Opinion by Judge KOZINSKI; Dissent by Judge BRUNETTI; Dissent by Judge O’SCANNLAIN.

Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. We consider whether he was denied a fair trial because one of the jurors obtained her seat by lying during voir dire.

I

In 1980 Alfred Dyer and two friends took four hostages and drove them into the remote hills overlooking Oakland, California. They ordered the hostages out of the car and instructed them to lie down alongside the road. Dyer and an accomplice then shot all four; amazingly, two survived. Dyer admitted participating in the shootings but argued diminished capacity.

During voir dire the jurors had been asked the usual questions, including:

Jessica Freeland, the last prospective juror to be questioned, answered “no” to both questions. She was named as an alternate and eventually was seated as a juror and helped decide Dyer’s fate.

After the guilt-phase verdict, the defense learned that Freeland’s brother Richard had been shot and killed some six years earlier. When questioned by the trial judge, Free-land explained that she had answered “no” to question 13 because she thought the shooting was an accident, not a crime. The trial judge *973 accepted her explanation. The prosecutor-who had also prosecuted Richard Freeland’s killer-had just turned over to the court the file in that case. A quick review of the file would have disclosed that the killing had none of the earmarks of an accident: Richard, who was just seventeen, was pistol-whipped four times and then shot in the back of the head. The prosecutor said nothing, the judge did not examine the file and therefore remained unaware of the facts which undermined Freeland’s explanation. Freeland remained on the jury, which then sentenced Dyer to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed. See People v. Dyer, 45 Cal.3d 26 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 (1988).

On federal habeas, Dyer’s lawyers conducted an investigation of Jessica Freeland and discovered further evidence easting doubt on her veracity. The district court held an evi-dentiary hearing on the issue of juror bias but concluded that it was bound by the state court’s finding of impartiality and denied relief. A divided panel of this court affirmed. See Dyer v. Calderon, 122 F.3d 720 (9th Cir.1997). A majority of active judges subsequently voted to accept Dyer’s suggestion for rehearing en bane.

II

[1] A. The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a verdict by impartial, indifferent jurors. The bias or prejudice of even a single juror would violate Dyer’s right to a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.1977). One important mechanism for ensuring impartiality is voir dire, which enables the parties to probe potential jurors for prejudice. For voir dire to function, jurors must answer questions truthfully. Nevertheless, we must be tolerant, as jurors may forget incidents long buried in their minds, misunderstand a question or bend the truth a bit to avoid embarrassment. The Supreme Court has held that an honest yet mistaken answer to a voir dire question rarely amounts to a constitutional violation; even an intentionally dishonest answer is not fatal, so long as the falsehood does not bespeak a lack of impartiality. See McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 555-56 , 104 S.Ct. 845 , 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). 1 Accordingly, we must determine whether Freeland’s answers were dishonest and, if so, whether this undermined the impartiality of Dyer’s jury. 2

The state trial judge here held a brief hearing in chambers and found that Freeland was candid and impartial. The state clings to this finding, reminding us that juror impartiality is a question of historical fact. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 2885 , 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984). Moreover, state court fact findings are presumed to be correct; we may set them aside only in limited circumstances specified by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(l)-(d)(8) (1994). 3 Dyer argues that one of these circumstances applies to him, namely that “the material facts were not adequately developed” by the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(3) (1994).

B. Freeland’s candor first came into question after the jury found Dyer guilty of murder but before the start of the penalty phase. Freeland’s estranged husband, Melvin Provost, had been arrested for rape earlier that month. Although the details are murky, it seems that Dyer and Provost crossed paths in the courthouse jail and Provost told Dyer that Freeland’s brother had been shot and killed some years earlier. According to Dyer’s lawyer, Provost said that Freeland “had expressed strong views about *974 that event and the circumstances surrounding it.” The court turned down defense counsel’s request that Provost be called as a witness but encouraged counsel to investigate.

The next morning, just before the start of the penalty phase, the court returned to the question of Freeland’s bias. The prosecutor, Jerry Curtis, explained that he was familiar with the Richard Freeland homicide:

Curtis then handed the file over to the judge, who called Freeland into chambers.'

The judge asked Freeland if anyone in her family had been the victim of a homicide, and this time she answered yes. He then asked whether she was aware of any legal action taken, civil, criminal or otherwise. Freeland answered: “It was an accident. They didn’t let us know when the trial was going on so we don’t know what happened to the man that accidentally shot him.” This, she felt, justified her voir dire answer: “Well, if it was an accident I don’t think that’s really a crime, is it?” Freeland then explained why she thought the shooting was accidental:

(Emphasis added.)

Dyer’s lawyer asked Freeland if she had spoken to the police or to the District Attorney about the case, and she answered no. He then asked: “And no one from your family ever testified in court at all?” Free-land responded, “Oh, no.” The trial judge did not ask Freeland about her husband’s statement that she had “expressed strong views” about the shooting. Nor did he question Freeland about the fact that her husband was then in jail, which seemed to conflict with her answer to voir dire question 15. Provost himself was never questioned.

On the basis of this hearing, which seems to have lasted less than five minutes, the judge retained Freeland on the jury: “She has explained her answer [to the voir dire questions], and I would not characterize anything she did or did not do as demonstrating any lack of candor, as far as I’m concerned.” Was it plausible that Freeland could be so confused about the circumstances of her brother’s death? Yes, the judge explained:

(Emphasis added.) Why the judge thought he could not verify the details of the crime— even where it occurred — when he had the casefile in his hands, is a mystery.

