Opinion by Judge SNEED; Dissent by Judge TASHIMA.

Arizona prison warden Terry Stewart and the State of Arizona (“respondents”) appeal from the decision of the District Court for the District of Arizona, Judge Robert C. Broomfield, granting the habeas corpus petition of state prisoner Daniel Arvizu Moreno (“petitioner”). The district court held that the Arizona state trial court’s colloquy with petitioner failed to establish that petitioner knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and reversed petitioner’s 36-year sentence for armed robbery. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and reverse.

BACKGROUND

On August 1, 1979, petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County on one count of armed robbery. He was arrested on November 29, 1979, and the trial court appointed the Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office to represent him.

Petitioner subsequently was transferred to prison in Pima County to stand trial on unrelated armed robbery and aggravated assault charges. He later escaped from jail and was rearrested on March 6, 1980. He was tried and convicted in Pima County and sentenced to 144 years in prison; his present petition does not affect that sentence.

After his conviction in Pima County, petitioner was transferred back to Maricopa County jail. Petitioner was unhappy with three different public defenders assigned to represent him; the public defender’s office and trial court accommodated his first two requests and reassigned his case to new counsel. However, the third time that petitioner appeared before the trial court complaining of his counsel, the judge refused to assign petitioner another attorney after concluding that petitioner failed to articulate a legitimate reason as to why he was dissatisfied with counsel.

On February 2, 1981, petitioner informed the trial court that he wanted to represent himself. The trial court conducted two separate colloquies with petitioner and subsequently granted his motion. 3 The judge appointed a public defender as “amicus curiae” counsel for petitioner for the duration of the trial.

A jury found petitioner guilty on February 19, 1981, and the trial court sentenced him to a 36-year sentence to run concurrently with the 144-year sentence imposed in Pima County. Petitioner appealed the conviction and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.

*660 Petitioner filed the instant petition ten years after his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court. He alleged that the trial court improperly allowed him to proceed without counsel. The magistrate judge below recommended that the district court grant the petition; the district court agreed. Respondents now appeal that decision.

ANALYSIS

Respondents contend that the district court erred in concluding that (1) a state trial court is constitutionally compelled under the Sixth Amendment to engage in a colloquy with the accused that mirrors the one set forth by this Court in United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.1987), and (2) petitioner did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. We agree with respondents’ arguments and reverse.

A. Required Inquiry Under Faretta.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const, amend. VI. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the Supreme Court announced that the Sixth Amendment also provides a correlative right to self-representation. Before a trial court will allow an accused to exercise the right of self-representation, it must conclude that the accused has “knowingly and intelligently” waived his underlying right to counsel. Id. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1022 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). Consequently, a trial court must ensure that the accused has been “made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236, 242 , 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). 4

This Court, beginning with its decision in United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.1973), which preceded the Supreme Court’s opinion in Faretta by one year, has required federal trial courts to conclude that a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before allowing him to proceed pro se. In Dujanovic , this Court set forth a recommended colloquy that a district court conduct with a defendant before the court conclude that the defendant has waived his right to counsel. Specifically, this Court instructed a district court to inquire whether “the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, with an understanding of the charges, the possible penalties, and the dangers of self-representation.” United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir.1982) (citing Dujanovic, 486 F.2d at 188 ). One year later, in Faretta , the Supreme Court addressed the issue of waiver of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and concluded that a trial court must be satisfied that a defendant wishing to proceed without the assistance of counsel “knows what he is doing and” makes “his choice ... with eyes open.” 422 U.S. at 832 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 . The Court made no mention of the Dujanovic opinion nor did it set forth the guidelines articulated in Dujano-vic as required procedure for a trial court to follow before it concludes that a defendant has “knowingly and intelligently” waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Notwithstanding Faretta , this Court in United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.1987), again set forth the “preferred procedure” for a federal district *661 court to follow before it allows a defendant in federal court to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We stated that

Balough, 820 F.2d at 1488 (quoting Harris, 683 F.2d at 324 ). We also emphasized that “a limited exception may exist whereby a district court's failure to discuss each of the elements in open court will not necessitate automatic reversal when the record as a whole reveals a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Id. (citing Harris, 683 F.2d at 324 ; United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Bird, 621 F.2d 989, 991 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.1978); and Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir.1974)). We noted that application of this exception is “limited” and only applies in “rare” cases. Id. Nowhere in Balough or, for that matter, in any of our subsequent decisions, have we ever concluded that this procedure, originally set forth as a guideline for district courts, is compelled by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.

The district court nonetheless held that the procedure we first articulated in Dujanovic and crystallized in Ba-lough is constitutionally compelled and must be applied in this case. The district court was incorrect. Although we have applied the Balough framework in habeas cases challenging state convictions, we have also made it clear that those “federal cases on this issue are instructive,” Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 669 (9th Cir.1993) (emphasis added), not binding, see Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir.1987) (“The preferable procedure for determining whether the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently is to discuss with the defendant in open court his understanding of the charges, the possible penalties, and the dangers of self-representation. The failure to engage the defendant in such a colloquy does not necessitate reversal, however, if the record otherwise reveals a knowing and intelligent waiver.”) (citations omitted). Whereas this Court has the power to impose a procedural framework on district courts, it cannot similarly do so to state courts if that framework is not constitutionally compelled. 5 To repeat, we hold that the framework articulated in the Balough line of decisions is not compelled by Sixth Amendment. 6

