Opinion by Judge ALDISERT; Dissent by Judge KOZINSKI.

This appeal by Franco Lopez, a/k/a Eduardo T. Hernandez, from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , requires us to decide whether Appellant’s waiver of his right to counsel at sentencing, following a no-contest plea to several sexual offenses in an Oregon state court, was knowing, intelligent, voluntary and with awareness of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. We are to review the detailed colloquies that took place on different days in open court between two Oregon state judges, Appellant’s then counsel of record and the Appellant himself.

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . Because the district court issued a certificate of probable cause, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 . The appeal was timely filed. Rule 22(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. We conclude that the record supports the district court’s determination of a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel at sentencing and affirm the court’s judgment.

*1122 I.

In February 1989, Lopez sexually assaulted the 11-year-old daughter of a woman with whom he was living. Represented by counsel, he appeared before Judge Haas, a Multnomah County, Oregon, Circuit Court judge, in October 1989 and pleaded no-contest to three counts of sodomy in the first degree and one count of sex abuse in the first degree. At the plea hearing, Judge Haas explained to Lopez the possible prison terms and fines for each count as well as the possibility of probation. SER at 6. Lopez indicated that he understood. Id. The judge also explained that the district attorney, pursuant to a plea agreement, ER at 22-23, was seeking a “dangerous offender” charge, see Or.Rev.Stat. § 161.725, which increased Lopez’s possible sentence on that count from 10-20 years to 15-30 years. SER at 7. Finally, the judge explained that a psychiatrist would examine Lopez to recommend whether or not he should be classified as a dangerous offender. Id. at 9. Again, Lopez indicated that he understood. Id.

On November 2, 1989, Lopez appeared before a different judge, Judge Roth, for a hearing on his motion to remove Attorney William Brennan as his counsel at the sentencing proceeding. Lopez had already successfully moved to replace three previous lawyers. He insisted to the court that he desired to proceed to the sentencing hearing without representation of counsel. ER at 42^44. Attorney Brennan recommended against Appellant’s self-representation at sentencing and explained to Judge Roth in open court, in Lopez’s presence, that psychiatrists would be evaluating Lopez for the purpose of determining the dangerous offender status:

Id. at 32-37. Later, Lopez started talking about crimes he previously committed in Texas and he was advised strongly about the dangers of self-representation:

Id. at 41-44. On the same day, Lopez signed a written waiver of his right to counsel, which stated his understanding that an attorney could help him:

Id. at 47.

Lopez proceeded to the sentencing hearing without representation of counsel. At sentencing, Lopez did not cross-examine the psychiatrist, but rather indicated that he was confused and needed the assistance of counsel. Id. at 51-52. Lopez acknowledged that he previously had fired four attorneys and that he understood when he waived counsel for sentencing that he would not be entitled to have another attorney appointed to represent him. Id.

The sentencing court adjudged Lopez to be a “dangerous offender” and sentenced him to 15-30 years on that count. Id. at 53-54. On the remaining three counts, the judge sentenced Lopez to consecutive prison sentences of 10-20, 10-20 and 2 1/2-5 years. Id. at 54-55.

Lopez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 28, 1995, alleging: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) violation of his right against double jeopardy, (3) denial of due process and (4) denial of the right to counsel at sentencing. Id. at 1-6. 1

The issue presented for review is extremely narrow. We are to evaluate Appellant’s basic contention that his waiver of counsel at sentencing was neither voluntary nor knowing because:

Appellant’s Br. at 13.

II.

Because Lopez filed his petition on February 28, 1995, prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”), the AEDPA’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253 and 2254, 110 Stat. 1217 -1219, do not apply to his petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 , 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 , 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997).

Under pre-AEDPA law, this Court reviews de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus. McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1490 (9th Cir.1995). Habeas corpus relief is appropriate where the state court committed an error that had a *1125 “ ‘substantial and injurious affect or influence’ ” on the outcome of the proceedings. Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). The state court’s factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d), and the district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. McKenna, 65 F.3d at 1490 .

In felony cases; a criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of the prosecution, including sentencing. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 136 , 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). It is clear that Lopez had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his sentencing hearing.

Nonetheless, a criminal defendant also has the right to waive assistance of counsel and represent himself or herself in a criminal proceeding. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (“But it is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want.”). Thus, it is clear that Lopez had the right to remove Attorney Brennan and proceed pro se.

In order to waive the right to counsel, a criminal defendant must make a knowing and intelligent decision that represents an exercise of his or her informed free will. Id. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 . In Faretta , the Court carefully explained:

Id. (internal citations omitted). 2

Lopez’s waiver of his right to counsel met this test.

A.

The colloquies between Appellant, his counsel and Judges Haas and Roth were equivalent to what has been deemed necessary by this court to constitute a valid waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227, 229-230 (9th Cir.1994) (waiver sufficient where defendant was aware of nature of charges and possible sentences and judge, on several occasions, had warned him of perils of self-representation). At the plea hearing and the subsequent hearing to remove his counsel, Appellant was informed of the *1126 nature of the charges and proceedings against him, the possible sentences that might be imposed-including possible sentence enhancements-and the dangers of self-representation. ER at 36-37, 42. Additionally, Appellant was informed that psychiatrists would testify at the sentencing hearing on “the dangerous offender treatment.” SER at 8. At all times, Lopez indicated that he understood.