[2] C. A court confronted with a colorable claim of juror bias must undertake an investigation of the relevant facts and circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(3) (1994); Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377, 379 , 76 S.Ct. 425 , 100 L.Ed. 435 (1956); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 230 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). An informal in camera hearing may be adequate for this purpose; due process requires only that all parties be represented, and that the investigation be reasonably calculated to resolve the doubts raised about the juror’s *975 impartiality. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982); United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 258 (1st Cir.1990). So long as the fact-finding process is objective and reasonably explores the issues presented, the state trial judge’s findings based on that investigation are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir.1990).

As a predicate for his ultimate finding that Freeland was not biased, the state judge found that Freeland did not “demonstrate[ ] any lack of candor” in response to voir dire questions 13 and 15. The judge did not explain his reasoning fully, but his comments suggest the following chain of logic:

Freeland’s relationship with her brother thus was the fulcrum of the judge’s finding that Freeland was candid. If Jessica and Richard were siblings in name only — if they were separated at birth and lived in distant cities — Freeland’s claim that she didn’t know exactly how her brother died would be plausible. 4 But Jessica and Richard were not estranged; in fact, they lived under the same roof, with their mother. As one would expect, Freeland attended her brother’s funeral. Their mother, moreover, testified at the preliminary hearing (there was no trial). , of Richard’s killer. At the time of the testimony, Jessica and her .mother were still living together. .Other readily available facts also suggest that the judge was wrong to infer that Jessica-.and her brother weren’t close. The criminal casefile noted that Freeland was a plaintiff in a civil suit against Richard’s killer. As a plaintiff in a wrongful death action, Freeland claimed she had suffered because of the death of her brother; this too suggests they -were close enough for her to know that the killer was charged with a crime.

In any event, Freeland never claimed she was estranged from her brother or that she, was unaware of how he died. Rather, she stated several times that she knew the details of the shooting and had reason to believe it was an- accident. See supra at 974. Whether her explanation was plausible — not whether she and her brother were close— was the key to determining if Freeland had lied during voir dire. The'actual facts of the crime were remarkably different from Free-land’s description: Richard was pistol-whipped four times and shot in the back of the head, much like Dyer’s own victims. It is inconceivable that Freeland, living under the same roof as Richard, their mother and two other siblings, could have been so confused..

Are these facts the state trial judge should have uncovered? We think so. If the judge thought that the plausibility , of Freeland’s explanation turned on how well she knew Richard, he could have asked her. Or he could have asked Curtis, the prosecutor. Or he could have examined the casefile, which showed that Freeland’s mother had testified at the preliminary hearing in the criminal proceeding, that Freeland herself was a plaintiff in the civil suit and that the shooter was charged with murder. 5 Or he could have *976 ordered Provost brought in to testify as to what he knew about Freeland’s relationship with her brother. Indeed, Provost had been reported as saying that Freeland had expressed strong feelings about' her brother’s killing — which was not only inconsistent with the nonchalance she displayed when questioned about it, but also bespoke bias on her part. 6 .

The judge did none of these things, leaving the matter in doubt: “We’re making a whole series of assumptions,” he said. But a judge investigating juror bias must find facts, not make assumptions, and here the key facts were easily discernible. A few questions to Jessica about her relationship with her brother; an examination of the casefile; a request for confirmation from the prosecutor; an-order to bring Provost into court — any or all of these would have disclosed that Free-land knew a lot more about her brother’s death than she was letting on. Perhaps the judge was lulled into a false sense of security by the prosecutor’s assurance that he was familiar with the Richard Freeland homicide; the judge might have understood the prosecutor’s silence as confirming that Jessica’s explanation was plausible. 7 In these circumstances, “it was the [trial] court’s obligation to develop the relevant facts on the record, not merely presume them.” United States v. Gaston-Brito, 64 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir.1995). The judge’s lack of .verve in pursuing the matter casts doubt on his findings.

To warrant setting aside the presumption of correctness, facts left undeveloped by the state court must be “material,” see 28 U.S.C. § ‘ 2254(d)(3), not trivial or tangential to the issue presented. Indeed, something more than the usual meaning of “material” seems to be required: The missing facts must be “crucial,” “vital” or “indispensable to a fair, rounded, development of the material facts.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 321-22 , 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); see also Thomas v. Zant, 697 F.2d 977, 986 (11th Cir.1983). What this means is that the evidence not discovered (that an adequate hearing would have discovered) must be so significant that a reasonable fact-finder could have decided the bias question differently if armed with this knowledge. In other words, there must be a material possibility that the judge would have made a different decision if he had been aware of the facts in question.

Is there a material possibility the state trial judge would have found that Freeland was not impartial had he considered all the facts readily available to him? We believe there is. Had he questioned Freeland about her relationship with her brother, the judge would have discovered that the siblings were, in fact, very close; he would have learned that they lived in the same household and that she attended his funeral. And, had the judge just cracked open the casefile, he would have learned that Freeland’s mother testified in the criminal proceeding and that Freeland herself was a plaintiff in the wrongful death action. All" this would have cast considerable doubt on Freeland’s explanation that she thought the killing was an accident and could well have shaken the judge’s confidence in Freeland’s veracity. And, once the trial judge determined that Freeland lied about her brother’s death, he might well have developed doubts about her impartiality.

