Opinion by Judge T.G. NELSON; Dissents by Judge SCHROEDER, FLETCHER and KLEINFELD.

This case concerns the constitutionality of a policy issued by Joseph M. Arpaio, in his capacity as Maricopa County Sheriff, prohibiting inmates from possessing “sexually explicit material.” Jonathan Mauro, an inmate in the Maricopa County jail system, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the policy infringed on his First Amendment rights. Because we conclude that the policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, we hold that the policy is a valid restraint on Mauro’s First Amendment rights.

I.

The Maricopa County jail system is one of the country’s largest, housing 6500 inmates at any given time. The average inmate stay is slightly less than fourteen days. Until 1993, the jail had no policy restricting possession of sexually explicit materials.

Prior to adoption of the policy challenged by Mauro, female detention officers were faced with situations in which male inmates compared the officers’ anatomy to that of nude women depicted in various publications, often Playboy magazine centerfolds. The officers would be invited to look at the breasts on these nude models, or asked their opinion about shaved genitalia. The officers would also encounter inmates who were openly masturbating while looking at sexually explicit pictures. One inmate told an officer that he was mentally having anal intercourse with Miss July, and when he was done, he was going to do the same to the officer. The officers were confronted with this type of behavior often, ranging from several times daily to several times a week.

In response to this problem, on August 6, 1993, the jail administration instituted a policy which prohibited inmates from possessing “sexually explicit materials.” The notice to the inmates only included the prohibition on sexually explicit materials, while the accompanying notice to jail employees defined “sexually explicit materials” as “materials that show frontal nudity” including “personal photographs, drawings, and magazines and pictorials that show frontal nudity.” Pursuant to the policy, sexually explicit materials found in the possession of inmates are confiscated and destroyed.

Implementation of the policy resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of problems encountered by the female officers. The officers reported that the situations declined to only happening to them occasionally, if at all. Aso, from August 1993, when the policy was implemented, until August 1995, no inmate had requested au *1058 thorization to receive and possess sexually explicit materials that are prohibited under the policy.

Jonathan D. Mauro was incarcerated in .the Maricopa County jail system as a pretrial detainee in August 1995. He requested that he be allowed to receive a Playboy magazine, which was denied pursuant to the policy. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Maricopa County and its sheriff, Joseph Arpaio, claiming that the policy infringed his rights under the First Amendment.

The district court' granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Mauro appealed. A panel of this court reversed. See Mauro v. Arpaio, 147 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.1998). The panel opinion was withdrawn when this court voted to rehear the case en banc. See Mauro v. Arpaio, 162 F.3d 547 (9th Cir.1998).

II.

We begin our discussion with a review of two basic and potentially competing principles that necessarily frame our analysis of Mauro’s constitutional claim. The first of these principles is that prisoners are not stripped of the protections of the Constitution upon incarceration. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 , 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Thus, “when a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect [prisoners’] constitutional rights.” Id.

The second basic principle that frames our analysis is that “courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.” Id.

Id. at 84-85 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 (citations omitted).

To maintain the necessary balance between these two basic principles, we must apply a deferential standard of review to challenges regarding prison regulations and uphold the regulation “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 .

Id. (citations, quotations and ellipses omitted).

III.

To determine whether the jail’s policy of excluding all material containing frontal nudity “is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” and therefore valid, we must consider four factors: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the policy and the legitimate governmental interest put for *1059 ward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right; (3) whether the impact of accommodating the asserted constitutional right will have a significant negative impact on prison guards, other inmates and the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) whether the policy is an “exaggerated response” to the jail’s concerns. See id. at 89-90 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 ; Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir.1993).

A. Rational Connection

The first factor we must consider is whether there is a rational connection between the challenged policy and a legitimate governmental interest. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 . This requires us to determine whether the governmental objective underlying the policy is (1) legitimate, (2) neutral, and (3) whether the policy is “rationally related to that objective.” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 , 109 S.Ct. 1874 , 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989).

The jail’s policy of excluding sexually explicit materials is expressly aimed at maintaining jail security, rehabilitating inmates and reducing sexual harassment of female detention officers. It is beyond question that both jail security and rehabilitation are legitimate penological interests. 1 See id. at 415, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (prison security); Turner, 482 U.S. at 91 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 (prison security); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 , 94 S.Ct. 2800 , 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) (rehabilitation); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 , 94 S.Ct. 1800 , 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (prison security, order and rehabilitation). Moreover, although no court has addressed whether reducing sexual harassment of prison employees is a legitimate penological interest, there is no doubt that protecting the safety of guards in general is a legitimate interest, and that reducing sexual harassment in particular likewise is legitimate. 2 See Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754 , 756 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that employer may be liable for failing to prevent sexual harassment of employee by co-workers and by private individuals, such as business patrons).

