of our own even though we might arrive at a different conclusion, the trial court having found the evidence to weigh more heavily against the plaintiff. See Murphy v. Ablow, 123 Cal.App.2d 853 [ 268 P.2d 80 ].

Again in the Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221 [ 143 P.2d 689 ], we find the following: “Estate of Barr (1924), 69 Cal.App. 16, 33 [ 230 P. 181 ]. The rule as to our province is: ‘In reviewing the evidence ... all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an elementary . . . principle of law, that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the jury. When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. ’ Crawford v. Southern Pac. Co. (1935), 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ], The rule quoted is as applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when considering a jury’s verdict. The critical word in the definition is ‘substantial’; it is a door which can lead as readily to abuse as to practical or enlightened justice. It is common knowledge among judges and lawyers that many cases are determined to the entire satisfaction of trial judges or juries on their factual issues, by evidence which is overwhelming in its persuasiveness but which may appear relatively unsubstantial—if it can be reflected at all—in a phonographic record. Appellate courts, therefore, if there be any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding, should resolve that doubt in favor of the finding; and in searching the record and exploring the inferences which may arise from what is found there, to discover whether such doubt or conflict exists, the court should be realistic and practical.”

Under the rule of law above quoted we cannot. hold that any material finding in this case is unsupported by the evidence. The appellant here makes a. long argument on the effect of the amendment to the statute after the decision in the Nest case. People v. Nest (1942), 53 Cal.App.2d Supp. 856 [ 128 P.2d 444 ]; to section 9.2 there was added other legislation effective in 1949, the following significant amendment: “For the purpose of this section only, the term ‘wages’ in- *Supp. 852 eludes any and all compensation for personal services whether performed as an employee or as an independent contractor.” We have here held that the defendant was not an independent contractor, and the evidence certainly shows that he was not an employee. He was employed by himself, but there is nothing in this amendment that would prevent him from being self-employed if he were likewise available for work.

Appellant argues there is a loophole in the law, and this may very well be, but it is not the province of the court to legislate. If the Legislature wants to require a self-employed individual to report his earnings, that is a very simple matter for the Legislature to cover. The rules of interpretation as to statutes are well-known and are set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure, sections 1858 to 1860, inclusive. In other words, it is not the court’s province to put in something that isn’t in the statute or to take out something that is there.

“Where a statute enumerates the persons or things to be affected by its provisions, there is an implied exclusion of others.” McGahey v. Forrest, 109 Cal. 63 [ 41 P. 817 ] and People v. Boyle, 13 Cal.App. 611 [ 110 P. 458 ], Mackey v. Mott, 25 Cal.App. 110 [ 142 P. 1082 ], these cases and others are cited in the case of In re Haines, 195 Cal. 605 [ 234 P. 883 ].

And as to the defendant wilfully omitting to report his income from the bee business we think that this charge must fall because under the facts of this case, the court having found that he was available for work under the law, it wasn’t material that he report his earnings from the bee business or mention the bee business. The questions that a person applying for unemployment insurance must answer can’t be any broader than the statute that provides for unemployment insurance. We have not discussed the evidence at length because it would serve no useful purpose. We have set out the pleadings and findings and there is no conflict in the facts, but only the inferences to be drawn therefrom, which is the province of the trial court.

The judgment is affirmed.

Bradshaw, J., and Main, J., concurred.