The bias hearing was deficient in other ways as well. The trial judge left untouched Freeland’s negative answer to voir dire question 15: “Have ... any of your relatives or close friends ever been accused of any offense other than traffic cases?” The judge’s *977 failure to question Freeland about her husband’s criminal history is remarkable because the issue of Freeland’s potential bias arose when Dyer and Provost met in a jail cell during the trial. Situations where a juror’s husband lands in the same jail cell as the defendant are sufficiently rare and troublesome to merit a close look by the trial judge. 8 There may have been a legitimate explanation for Freeland’s failure to disclose that her husband was in jail, but the trial judge never put her to the test. Ten years later, in her deposition, Freeland claimed a fuzzy memory: “When I found out [Provost] was in trouble either the ease was already over or we were already past voir dire.” But Provost had been arrested a full month before the trial, and Freeland paid him a visit. Had she been asked about this at the time, the date of her visit could have been confirmed by consulting prison visitation records. Maybe Freeland knew of her husband’s arrest during voir dire, maybe she didn’t. The trial judge passed up the opportunity to find out.

The trial judge’s most serious blunder was his failure to pursue Provost’s statement that Freeland “expressed strong views” about the circumstances of her brother’s killing. One potential juror had been excused for cause because she admitted to having “strong ... feelings that people who are involved in drugs or have, anything to do with drugs I just don’t care for them.” 9 If Freeland had strong views about her brother’s death— entirely plausible given Freeland’s later admission that she was very close to her brother — -this might have undermined her ability to render an impartial verdict; it certainly would have cast a sinister light on her failure to mention the killing in her response to question 13.

Dyer’s lawyer, John Burris, went to the heart of the matter when he asked the court to bring Provost in for questioning. The trial judge refused because at that point defense counsel had no evidence to support the allegation; the whole thing might have been ginned up by Dyer to throw sand into the machinery of the trial. The judge thus reasonably directed Burris to gather basic information about “whether in fact there was a death and whether it was a death that occurred in such an instance, because we want to know the preliminary fact whether she has a brother by that name, and all of these things that have to be looked at.” The judge held open the possibility of calling Provost later: “I don’t know about subpoenaing somebody at this stage. It may be necessary to do that. It could become necessary, let me put it that way.”

Yet, the. next morning, when the prosecutor produced a casefile . confirming Dyer’s account of what Provost had told him, the judge did not call Provost. Richard’s death was no invention; everything Dyer had reported that could- be verified, turned out to be true. The trial judge thus had no basis for shrugging off Provost’s further statement that. Freeland had expressed strong views about the shooting. Had Provost been called as a witness, he could have elaborated on his statement and reported any bias Freeland might have exhibited .as a result of that traumatic experience. He most certainly could have shed light on whether Freeland was telling the truth when she claimed that she thought her brother .was killed by accident. Since Provost was in jail, there would have been no delay in trying to locate and subpoena him. Had the judge ordered him to appear, he would have been brought in post-haste.

The California Supreme Court laid the blame for the inadequate factual development at the bias hearing on the shoulders of defense counsel. See People v. Dyer, 45 Cal.3d 26, 59 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 (1988). See generally Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11-12 , 112 S.Ct. 1715 , 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992) (applying cause-and-prejudice standard to inadequate factual development attributable to attorney error). Spe- *978 cifieally, the court refused to take judicial notice that Fre'eland was a plaintiff in the civil action ahd that an opinion in the criminal case against Richard’s killer stated' that the attacker “struck the victim on the head four times with a pistol and then shot him in the back of the head.” Dyer, 45 Cal.3d at 59 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 . It did so because “[e]ach of the facts of which defendant now requests us to take judicial notice could have been presented to the trial court.” Id.

The California Supreme Court overlooked the fact that this evidence was before the trial court at the time of the hearing; it was all contained in’the criminal casefile of Richard’s killer. The court also did not take-account of the fact that Curtis, the prosecutor, was very familiar with the case and had an obligation to share his information with the court and opposing eohnsel. And, of course, Freeland herself and Provost were available to be questioned on these points. This was not a ease where defense counsel failed to discover relevant evidence or knowledgeable witnesses. ■

Where Bums might have been more aggressive is in questioning Freeland and pointing out the conflict between her claim that she thought Richard’s killing was an accident and the information available in the casefile. Burris, however, was seriously handicapped in preparing for the hearing. He could not contact Freeland and question her, so he had ño clue as to how she would respond when confronted with her brother’s murder. Even if Burris had access to the casefile. before the hearing — -which we assume though it’s nowhere disclosed in the record — he could not have examined the file with an eye towards rebutting Freeland’s as yet untold story. By the time Freeland testified, the file was with the judge. . Nor could Burris be too aggressive in questioning Free-land,. who would soon have his client’s life in her. hands. . Freeland might well have taken umbrage at counsel’s suggestion, that she was lying, especially as it exposed her to charges of perjury. Burris recognized as much when he said, “[Mjaybe I’m not in a position to really get a candid answer.” Counsel also had his hands full preparing for the penalty phase, which began just minutes after the bias healing.

Given the extremely delicate situation when a juror is suspected of prejudice or misconduct, the trial judge must assume the “primary obligation ... to fashion a responsible procedure for ascertaining whether misconduct actually occurred and if so, whether it was prejudicial.” United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 258 (1st Cir.1990). While a trial is ongoing, lawyers may not conduct the kind of aggressive investigation of jurors they would of other witnesses. In such circumstances the trial judge fulfills his duty only if he “erects, and employs, a suitable framework for investigating the allegation [of bias] and gauging its effects[.]” Id. Where juror misconduct or bias is credibly alleged, the trial judge cannot wait for defense counsel to spoon feed him every bit of information which would make out a case of juror bias; rather, the judge has an independent responsibility to satisfy himself that the allegation of bias is unfounded.