The requirement that the policy be “neutral” is also unquestionably met in this case. As the Court explained in Thorn-burgh, to meet Turner’s “neutrality” test,

490 U.S. at 415-16 , 109 S.Ct. 1874 (quotations and citation omitted).

Here, as in Thornburgh , the jail administrators drew a distinction between materials solely on the basis of the materials’ potential effect on the prison’s legitimate objectives. The regulations are therefore “neutral” in the technical sense required under Turner and Thornburgh. See 490 U.S. at 415-16 , 109 S.Ct. 1874 ; Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 197-98 (D.C.Cir.1998); Dawson v. Scurr, 986 F.2d 257, 261 (8th Cir.1993).

*1060 Finally, the requirement that the policy be rationally related to the jail’s legitimate objectives is met in this case. To show a rational relationship between a regulation and a legitimate penological interest, prison officials need not prove that the banned material actually caused problems in the past, or that the materials are “likely” to cause problems in the future. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 417 , 109 S.Ct. 1874 ; Casey, 4 F.3d at 1521 . Moreover, it “does not matter whether we agree with” the defendants or whether the policy “in fact advances” the jail’s legitimate interests. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199 . The only question that we must answer is whether the defendants’ judgment was “rational,” that is, whether the defendants might reasonably have thought that the policy would advance its interests. See id.

The relationship between the possession of sexually explicit materials and the problems sought to be addressed by the policy-sexual harassment of female officers, jail security and rehabilitation of inmates-is clear. In the past, 3 inmates have used nude photographs to draw anatomical comparisons with the wives, girlfriends and mothers of other inmates, which in turn led to fights and disturbances by the inmates and created a security risk for both inmates and jail employees; to draw anatomical comparisons between the female detention officers and the persons depicted in the photographs; and to openly masturbate in front of and otherwise sexually harass the female officers.

The relationship between the jail’s policy of prohibiting the possession of sexually explicit materials and the goals of preventing sexual harassment of the female officers, inmate rehabilitation and maintenance of jail security is not so “remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.” 4 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 ; Amatel, 156 F.3d at 200-01 ; Dawson, 986 F.2d at 261 (holding regulation restricting access to sexually explicit materials is rationally related to goals of prison security and inmate rehabilitation). Although, as the defendants candidly admit, the “fit” between the policy and the jail’s objectives is not “exact,” an exact fit is not required. Rather, all that is required is that there be a “rational” connection between the policy and the jail’s legitimate objectives. This standard is met. 5

*1061 B. Alternative Avenues

The second factor we must consider in determining the reasonableness of the policy’s restriction on constitutional rights is “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 . “Where ‘other avenues’ remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, courts should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials ... in gauging the validity of the regulation.’ ” Id. (citations omitted).

In applying this factor, “the right in question must be viewed sensibly and expansively.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 417 , 109 S.Ct. 1874 (quotations omitted). For example, in Turner , the Court upheld a regulation that restricted correspondence between inmates at different state prisons. In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that inmates should be afforded other means of communicating with inmates at other institutions, finding it sufficient if other means of expression remained available to the inmates. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 92 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 .

Similarly, in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 , 107 S.Ct. 2400 , 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), the Court upheld a regulation that restricted inmates’ ability to attend the Jumu’ah, a Muslim religious ceremony, finding it sufficient if the inmates were permitted to participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies. See id. at 351-52 , 107 S.Ct. 2400 . Finally, in Thorn-burgh, the Court upheld a regulation restricting the incoming publications that inmates could receive and possess, finding sufficient alternative means available to the inmates because the regulations permitted “a broad range of publications to be sent, received, and read.” See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 417-18 , 109 S.Ct. 1874 ; see also Amatel, 156 F.3d at 201 .

We agree with the district court that a sensible and expansive view of the constitutional right infringed by the jail’s policy is the “right to receive sexually explicit communications.” Viewed in this sensible and expansive manner, there are many alternative means available to the inmates. As the district court recognized, although the policy bans all sexually explicit materials depicting frontal nudity, it does not ban sexually explicit letters between inmates and others, nor does it ban sexually explicit articles or photographs of clothed females. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 202 (“[T]he regulation by its terms only restricts pictures; a prisoner may read anything he pleases.”)

