dissenting:

In this case, the court faces- two extremely important issues that warrant our most thorough consideration. The positions advanced by the government on both constitutional questions are remarkable and should be examined with the greatest of care. In doing so, we should bear in mind that what the government tells us it can do to a foreign citizen in this ease, it can just as easily do to a United States citizen in the next. 1

First, the government maintains that when a foreign country simply suggests that it is considering requesting extradition, the United States government can arrest the person without a showing of probable cause and keep him locked up for months without bail. This position is at odds "with one of our most basic constitutional principles — that the government cannot seize a person off the streets (or from a lawyer’s office) and deny him his liberty without first showing probable cause to believe he has engaged in criminal activity. The government’s contention that probable cause in the context of a provisional arrest is merely probable cause to believe that a foreign country has issued an arrest warrant is plainly incorrect. Such a showing would never, in any other circumstances, suffice to support the arrest of a person in this country, and there is no reason why it should suffice in the case of provisional arrests.

*512 As to the bail issue, the government relies on cryptic language in an ambiguous case written by the Supreme Court almost 100 years ago for its argument that an almost irrebuttable presumption against bail exists in extradition cases. See Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 , 23 S.Ct. 781 , 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903). By failing to address the government’s argument, we leave this circuit’s law on the bail issue exactly where it was before this case — in total disarray. See, e.g., In re Kirby, 106 F.3d 855 (9th Cir.1996) (finding special circumstances existed for the remarkable reason that the potential extraditees, IRA terrorists, “enjoy the sympathy and are objects of concern of many Americans”).

The fallacy in the government’s positions is amply demonstrated in the panel’s majority opinions, which I adopt in full; they still accurately set forth the law. Notwithstanding the compelling nature of the constitutional issues, however, the majority has avoided deciding them by invoking the fugitive disen-titlement doctrine under the most unusual of circumstances. Because the doctrine is inapplicable to the circumstances presented here, it is this court’s duty to reach the merits of the case. Accordingly, I dissent.

I briefly review the procedural history of this case in order to demonstrate why applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in this case is unusual and serves no purpose. On October 18, 1995, Giancarlo Parretti was arrested by federal agents, pursuant to a warrant issued by a United States Magistrate Judge on the basis of allegations that an international warrant had been issued against him in France. On the basis of a letter from the government of France indi- ' eating that it would seek Parretti’s extradition, the magistrate judge denied bail and ordered that he be detained pending the extradition hearing. Parretti filed a petition for habeas corpus in the district court, arguing that his prolonged detention was unconstitutional. On November 9, the district court denied the petition.

Soon thereafter, Parretti filed an emergency motion with this court. On November 21, after -Parretti had been incarcerated for 33 days, a panel of this court heard oral argument and ordered his immediate release on two independent grounds. First, the panel found that Parretti’s arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because it was effected without a showing of probable cause to believe that he had committed an extraditable offense. Second, the panel concluded that Parretti’s continued detention violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process because the district court specifically found that he presented neither a risk of flight nor a danger to the community. In a published opinion issued subsequently, the panel elaborated fully on its reasons for granting Par-retti’s emergency motion.

After the panel issued its order, but prior to the time the panel issued its full opinion, the district court implemented the order and Parretti was released on bail. Eight days after his reiease, the government, at the behest of France, filed a formal request for Parretti’s extradition, at which time the district court made the requisite probable cause finding. The government did not, however, seek to have Parretti taken into federal custody again. Instead, sometime afterwards, jurisdiction over Parretti was assumed by the state of Delaware. He was then tried and convicted on criminal charges in a Delaware state court. Pending sentencing on these offenses, Parretti fled the Delaware court’s jurisdiction. Thereafter, the panel’s full opinion was released, and the government sought and we granted, at its suggestion, rehearing en banc because of the government’s objections to the content of the panel’s decision on the constitutional questions. Parretti has, of course, obtained all the relief he ever desired from the court and seeks nothing further.

In light of these procedural and factual circumstances, it is clear that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine has no applicability. Indeed, neither party has urged the court to invoke the doctrine and both parties agree that the doctrine has no relevance to the case. 2 The purpose of the doctrine is to deny *513 to those who have fled the court’s jurisdiction any benefits of the court system. Here, Parretti received all the relief he could possibly obtain prior to fleeing and he seeks no further benefit from the court. Our dismissal of the case will deny Parretti nothing — it is only the government that seeks relief now, and it seeks relief not from the order we issued, but from the precedential effect of our opinion on the serious constitutional questions that arise in many extradition cases. The fugitive disentitlement doctrine makes sense only when we deny the fugitive some form of relief from the court, not when we frustrate our own ability to resolve critical constitutional questions. In the words of the Supreme Court, as quoted by the majority, maj. op. at 510, the doctrine makes sense only as a “sanction” against the defendant. 3

As the majority’s opinion amply demonstrates, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is properly invoked only in cases in which the defendant seeks to benefit from the use of our limited judicial resources. That is not the case here. I therefore dissent.

. For a discussion of treaties permitting the extradition of United States citizens, see Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 785-86 (9th Cir.1997) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).

. Nor has either party argued mootness as a ground for dismissal, because as the majority’s opinion concedes, that doctrine is inapplicable. The circumstances in this case present a classic situation involving a constitutional question that is "capable of repetition,■ yet evading review.” *513 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-23 , 108 S.Ct. 592, 601-04 , 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). Because of the time limitations inherent in the brief provisional arrest period, any case involving such an arrest will become moot before it can run the normal judicial course. In this case, for example, which was originally filed as an emergency motion, the panel did not issue its order until Parretti had already been in jail for 33 days; however, the initial detention period would have expired seven days later.

In addition, there is a reasonable likelihood that Parretti could be subject to the same violation in the future. Although he is currently a fugitive, there is reason to expect that he may one day return to the United States. Parretti is, after all, an international financier with significant business interests in this country. And, if he returns, he will undoubtedly face another round of arrests. So far as the record reveals, incidentally, the government of France has never obtained jurisdiction over him. Accordingly, the case is not moot.

. The majority also relies on Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 724 , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1595-96 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting), for the proposition that dismissal is appropriate in light of the risk that "the adversary character of criminal litigation may be compromised when the defendant is a fugitive." Maj. op. at 511. Fortunately, that potential was not realized in this case, nor was it realized in Sharpe , in which the eight other Justices remained unpersuaded by that argument. See id, at 681 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. at 1573 n. 2 (noting that the Court ordered briefing from amicus curiae in opposition to the government's position). Here, Parretti’s counsel agreed to continue his representation in spite of his client's flight, and has served as the government's very able adversary throughout the litigation.