Here, Burris did quite a bit, given the constraints of time and circumstance. He promptly advised thé court that one of the jurors may have failed to disclose highly relevant information during voir dire. At the trial judge’s direction, he obtained corroboration for the information from the prosecutor, including the casefile. He requested that Provost be brought in for questioning, and when that request was denied, he had co-counsel interview Provost in jail and then reported what he said’ to the court. At the hearing, Burris asked Freeland the right questions and timely objected when the court ruled against him. And immediately following the hearing he drew the court’s attention to the key fact contained in the file, namely that “the blue card from the prosecution ... certainly suggests that her brother was shot in the back of the head and died in somewhat of a violent manner.” Given the delicate circumstances and the fact that the penalty phase of the trial was moments away, it’s hard to fault Burris for not doing more. It seems to us that counsel did enough to alert the trial court to the problem; it was then up to the judge to give the matter the attention it obviously deserved.

*979 We are not unmindful that the trial judge too was in a difficult position. Through no fault of his own, the verdict in a five week murder trial was suddenly in jeopardy. Freeland was the last alternate juror; removing her would have required the court to set aside the guilty verdict, empanel a new jury and start from scratch. 10 Had Free-land’s omissions been discovered during voir dire, another juror could have been selected. With five weeks of trial completed and a verdict in hand, the problem had no comfortable solution. No judge would be eager to discover bias in these circumstances, and we attribute the trial judge’s complacency to an ostrich-like desire to avoid learning anything that would jeopardize the verdict.

Whatever the reason, the judge did not avail himself of evidence that was, almost literally, right under his nose. Instead, he made a finding that Freeland told the truth — a finding that is nearly inexplicable given what he knew, and positively irrational given what he could easily have learned. If what happened here is an adequate investigation into juror bias, we are at a loss to say what is not.

Ill

Because the facts were not properly developed by the state court, its finding that Freeland was unbiased is not entitled to a presumption of correctness. 11 Under such circumstances, the federal courts must address the question de novo, considering not only the evidence developed in state court, but also other evidence which comes to light afterward. See Rhoden v. Rowland, 10 F.3d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir.1993). While the district court made no findings, it nevertheless held an evidentiary hearing. We can therefore consider the question of whether Freeland was biased with the benefit of a fully developed record. This record conclusively answers our two key questions: First, Freeland plainly lied when she answered “no” to voir dire questions 13 and 15; no rational trier of fact could find otherwise. And she lied again when she was questioned by the state judge in chambers — presumably to cover her earlier lie and remain on the jury. Second, Free-land’s lies give rise to an inference of implied bias on her part. Because implied bias is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable de novo, see Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir.1991), there is no need to remand 'to the district court for consideration of this issue in the first instance. 12

A. The circumstances of Richard’s killing were such that Freeland could not possibly have confused it with an accident. Free-land’s account of what happened made it sound like the shooter was waving his gun around, and the gun happened to go off in the direction of her brother. 13 But the California Court of Appeal reviewing the indictment of Richard’s killer described the event as “an angry confrontation between [the shooter] and the victim[.]” The court concluded that “the fact that [the shooter] struck the victim on the head four times with a pistol and then shot him in the back of the head suggests an inference of malice.” This paints quite a different picture from Free-land’s account of the incident and explains why Curtis charged the shooter with murder.

*980 Did Freeland know what really happened? No doubt. In her deposition, Freeland acknowledged that she and Richard were “very close.” It is inconceivable that the brutal circumstances of Richard’s killing would not have been discussed within the Freeland household; indeed, Freeland’s father testified that no one in the family had ever spoken of the killing as an accident. Nor is it believable that Freeland would have been unaware that her mother testified at the killer’s preliminary hearing, which happened within ten weeks of the shooting.

Freeland’s account of Richard’s death was just the tip of Pinoechio’s nose. Freeland also lied when she said she had never been a victim of crime. When she was a child, at 'a time when her parents were separated, Free-land’s father kidnapped her and her siblings. Freeland explained that “the police finally caught up with us and he was arrested.” When Freeland was a teenager she was attacked by her cousin, Buddy, who broke into her house in the dark, showed a knife and pulled her underwear off before she fought him off. Freeland’s father called the police. Freeland downplayed the incident in her deposition, but admitted that it “scared the hell out of me.” 14

Freeland also failed to mention the many burglaries to which she had fallen prey. Her cars had been broken into so many times she lost count. One car had been stolen outright. Her home had been burglarized on at least three occasions. During her deposition Freeland vividly recalled walking in on one robbery and watching as the burglar fled through the back door with a sack of loot thrown over his shoulder “like Santa Claus’ bag.” Several potential jurors had disclosed burglaries during voir dire; Freeland watched as most of them were picked off by peremptory challenge. 15 Being the last to be seated, Freeland was not taken by surprise; the trial judge had instructed the potential jurors to “[m]ake sure that while this process is going on that you hear every question that is asked and every answer that is given[.]” Lest the point be lost, the judge continued, “[A]s I’ve indicated to you before, you have a right to hear, and a duty to hear. So make sure that you do.” Freeland sat through the questioning of 74 potential jurors over the course of five days and had time to consider how she would answer the same questions when her turn came. When her turn did come, Freeland answered “no” to voir dire questions 13 and 15, even though her incidents were far more serious, both in number and magnitude, than those disclosed by others who had preceded her.