In Snook v. Wood, 89 F.3d 605, 612 (9th Cir.1996), this Court was again presented with the question of the required constitutional inquiry that a state trial court must undertake before concluding that an ac *662 cused has knowingly and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 7 We concluded that the Sixth Amendment necessitates that a state trial court, before letting an accused proceed pro se be assured that he “is made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” Snook, 89 F.3d at 613 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ). That is all that was required then under the Sixth Amendment, and that is all that is required now. To repeat, Balough is not a rule of constitutional procedure; rather it represents a recommended framework for courts to follow in conducting an analysis of the record to determine if an accused has voluntarily and knowingly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 8

We now turn to an analysis of the record as a whole to determine if the trial court properly made petitioner “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record ... establishes] that he kn[ew] what he wa[s] doing and his choice [wa]s made with eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 . We conclude, after reviewing the record, that the trial court fulfilled its duty and petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his right to representation.

B. Review of the Record Below.

To repeat, in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , the Supreme Court found waiver where the defendant was (1) “literate, competent and understanding,” (2) “voluntarily exercising his informed free will,” (3) warned by the trial judge that “he thought it was a mistake not to accept the assistance of counsel,” and (4) informed that he would be “required to follow all the ‘ground rules’ of trial procedure.” We caution that a trial court need not find all four of these elements before it concludes that an individual has waived his right. It also follows that a finding of all four of these elements does not necessitate a decision that a defendant has waived his right to counsel. In this case, however, we are satisfied that the trial court carefully inquired on all four subjects and that the record, viewed as a whole, reflects that the petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. 9

*663 The trial court engaged in two separate colloquies with the petitioner regarding his decision to represent himself, one on February 2, 1981, and one on February 6, 1981. The trial court, on numerous occasions during these colloquies, informed the petitioner of the dangers of self-representation. On February 2, the court told petitioner:

Petitioner told the court: “Yeah, I understand what you’re saying.”

Later in the hearing, the court again instructed petitioner of the dangers of self-representation and warned petitioner to reconsider his “foolish” decision:

On February 6, the court revisited this issue:

The court also warned petitioner that his decision would affect his post-trial options as well:

Notwithstanding these admonitions, petitioner freely waived his right to counsel. 10 The record, taken as a whole, indicates that petitioner freely and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, even after he was informed (1) of the dangers of self-representation, including the absence of trained legal assistance and (2) that the trial court viewed his decision as “foolish” and warned that he would still be required to follow the rules of court and would not receive any special treatment at trial. In sum, we conclude that the record supports the conclusion that the trial court was satisfied that petitioner “knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” The decision of the district court is therefore

REVERSED.

APPENDIX

Transcript of the Hearing on February 2, 1981.

Transcript of the Hearing on February 6, 1981.

(The following proceedings were held in open court at 1:45:)

. We have included the full text of these two colloquies in the Appendix which appears after the conclusion of this opinion.

. In Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , the Supreme Court found waiver where the defendant was (1) "literate, competent and understanding," (2) "voluntarily exercising his informed free will,” (3) warned by the trial judge that "he thought it was a mistake not to accept the assistance of counsel,” and (4) informed that he would be "required to follow all the 'ground rules' of trial procedure.”

. Indeed,

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 948 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

In addition, because Balough is not a rule of constitutional law, it is not available to a petitioner proceeding with a habeas corpus petition. See generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048-49 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (holding that protections not guaranteed by federal law or the Constitution are not available as grounds for challenging conviction at habeas corpus review).

. It is clear that the trial court in this case did not follow the Balough framework.

. In Snook , the actual question before this Court was what the state of Faretta law was in 1979 for purposes of the retroactivity analysis under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). We concluded that, in 1979, a trial court was required to warn a defendant of the dangers of self-representation; we did not hold that a trial court was required to go through a Ba- lough-type inquiry.

. Because we conclude that Balough did not create a rule of constitutional procedure, we need not reach respondents’ argument that Teague, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 , controls. Cf. Snook, 89 F.3d at 612 .

. The dissent complains that "Moreno was not queried or informed about any of the intricacies of trying a criminal case, including voir dire and jury selection, the rules of evidence (e.g., hearsay, leading questions, authentication, opinion testimony), his familiarity with obtaining compulsory process for witnesses or documents, discovery, or Brady rights.” Dissent at 2196-97. We agree.

Trial courts, however, are not required to teach each defendant, wishing to proceed pro se, the intricacies of criminal procedure and evidence. That is precisely why every criminal defendant has a right to counsel in the first place. Faretta counsels only that trial courts must make a defendant aware that proceeding without counsel is a mistake because only properly trained counsel knows "all the 'ground rules' of trial procedure.” 422 U.S. at 835-36 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 .

In this case, the trial court clearly told petitioner that:

. The dissent argues that the trial judge did not explain the nature of the charges or the possible penalties to the petitioner. The dissent does not argue that he really didn't know. In fact, the record shows that just one year prior to his armed robbery trial in this case, the petitioner had been convicted of three counts of armed robbery (and three counts of aggravated assault) in a separate case and had been sentenced to 144 years in prison. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this fact permits an inference that petitioner was not unfamiliar with the nature of the charges and the possible sentence.