Dissenting:

The arbitration committees in this case read a knowledge requirement into the plain language of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Although a labor arbitrator is not confined to the four corners of the collective bargaining agreement, it may not disregard the facts of the particular case before it while engaging in contract interpretation. It is the facts of a particular case and the parties' inabifity to foresee them that justify augmentation of the language of an agreement. I dissent because the arbitral committees in this case have interpreted the contract language so as to work a manifest injustice.

The proper resolution of this case depends on a full understanding of the context in which the disputed discharges took place. Brenda Vanderkin, married with two children and a freight handler at Roadway Express, submitted evidence that for more than one year, between August 1995 and June 1996, co-worker Roger Bowman sexually harassed her. Bowman continuously made comments about Vanderkin's breasts and genitalia, and touched her breasts at the workplace as well. By June 1996, Bowman's harassment became almost a daily occurrence, widely known to Vanderkin's coworkers and supervisors. Bowman was not *1101 discharged, however, and the harassment continued unabated.

On June 19, 1996, Bowman hid a cup of water on Vanderkin’s forklift, positioning it so that it would spill when Vanderkin moved the forklift. The cup fell as anticipated and soaked Vanderkin’s tee shirt. Later that day, in response to Bowman’s conduct and Roadway’s general unwillingness to address the harassment, four of Vanderkin’s co-workers held Bowman in the break room while Vanderkin pulled his pants down and another employee took a polaroid picture of his genitals.

Bowman states that the break room was crowded at the time of the pantsing and that the scuffle was lengthy and loud. Once released, Bowman chased his co-workers through the yard and finally stood in the middle of the dock, refusing to move until they had given him the picture. Bowman indicated that for more than six months after the pantsing, co-workers continued to yell, post drawings, and pass notes around the workplace regarding the incident.

Two arbitral committees provided for in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement upheld the termination of ten employees involved in the pantsing. The relevant clause in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement provides that the employer may only terminate an employee within ten days from “the occurrence” on which the dismissal is based. It is undisputed that the discharges occurred more than ten days after the pants-ing and would therefore appear to be untimely. Nevertheless, the arbitration committees construed the word “occurrence” as requiring Roadway’s knowledge of the incident, and found that Roadway did not know of the incident until Bowman reported in to his supervisor. The committees determined that the discharges were timely because they took place within ten days of Bowman’s report to his supervisor. They did so without considering the facts of the industrial dispute, the custom and practice of the work place, the deliberate blindness of the employer to the working conditions of its employees, or any other matter that would permit a reasoned judgment.

In the Steelworkers Trilogy, 1 the Supreme Court determined that the Labor Management Relations Act establishes a policy of “industrial self-government” under which preference is to be given to the resolution of labor disputes through arbitration. See also United Paperworkers Internat’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37 , 108 S.Ct. 364 , 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (discussing rationale). Consequently, the scope of review of a labor arbitration decision is extremely narrow. See, e.g., Federated Dept. Stores v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1442, 901 F.2d 1494, 1496 (9th Cir.1990). The Court may not review the merits of the case, even if the arbitrator makes mistakes of both fact and law. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Phoenix Mailers Union Local 752, 989 F.2d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir.1989)).

Nevertheless, this Court has identified three exceptions to the general deference to arbitration awards: (1) when the award does not “draw its essence” from the collective bargaining agreement; (2) when the arbitrator exceeds the scope of the issues submitted; and (3) when the award runs counter to public policy. SFIC Properties, Inc. v. International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 311, 103 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir.1996). The analysis of whether the decision draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement turns in part on whether the arbitrator ignored the “plain language.” See Stead, 886 F.2d at 1205 n. 6; SFIC, 103 F.3d at 925 ; Detroit Coil v. International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 82, 594 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir.1979).

It would be folly to shackle the arbitrator to dictionary definitions of the words contained in the collective bargaining agreement. It is unlikely that the parties will be able to anticipate all of the many subjects of *1102 disagreement that will arise over the course of their relationship. Therefore, the Supreme Court has indicated that the arbitrator is not confined to the four corners of a collective bargaining agreement. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 , 108 S.Ct. 364 ; Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. at 581-82 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 ; Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597 , 80 S.Ct. 1358 ; Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1081 . The arbitrator may look, for example, to industrial custom or the past practice of the parties to give meaning to a particular provision of the contract.

Nevertheless, once a labor arbitrator begins a process of legal interpretation of a contract, it must do so cognizant of the specific factual context in which it makes its decision. It is the unforeseen nature of the specific facts of a ease which allows the arbitrator to embark on the process of contract interpretation in the first place. Where the arbitrator does not ground its decision on the facts of a particular case, it has abdicated its responsibilities and its decision is no longer entitled to heightened deference.

In the present case, it stretches credulity to suggest that Roadway Express supervisors were unaware of the obstreperous pantsing nor heard any of the catcalls nor observed any of the drawings or notes posted about the premises. Even if Roadway had no knowledge of the incident prior to Bowman’s report, however, it shares the blame for its employees’ attempt at self-help due to its complete failure to protect Vanderkin from Bowman’s outrageous conduct. When the employer contends that it did not know about the facts of this case until a formal complaint was submitted by Bowman, it has closed its eyes to everything that happened on the docks, in the break room, and the drawings posted on the bulletin boards. It should not be permitted to shield itself by such self-serving denials, at least by a motion of summary judgment when the facts submitted by the plaintiff clearly show that everyone, including supervisors, who worked the docks knew for a long time what happened. Even in criminal cases defendants are accountable when their defense is blind ignorance. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1491 (9th Cir.1995).

Given the particular facts of this case, the arbitral committees were unjustified in departing from the bargained-for language of the collective bargaining agreement. In this case, justice and common sense have not been served. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 , 80 S.Ct. 1343 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 , 80 S.Ct. 1358 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960).