Equally inexplicable was Freeland’s negative response when she was asked if any “relative” had been “accused of any offense other than traffic cases.” Freeland’s husband had been arrested on rape charges just a month before trial. In her deposition, Freeland explained that she did not consider her husband to be a relative, but other prospective jurors had offered information about in-laws and former spouses. Freeland and Provost were still legally married, and Free-land went to visit him shortly after his arrest..

Even if her nondisclosure about Provost could somehow be explained, the arrest record of other relatives cannot. Freeland’s father was arrested for the kidnapping already mentioned. Freeland’s uncle, Jason Caldwell,- who lived with the Freelands from time to time, had been arrested for murder in- Louisiana in 1970. Caldwell was arrested again in 1978 in connection with an armed robbery and pled guilty to being an accessory after the fact. Caldwell was paroled to Oakland a few years later. In 1980 Freeland’s brother Billy had been convicted of possessing brass knuckles. And less than a month *981 before the voir dire, Billy was arrested for possession of LSD and marijuana.

Freeland’s family had a long history with the law, and not every event might have come to mind as Freeland sat in the jury box during voir dire. But her failure to mention that any of her relatives had been accused of crime defies an innocent explanation. Nearly every close relative of hers had been arrested: Her husband for rape; her father for kidnapping; her uncle Jason for murder, and again for armed robbery; her brother Billy for possession of brass knuckles, and again for drug possession; her cousin Buddy for attempted rape of Freeland herself. Free-land overlooked too many incidents for us to attribute her responses to mere forgetfulness.

Indeed, in her deposition Freeland did not claim to be forgetful. 16 Rather, she steadfastly maintained that she — not the court, not the defense, not the prosecutor — -was the best and only judge of what information was relevant. As to the countless burglaries of her cars and homes, she explained that she thought that these events had no bearing on her impartiality:

(Emphasis added.) Freeland even shrugged off the suggestion that burglary could be considered a crime: “It’s just a way of life and it’s just the way things go. It was not a traumatic event that caused me to be so bitter that I would irrationally try to pay back someone like Alfred Dyer who has evidently done burglaries or robberies.” Id. Freeland even belittled the significance of her uncle’s arrest for murder: “Am I to reveal everything, the little information I know about other relatives? That’s ridiculous. If that’s what they wanted and you feel I have been unfair by not saying a distant relative has done something, then let Alfred Dyer get a new trial.” Later, Freeland stated forthrightly, “I dislike giving information, period. Information that to me is not rele-vant_• [E]ven if my brother was the victim of a violent crime, how can you take that little information and say, ‘Here she was unfair to Alfred Dyer.’ ”

B. Because the record conclusively establishes that Freeland lied, and lied repeatedly, we proceed to consider whether her lack of candor reflects an “[injability to render an impartial verdict.” Smith, 455 U.S. at 220 , 102 S.Ct. 940 .

Whether Freeland was actually biased— i.e., whether she was disposed to cast a vote against Dyer — is difficult to figure out eighteen years later. Freeland acknowledged that she was very close to her brother, and added that the period following his death was painful. It’s certainly possible that anger about her brother’s killing drove Freeland to finagle a seat on the jury so she could lobby for a conviction and death sentence. Free-land herself was a victim of many crimes, and she may have wanted to use her jury service to send a message of deterrence. On the other hand, the fact that many of her relatives had been arrested suggests she could have harbored some empathy for criminal defendants. However, we need not resolve the actual bias question, which would first require factual findings by the district court, because the implied bias issue is dispositive here. Thus, we need not speculate further about what motivated Freeland to lie.

In extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the -circumstances. See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57 , 104 S.Ct. 845 (Blackmun, Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (accepting doctrine of implied bias in exceptional circumstances); id. at 558 , 104 S.Ct. 845 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (same); Zerka v. Green, 49 F.3d 1181 , 1186 n. 7 (6th *982 Cir.1995); Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404, 1405-06 (1st Cir.1992); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir.1990); Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71-72 (9th Cir.1977).

What kind of circumstances give rise to a finding of implied bias? In Smith v. Phillips, Justice O’Connor gave some examples of situations where bias may be presumed: “a revelation that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction.” 455 U.S. at 222 , 102 S.Ct. 940 (concurring opinion). Of course, a juror could be a witness or even a victim of the crime, perhaps a relative of one of the lawyers or the judge, and still be perfectly fair and objective. Yet we would be quite troubled if one of the jurors turned out to be the prosecutor’s brother because it is highly unlikely that an individual will remain impartial and objective when a blood relative has a stake in the outcome. Even if the putative juror swears up and down that it will not affect his judgment, we presume conclusively that he will not leave his kinship at the jury room door. The effect of this factor would be impossible to predict: Would the juror yield to his sympathies, or fight them and lean the other way? There is no way to know, but permitting such a juror to serve would introduce into the jury room an extraneous influence that could materially color the deliberations. The juror in question would be . lacking the quality of indifference which, along with impartiality, is the hallmark of an unbiased juror.

