Opinion

Defendant and appellant, Balwant Singh, was convicted of a violation of Vehicle Code, section 22349, exceeding the maximum speed limit, and now appeals. In this appeal it is conceded that there was a posted, prima facie limit, that radar established defendant was traveling in excess of 65 miles per hour; and that the officer cited appellant for exceeding the maximum speed law, but did not cite him for exceeding the lower, posted, prima facie limit, Appellant’s position is that if there is a speed trap as to a posted limit, it is unlawful to enforce even the maximum speed limit. This appeal turns on the definition of “speed trap” contained in section 40802 of the Vehicle Code.

Stripped of the phrases which explain or expand on subjects not in issue here, the relevant portion of the statute in question reads:

The question we must answer is whether the emphasized “speed limit” means any speed limit for which the citation was issued, or rather, only those speed limits referenced in the antecedent portion of Vehicle Code, section 40802, subdivision (a)(2).

Appellant relies upon the persuasive effect of People v. Studley (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 461 ], a case with the same significant facts as this matter on appeal and in square agreement in its decision. In Studley , the court relied upon the legislative intent found in the entire *Supp. 16 legislative scheme regarding radar and found the radar evidence inadmissible: “[A]fter a close reading of the statutes in question, we find the Legislature’s antipathy toward any radar-based prosecution of any speed law violation in any posted zone, where the prima facie speed limit is not justified by proof of a timely engineering survey, is absolute and unequivocal.” (Id. at p. Supp. 3, italics omitted.)

On the other hand, the People rely on the persuasive effect of the precisely contrary interpretation of the speed trap laws as set forth in People v. DiFiore (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d Supp. 26 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 359 ]. DiFiore reasoned: “A person who drives in excess of the maximum lawful speed has not been subjected to a ‘speed trap’ even if his speed has been detected by radar on a posted road unless the officer relies on the posted or prima facie speed limit.” (Id. at p. Supp. 29.)

Faced with these contrary interpretations of Vehicle Code section 40802, this court engages in its own analysis of the statute, and follows the guidelines for construction and interpretation of a statute as explained in J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1575-1576 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 206 ]:

Examining the language of the section in question, we find “speed limit,” as that term is used with reference to enforcement, is not modified by “prima facie.” From this, appellant argues the section is ambiguous and, thus, consideration of legislative intent is necessary. However, such an interpretation would require us to read the statute as if it contained the all-inclusive, indefinite article “a,” i.e., “enforcement of a speed limit.” Notably, the Legislature chose the definite article “the” not the indefinite, and so, the statute reads, “enforcement of the speed limit.” (Veh. Code, § 40802, subd. (a)(2), italics added.)

Within the sentence under consideration, there is but one reference to “speed limit” to which the definite article may refer. The reference is to a subset of speed limits; namely, prima facie speed limits.

The literal meaning being clear, although the analysis arcane, no reference to a general purpose of the Legislature is required. “In summary: If an officer testifies only that he clocked a defendant on radar at a specified speed in excess of [the maximum speed limit], no ‘speed trap’ is involved, and the anti-speed-trap laws do not apply. If, however, that officer relies on a prima facie or posted speed limit, that officer is incompetent as a witness and any evidence concerning the vehicle’s speed is inadmissible unless an adequate survey is introduced.” (People v. DiFiore, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at pp. Supp. 29-30, fn. omitted.)

The judgment is affirmed.

*Supp. 18 Appendix

Vehicle Code section 40802.

(a) A “speed trap” is either of the following:

(b) (1) For purposes of this section, a local street or road is defined by the latest functional usage and federal-aid system maps submitted to the federal Highway Administration, except that when these maps have not been submitted, or when the street or road is not shown on the maps, a “local street or road” means a street or road that primarily provides access to abutting residential property and meets the following three conditions:

(2) For purposes of this section “school zone” means that area approaching or passing a school building or the grounds thereof that is contiguous to a highway and on which is posted a standard “SCHOOL” warning sign, while children are going to or leaving the school either during school hours or during the noon recess period. “School zone” also includes the area approaching or passing any school grounds that are not separated from the highway by a fence, gate, or other physical barrier while the grounds are in use by children if that highway is posted with a standard “SCHOOL” warning sign.

*Supp. 19 (c)(1) When all of the following criteria are met, paragraph (2) of this subdivision shall be applicable and subdivision (a) shall not be applicable:

(2) A “speed trap" is either of the following:

Before McNatt, P. J., Sueyres and Harrington, JJ.