Opinion

I. Statement of the Case and Factual Background

Defendant was cited for violation of Beverly Hills Municipal Code section 3-6.2205(a). That ordinance is part of a legislative scheme establishing preferential parking zones in designated sections of the City of Beverly Hills. The pertinent sections of the ordinance read:

II. Issues

After a plea of guilty, defendant challenges by a clerk’s transcript appeal the constitutionality of section 3-6.2205 of the Beverly Hills Municipal Code on the following grounds:

III. Discussion

A. Equal Protection Clause—Strict Scrutiny Test

Defendant contends that the ordinance under discussion must be judged by the strict equal protection test, i.e., must be shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Defendant posits the ordinance impinges on her “right to travel,” a fundamental right. We disagree. Defendant equates the denial of the right to park on certain designated streets in Beverly Hills with denial of the right to travel from city to city, or state to state. Such reasoning is analogous to the faulty reasoning adopted by appellant in Ector v. City of Torrance (1973) 10 Cal.3d 129 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 ], wherein the court states at page 135:

In the sole authority which we have ascertained to be directly in point to the legal and factual issues before us, Arlington County Board v. Richards (1977) 434 U.S. 5 [ 54 L.Ed.2d 4 , 98 S.Ct. 24 ], a case involving the constitutionality of a preferential parking ordinance with similar stated purposes as the one before us, the United States Supreme Court at page 7 [ 54 L.Ed.2d at page 7 ] states:

The court’s footnote 3 provides: "3Restrictions on nonresident parking have sparked considerable litigation. See, e. g., South Terminial Corp. v. *Supp. 51 EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 671-676 (CA1 1974) (restrictions upheld); Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118, 1125 (CA2 1974) (restrictions upheld); Commonwealth v. Petralia, 372 Mass. 452 , 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977) (restrictions upheld); State v. Whisman, 24 Ohio Misc. 59 , 263 N.E.2d 411 (Ct. Com. Pleas, 1970) (restrictions invalidated); Georgetown Assn, of Businessmen v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 7242-76 (D. C. Super. Ct., Aug. 9, 1976) (restrictions preliminarily enjoined). The United States as amicus curiae notes that parking restrictions to discourage automobile commuting have been recommended by the Environmental Protection Agency to implement the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. See 38 Fed. Reg. 30629 (1973).”

Defendant attempts to circumvent the clear and definite holding in Arlington County Board v. Richards, supra, 34 by arguing that the right to park amounts to a fundamental right. She cites no authority for this position. In support of her allegation equating “travel” rights with “parking” privileges, defendant cites several cases which involve serious burdens upon the right to travel, and not inconsequential burdens. None of these cases involves parking. “The test is not whether the penalty imposed on the right to travel is the denial of a fundamental right, such as access to basic necessities or the right to vote. Instead, the test is whether the penalty is significant and consequential, rather than merely inconsequential as was the case in Adams, supra, 12 Cal.3d 55 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 247 , 524 P.2d 375 ].” (Bay Area Women’s Coalition v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 961, 969 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 591 ].) In Bay Area, cited by defendant, the court was considering the constitutionality of a five-year durational residency requirement for holding public office. The court held that under the “ ‘strict scrutiny test’ the City must establish that the durational residency requirements are reasonably necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Measured by this test these requirements cannot be upheld, and the City concedes this in its brief.” (P. 970.)

Defendant further cites People v. Beach (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 612 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 381 ] in support of her position that the ordinance before us impinges upon the “right to travel.” However, Beach involved an onerous condition of probation which required the defendant to relocate herself from the community where she had lived in her own home for 24 years.

In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 562 ], cited by defendant, involved a harsh and oppressive condition of probation pursuant to which defendant, convicted of prostitution, was provided with a map and was prohibited from being in a specified area of Fresno, at any time of the day or night.

*Supp. 52 In further support of the proposition that the use of public streets involves the fundamental constitutional right to travel, defendant cites the following language from Escobedo v. State of California (1950) 35 Cal.2d 870, 875-876 [ 222 P.2d 1 ]; “ ‘The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen . . . .’ ‘The use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right, of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived . . . .’ ”

In Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 566 , 634 P.2d 917 ], the court rejected the contention that the right to drive is a fundamental constitutional right. At pages 78-79, the Hernandez court states; “Past California cases, however, provide no support whatsoever for plaintiff’s contention. Over 30 years ago, in Escobedo v. State of California (1950) 35 Cal.2d 870 [ 222 P.2d 1 ] (overruled on other grounds in Rios v. Cozens (1972) 7 Cal.3d 792 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 299 , 499 P.2d 979 ]), our court—while acknowledging the great importance of driving—at the same time explicitly emphasized that ‘it is . . . well established . . . that usage of the highways is subject to reasonable regulation for the public good .... “The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its constant dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. . .

We conclude that the right to use city streets for the purpose of travel or parking is not in that category of fundamental rights subject to the strict scrutiny test under either Amendment XIV of the federal Constitution or article I, section 7 of the California Constitution. Upon the limited record before us, we find that Beverly Hills Municipal Code section 3-6.2205(a) on its face is not violative of either Amendment XIV of the federal Constitution or article I, section 7 of the California Constitution.

B. Privileges and Immunities Clause

Defendant next contends that Beverly Hills Municipal Code section 3-6.2205(a) violates the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution (art. IV, § 2) and the California Constitution (art. I, § 7, subd. (b)). Again, we disagree.

The California and United States privileges and immunities clauses call for the same analysis as called for by the equal protection provisions; “Article I, section 7, subdivision (b), provides: ‘A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens . . . .’ The cases decided under former article I, section 21, of the California Constitution regarding privileges and immunities es *Supp. 53 tablish that the classifications under that section, like the equal protection clause and the prohibitions against special legislation, are valid unless the classification is unreasonable or arbitrary. ” (Citation omitted, italics added.) (Durham v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 567, 574 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 243 ].)

Our determination herein that the ordinance before us differentiates between residents and nonresidents on a reasonable and rational basis and that a fundamental right is not involved eliminates lengthy discussion of defendant’s contention regarding a privileges and immunities clause violation. Further, the limited record before us does not reflect defendant to be an out-of-state resident and, thus, she has no standing to claim the benefit of the clause under either the California or federal Constitutions.

The judgment is affirmed.

Cooperman, J., concurred.