Jessica Freeland was not involved in the crime which was the subject of the case, nor did she have a personal relationship with any of the trial participants. But there is every indication that she was not indifferent to service on the jury. After watching a number of potential jurors disclose relatively minor crimes and get dismissed, she chose to conceal a very major crime — the killing of her brother in a way that she knew was very similar to the way Dyer was accused of killing his victims. 17 She also failed to disclose many other facts that would have jeopardized her chances of serving on Dyer’s jury. Later on, when she was questioned about her brother’s death, she lied once again by pretending she thought it was an accident, and by telling the judge that no one in her family had testified about the killing. The inference we draw from all this is that Freeland lied in order to preserve her status as a juror and to secure the right to pass on Dyer’s sentence.

We don’t know why Jessica Freeland so cherished her seat on Dyer’s jury. 18 Jury service is a civic duty that citizens are expected to perform willingly when called upon to do so. But there is a fine line between being willing to serve and being anxious, between accepting the grave responsibility for passing judgment on a human life and being so eager to serve that you court perjury to avoid being struck. The individual who lies in order to improve his chances of serving has too much of a stake in the matter to be considered indifferent. Whether the desire to serve is motivated by an overactive sense of civic duty, by a desire to avenge past wrongs, by the hope of writing a memoir or by some other unknown motive, this excess of zeal introduces the kind of unpredictable factor into the jury room that the doctrine of implied bias is meant to keep out. 19

*983 A juror, like Freeland, who lies materially and repeatedly in response to legitimate inquiries about her background introduces destructive uncertainties into the process. There is, of course, the possibility that she did so because of some personal bias against the defendant which she managed to hide from the court. But a perjured juror is unfit to serve even in the absence of such vindictive bias. If a juror treats with contempt the court’s admonition to answer voir dire questions truthfully, she can be expected to treat her responsibilities as a juror — to listen to the evidence, not to consider extrinsic facts, to follow the judge’s instructions — with equal scorn. Moreover, a juror who tells major lies creates a serious conundrum for the fact-finding process. How can someone who herself does not comply with the duty to tell the truth stand in judgment of other people’s veracity? Having committed perjury,. she may believe that the witnesses also feel no obligation to tell the truth and decide the case based on her prejudices rather than the testimony.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Cardozo concluded that a juror who lies his way into the jury room is not really a juror at all: “The judge who examines on the voir dire is engaged in the process of organizing the court. If the answers to the questions are wilfully evasive or knowingly untrue, the talesman, when accepted, is a juror in name only.” Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11 , 53 S.Ct. 465 , 77 L.Ed. 993 (1933). Clark held that a juror who obtains that position by eommitting fraud on the court is no more entitled to the privileges of that position than a stranger who sneaks into the jury room: “His relation to the court and to the parties is tainted in its origin; it is a mere pretense and sham.” Id. 20

Were we to follow Clark to the letter, we would have to conclude that Dyer was not convicted by a jury of twelve, but by eleven jurors and one intermeddler. We need not go quite so far, because we can resolve the case on narrower grounds. Clark is nevertheless instructive because Justice Cardozo there equates a juror who lies his way onto the jury to a juror who is related to a litigant: “If a kinsman of one of the litigants had gone into the jury room disguised as the complaisant juror, the effect would have been no different.” Id Just as we would presume bias if the brother of the prosecutor were on a jury, we presume bias where a juror lies in order to secure a seat bn the jury. 21 -

More is at stake here than the rights of petitioner; “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 , 75 S.Ct. 11 , 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954). An irregularity in the 'selection of those who will sit in judgment “casts a very long shadow.” Cruz v. Abbate, 812 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir.1987). A perjured juror is as incompatible with our truth-seeking process as a judge who accepts bribes. Cf. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 , 117 S.Ct. 1793, 1797 , 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997). 22 In this regard we agree with Chief Judge Winter:

United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir.1989) (internal citations omitted).

Not all jurors may walk a perfectly straight line. A distracted juror might fail to mention a magazine he subscribes to. An embarrassed juror might exaggerate the importance of his job. Few voir dires are impeccable, and most irregularities can be shrugged off as immaterial to the fairness of the trial. But the magnitude of Freeland’s lies and her remarkable display of insouciance — her expressed feeling that only she would decide what matters — fatally undermine our confidence in’her ability to fairly decide Dyer’s fate. The facts here add up to that rare case where we must presume juror bias. 23 See Burton v. Johnsoh, 948 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir.1991).

IV

Presumed bias dates back in this country at least to Aaron Burr’s trial for treason, where Chief Justice Marshall, riding circuit, noted that an individual under the influence of personal prejudice “is presumed to have a bias on his mind which will prevent an impartial decision of the case, according to the testimony.” Marshall explained, “He may declare that notwithstanding these prejudices he is determined to listen to the evidence, and be governed by it; but the law will not trust him.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (D.Va.1807) (emphasis added). In the common law, implied bias can be traced all the way back to Sir Edward Coke’s dictum in Bonham’s Case that no man shall be judge in his own cause. See Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1610). This pedigree neatly disposes of the state’s argument that implied bias would be a “new rule” barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Implied bias may indeed be the single oldest rule in the history of judicial review, as Bonham’s Case is often identified as the .first case in which a court struck down a duly enacted legislative act. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1127, 1130 (1987).