Moreover, Lopez’s waiver was unequivocal. Attorney Brennan and the judges repeatedly told Appellant, in no uncertain terms, that he faced significant dangers if he chose to proceed without the assistance of counsel. See ER at 33-37. Notwithstanding these warnings, Appellant persisted in his desire to appear pro se at his sentencing and informed the court that he was aware of the potential pitfalls of self-representation. ER at 42-43. Lopez at one point said he would represent himself “if I have to.” If this response was equivocal, however, any doubts were erased when the judge proceeded to ask Lopez seven more times whether he really wanted to represent himself. ER at 41-44. Lopez answered affirmatively each time. The relevant dialogue concluded:

Id. at 44.

B.

Appellant contends that there was no knowing and voluntary waiver because Judge Roth did not “specifically advise [Lopez] that he had the right to confront and cross-examine the doctor who performed the evaluation.” Appellant’s Br. at 13 (emphasis added). Appellant cites no specific authority to support his theory, and our independent research has discovered none.

To require a specific admonition regarding the right to cross-examine witnesses would be to ignore the relevant jurisprudence governing self-representation in criminal matters. First, “[w]here a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a [sentencing proceeding] ... and later seeks release by the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-469 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Second, a criminal defendant’s right to self-representation is based on the rubrics of “free choice” and “personal liberty.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 . As a result, when evaluating whether there was a knowing and competent waiver, the court need not concern itself with the degree of the defendant’s knowledge of criminal court procedure and substantive law. In Faretta , the Court specifically stated:

Id. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (footnote omitted).

Were we to add an improper gloss to what the Supreme Court requires and announce the rule urged upon us by the Appellant-that the Court must specifically instruct on the right to cross-examination-a future waiver of counsel colloquy required of state and federal trial judges would be levitated to a crash course on “relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” This rule would run counter to the definitive instructions in Faretta :

Id. at 835 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 .

What is required in a waiver proceeding is that a defendant “be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” and that the defendant “ ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” Id. Because at two separate hearings he received knowledge that reports and testimony of psychiatrists would be introduced at sentencing, these requirements have been satisfied.

C.

Whether a criminal defendant waives his or her right to counsel before trial or, as here, just prior to sentencing, the inquiry is the same: whether the defendant’s waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. See United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir.1995); United States v. Day, 998 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir.1993). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that an inquiry regarding the waiver of the right to counsel at sentencing need not be “as exhaustive and searching as a similar inquiry before the conclusion of trial.” Salerno, 61 F.3d at 219 . We agree.

We previously have held that a valid pre-trial waiver of counsel also effectively waives counsel at sentencing. United States v. Springer, 51 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir.1995). Under the teachings of Springer , Lopez could have waived his right to counsel prior to trial and that waiver would have carried through sentencing. There is no logical justification for requiring a more searching inquiry-as Appellant advocates-when the waiver occurs for the first time at sentencing.

III.

This, too, must be emphasized. In reaching its conclusion that one has a constitutional right of self-representation because of “the inestimable worth of free choice,” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , the Court has made clear that when faced with such a request, a trial court need only satisfy itself that the defendant be made properly aware of the dangers and disadvantages of this “personal choice.”

Id. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-351 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).

That a trial court is obliged to accede to a proper request to remove counsel when waiver conditions are met is not to suggest that self-representation should be encouraged. Rather, the Court has emphasized that there are dangers that accompany self-representation:

Id. at 833 n. 43, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)).

Judges Haas and Roth gave Lopez every opportunity to reconsider his decision to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se at sentencing, yet Lopez repeatedly indicated that his waiver was made with full knowledge of the perils that he faced. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 , 113 S.Ct. 2680 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.”) (emphasis in original).

IV.

There is simply no case law or acceptable rationale to mandate a self-representation inquiry of the extraordinary specificity Lopez demands. He was aware of the details of the dangerous offender law, as well as the accompanying psychiatric evaluation, and was admonished on numerous occasions of the perils of proceeding to sentencing pro se. Because Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently and unequivocally assumed the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, he cannot now complain that his constitutional right to counsel at sentencing was violated.

AFFIRMED.

. In responding to the petition, the State argued that Lopez procedurally defaulted his claims of constitutional error. The magistrate judge determined that Lopez had procedurally defaulted the double jeopardy and due process claims, and rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel and right to counsel at sentencing claims on the merits. ER at 65-80. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations and dismissed Lopez’s petition on July 18, 1997. Id. at 81-83. The district court issued a certificate of probable cause for appeal on the issue of whether Lopez validly waived his right to counsel at sentencing. Id. at 86. Lopez’s appeal on that issue followed. The State has not raised the issue of procedural default on appeal.

. The Faretta decision has been applied by this court in a number of cases. See, e.g., Moreno v. Stewart, 171 F.3d 658 , 1999 WL 140733 (9th Cir.1999) ("In Snook v. Wood, 89 F.3d 605, 612 (9th Cir.1996), this Court was again presented with the question of the required constitutional inquiry that a state trial court must undertake before concluding that an accused has knowingly and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We concluded that the Sixth Amendment necessitates that a state trial court, before letting an accused proceed pro se be assured that he 'is made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” ’ Snook, 89 F.3d at 613 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ). That is all that was required then under the Sixth Amendment, and that is all that is required now.”) (footnote omitted); United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227 (9th Cir.1994); Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.1989); Harding v. Lewis., 834 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1987); Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322 (9th Cir.1982); and United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.1982).