Judge O’Scannlain nevertheless argues that implied bias is not an established rule of constitutional procedure because we can point to no Supreme Court case announcing it. But a rule needs to be announced for purposes of Teague only if it’s new. What we have here is the antithesis of Teague — a rule so deeply embedded in the fabric of due process that everyone takes it for granted. This is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. at 11 , 53 S.Ct. 465 . Offering an obvious example of someone who would not be qualified to serve as a juror, it mentioned a relative of one of the parties: “If a kinsman of one of the litigants had gone into the jury room disguised as the complaisant juror, the effect would have been no different.” Id. Such a juror, the Court said, would be a juror “in name only.” Id. The Court there understood — as every court that has dealt with the question has understood — that prejudice must sometimes be inferred from the juror’s relationships, conduct or life experiences, without a finding of actual bias.

In Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 , 47 S.Ct. 437 , 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927), the Court made it clear that bias must sometimes be presumed, even though the decision maker *985 may. be completely unbiased. In Tumey, a man in a small Ohio town was tried for unlawful possession of liquor. The Mayor also served as judge. In addition to his salary as Mayor, he received a small cut of each fíne he imposed as a judge. The Supreme Court unanimously held that a conviction so imposed violates due process. The Court first acknowledged that some fact-finders would not actually be prejudiced by a personal stake in the outcome: “There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration as $12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it[.]” Id. But, the Court held, subjective state of mind is not dispositive when the circumstances create an inference of bias. “[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of'the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice.” Id. Rather, the Court held, we'must look to the fairness of the procedure and whether bias should be presumed from the circumstances: “Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and .true between the State, and the accused, denies the latter due pro.eess of law.” Id. As in Clark , the Court in Tumey never stopped to question whether bias can be presumed from circumstances. Rather, it accepted the doctrine of implied bias as a given and applied it to the facts of the case.

Nothing in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) or McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 , 104 S.Ct. 845 , 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) is to the contrary. In Smith , Justice Marshall dissented, worrying that the majority was doing away with the doctrine of implied bias. Justice O’Connor joined the opinion on the understanding that it did not abolish the doctrine, see id. at 221 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , and the majority said nothing to the contrary. Smith has no bearing on our ease unless we assume the majority tacitly did what Justice Marshall accused it of doing. That it did not is confirmed by Greenwood , where the Court held that the bias could not be implied on the facts of that case, but assumed that the doctrine does, in fact, exist. See Greenwood, 464 U.S. at 556-57 , 104 S.Ct. 845 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ.) (fifth, sixth and seventh votes of majority). Accord Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 , 84 S.Ct. 1696 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1964); Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532 , 47 S.Ct. 437 .

No opinion in the two centuries of the Republic — except the dissent in our case— has suggested that a criminal defendant might lawfully be convicted by a jury tainted by implied bias. 24 Under the dissent’s logic, reasonable jurists could hold that Dyer would have been accorded due process even if he had been convicted by a jury comprised of the following twelve individuals: (1) the mother of Jerry Curtis, the prosecutor, (2) Curtis’s former law partner, (3) Oakland’s Chief of Police, (4) the Grand Dragon of the Bay Area KKK, (5) the sister of Floyd Murray, who died in the shooting, (6) Floyd Murray’s mother, (7) the victim of Dyer’s prior robbery, (8) Dyer’s ex-wife, (9) the District Attorney, (10) an Oakland councilman running for re-election on a “tough-on-crime” platform, (11) Melvin Provost, Dyer’s cellmate, and (12) Provost’s wife, Jessica Freeland — so long as they had all sworn they would be fair. We, on the other hand, believe that no reasonable jurist would take that position. Rather, jurists of reason would all agree that each of these individuals, had they made their way onto the jury, should have been struck without stopping to inquire into their subjective state of mind.

The panel opinion is VACATED, the district court is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

. We do not condone any lying by jurors; perjury is perjury. We are concerned here, however, with the rights of the defendant, not with whether the juror may be prosecuted for a deliberate lie during voir dire. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11 , 53 S.Ct. 465 , 77 L.Ed. 993 (1933).

. The presence of a biased juror cannot be harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice. See United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir.1977). Like a judge who is biased, see Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 , 47 S.Ct. 437 , 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927), the presence of a biased juror introduces a structural defect not subject to harmless error analysis. See generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-10 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).

.The AEDPA does not apply retroactively to Dyer’s appeal. See Lindh v. Murphy, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2059 , 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997).

. We say this only because we give very wide berth to the state trial judge's findings. For our part, we find it hard to believe that a sister would be aware that her brother was killed by gunfire yet be so unmindful of the details as to believe it was an accident. This is especially so since Richard’s mother was alive and no doubt discussed the details of the killing as part of the normal bereavement process. See Eric Schlos-ser, A Grief Like No Other, Atlantic Monthly, September 1997, at 52.

. As the case ended in a plea bargain, the file was not very big, so it would not have taken very long for the judge to examine it. Nevertheless, if the judge did not wish to postpone the sentencing hearing to make such an examination, he could have taken the matter under advisement *976 and examined the file over the course- of the next day or two.

. The judge was thus wrong when he said that “the record speaks for itself” as to Freeland's lack of bias. Provost's statement, as reported by Dyer's lawyer, was also-part of the record and flatly contradicted Freeland. While Provost’s statement, as reported, Was multiple-level hearsay, it could have been made much more definite if Provost had been questioned about it at the bias hearing.

. The prosecutor had an ethical obligation to bring to the judge’s attention evidence that would cast light on the question on which the judge focused-namely whether Jessica was in a position to know how her brother was killed. Had this incident occurred in federal court, we might have considered whether the prosecutor’s silence amounted to misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir.1993).

. For one thing, one would have to wonder whether Provost told Freeland anything about Dyer’s statements and conduct that might bear on her evaluation of his guilt or innocence.

. We express no view as to whether such a juror would have to be excused as a matter of due process. We note this only as ah authoritative determination of how the state law would operate in these circumstances.

. Because the verdict was in, the trial judge would probably not have been free to reopen jury deliberations, even if another alternate had been available.

. Slate appellate court findings are normally entitled to a presumption of correctness as well. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 , 101 S.Ct. 764 , 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). But the California Supreme Court here did not cure the inadequacy of the trial court's hearing. It explicitly refused to consider any of the circumstances surrounding Richard's shooting. See People v. Dyer, 45 Cal.3d 26, 59 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 (1988). Because the California Supreme Court's findings were grounded in the same incomplete record as the trial court’s, its findings, are no more entitled to a presumption of correctness.

. Because we conclude that Freeland lied, we need not decide whether dishonesty is a necessary predicate to a finding of juror bias. Compare McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556 , 104 S.Ct. 845 , with id. at 556-57 , 104 S.Ct. 845 (Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring); id. at 558 , 104 S.Ct. 845 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in the judgment); Zerka v. Green, 49 F.3d 1181 , 1186 n. 7 (6th Cir.1995); Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404, 1405-06 (1st Cir.1992); Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir.1988).

. That anyone would think such a reckless killing is not a crime itself stretches credulity.

. No doubt these events were embarrassing to Freeland, and she may not have wanted to air her family's dirty linen in public. Yet she could have asked that she talk about the events in chambers, as other potential jurors had done during voir dire.

. Courtney Coleman staled that ''I’ve had my house — when I was living in Union City when I was married I had my house broken into several times. I also had my wife’s car stolen twice.” Barbara Covarrubias stated, “My house was broken into three times in one year.” Dale Gritton stated, "My brother has had his apartment broken into several times.” John Braucht stated that a burglar, "I guess supposedly under the influence of drugs, broke into my parents’ home while they were theref.]”

. The district court did not hear Freeland testify because she evaded twenty-one separate attempts by the petitioner to subpoena her. Because the district court deferred to the trial court under section 2254, we do not have the benefit of an independent finding of impartiality to review. The district court did, however, review Free-land's deposition* testimony, and was not convinced that Dyer had shown enough to overcome the presumption of correctness. This, of course, is not the same as an independent finding of lack of bias.

. At the time of voir dire the judge had already informed the venire that Dyer was on trial for murder and attempted murder, with a handgun, and that the state had asked for the death penalty-

. In yet another bizarre twist, after Dyer's trial Freeland became an officer with the California Department of Corrections and served as a guard on death row in San Quentin, where Dyer is held awaiting execution. Freeland later became a parole agent, and on at least two occasions — in violation of prison regulations — she reviewed and photocopied portions of Dyer’s confidential Department of Corrections Central File to check up on the status of his appeal. While it is hard to know what to make of these facts — they are too few in number to prove that Freeland was on a vendetta or had a particular interest in seeing Alfred Dyer executed — they certainly are not consistent with the picture of a model indifferent juror.

.For example, a juror who lies his way on because he secretly plans to write a memoir of the experience might then vote differently to provide drama, or he might inject personal prejudice into the jury room in an attempt to jazz up *983 the deliberative process. Similarly, a juror who lies because he disputes the importance of following the judge’s instructions may also walk to his own beat when considering the meaning of reasonable doubt. See Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman, New Yorker, Feb. 24-Mar. 3, 1997, at 54-64 (noting erosion of public confidence in unanimous jury system caused by irrational holdout jurors).

.The question in Clark was whether the juror's statements in the jury room could be considered in convicting her of having lied during voir dire. In holding that the statements could be considered, the Court had to overcome the privilege then accorded to communications between jurors during deliberations. The Court held that the privilege does not apply because a juror who obtains his position by fraud is not in fact a juror. While this statement was made in a context very different from ours, it is clearly a holding and not dicta.

. Having committed perjury, a juror in Free-land’s position might realize that the likelihood of being prosecuted diminishes significantly if she votes to convict. Compare Clark, 289 U.S. at 9 , 53 S.Ct. 465 , with United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d i 49, 152 (2d Cir.1989).

. The doctrine of implied bias has a counterpart in the cations -of judicial ethics which require judges to disqualify themselves if they' have even the smallest stake in the proceedings, or if they believe that their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See Bracy, 117 S.Ct. at 1797 ; ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E (1990). Both rules safeguard both the existence and the appearance of justice.

. We appear to be unanimous that if Freeland knew the circumstances of her brother’s death, we must presume bias. See infra at 988 (Brunet-ti, J., dissenting) ("In order for Freeland to have the necessary relationship to create the emotional involvement she would have had to know and understand the circumstances and facts of her brother's death to be a brutal murder.”). We part company only as to whether such knowledge can be imputed to Freeland.

. The dissent cites United States v. Malloy, 758 F.2d 979 (4th Cir.1985), for the proposition that "the federal courts of appeals were split on the issue of implied bias.” Infra at 995 (O'Scann-lain, J., dissenting). Malloy-does nothing more than refuse to find implied bias on a particular set of facts. See Malloy, 758 F.2d at 981 ("Mal-loy urges us to adopt a per se rule [of implied bias] in joint service cases. We decline the invitation.”). Courts disagree (e.g., Smith) about when the doctrine applies, not whether it exists.