C. Impact on Others

The third factor that we must address is the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have on prison personnel, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 . This factor requires us to determine the impact of allowing inmates unrestricted access to sexually explicit materials. See id. at 92 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 .

The impact of such unrestricted access would be significant. As discussed previously, such access could lead to the bartering of sexually explicit materials and anatomical comparisons which could in turn lead to fights between inmates. These fights jeopardize not only the safety of jail employees, but also other inmates.

Moreover, as also previously discussed, allowing inmates unlimited access to sexually explicit materials would expose the *1062 female detention officers, whose complaints originally led to the adoption of the policy, to sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. “Where, as here, the right in question ‘can be exercised only at the cost of significantly less liberty and safety for everyone else, guards and other prisoners alike,’ [we] should defer to the ‘informed discretion of corrections officials.’ ” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418 , 109 5.Ct. 1874 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-92 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 ).

D. Exaggerated Response

The fourth and final factor that we must address is whether the policy is an exaggerated response to the jail’s concerns.

Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

The burden is on the prisoner challenging the regulation, not on the prison officials, to show that there are obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (“By placing the burden on prison officials to disprove the availability of alternatives, the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals fails to reflect the respect and deference that the United States Constitution allows for the judgment of prison administrators.”); Turner, 482 U.S. at 91 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 ; Casey, 4 F.3d at 1523 (“It is incumbent upon the prisoners to point to an alternative that accommodates their rights at de minimis cost to security interests.” (emphasis added)).

Mauro pointed to two alternatives in the district court: (1) a reading room for inmates to view sexually explicit materials; and (2) psychological testing of inmates who would be “fit” to receive sexually explicit materials. 6 We agree with the district court that both of these alternatives would impose more than a de minimis cost on valid penological interests and are therefore inadequate alternatives to the policy.

First, confining sexually explicit materials to a reading room would not prevent the sexual harassment of female detention officers. In fact, the female officers transporting inmates to and from the reading room, as well as those monitoring the reading room, would be especially vulnerable to sexual harassment by the inmates. As Deputy Chief Larry Wendt stated in his deposition, the creation of a reading room “does not guarantee that female detention officers would not be subjected to the same kind of harassment and verbal abuse that they endured before adoption of the Policy in 1993.”

Moreover, the creation of such a reading room would impose a significant administrative burden on the jail: inmates from different custody levels would need to be escorted to and from the reading room; strip searches of the inmates leaving the reading room would have to be conducted; and the reading room would have to be *1063 monitored. As Deputy Chief Wendt stated in his affidavit:

The second alternative Mauro proposes, the psychological testing of inmates, is also an inadequate alternative. Although psychological testing may prevent sexual offenders from receiving sexually explicit materials and therefore adversely affecting their rehabilitation, such testing would not address the other reasons for having the policy-prison security and sexual harassment of the female detention officers. See Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 923 F.2d 126, 128 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that inmates’ proposed alternative was inadequate where it satisfied some, but not all, of prison officials’ concerns).

Because Mauro failed “to point to an alternative that accommodates [his] rights at de minimis cost to security interests,” we hold that the policy “is not an exaggerated response” to the problems sought to be addressed by the defendants. See Casey, 4 F.3d at 1523 .

IV.

We recognize that there may be a different, less restrictive means of achieving defendants’ legitimate objectives. Under Thornburgh , however, the defendants are not required to adopt the least restrictive means of achieving these objectives. Rather, the defendants must simply ensure that the policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Because, under the facts of this case, the prohibition on sexually explicit materials fulfills this reasonableness test, we hold that the policy does not violate the First Amendment.

AFFIRMED.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges B. FLETCHER and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

The majority upholds a regulation that is not the regulation being enforced by Maricopa County in its jails. The County’s regulation defines “sexually explicit” materials as those materials that “show frontal nudity.” It bans publications ranging from the National Geographic to art books displaying Michelangelo’s David. At the same time, it permits inmates to receive the Sports Illustrated swimsuit issues and seductive lingerie catalogs. The Maricopa County regulation is not rationally related to any goal of rehabilitation, security, or preventing sexual harassment. It thus fails the primary test articulated by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 , 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).

The majority treats the regulation as if it were far narrower and limited to sexually explicit depictions like those contained in hard or soft core pornographic publications. As our panel originally and unani *1064 mously held, the regulation is overbroad and flunks the second Turner test as well. It leaves no alternative means for inmates to exercise their First Amendment rights to illustrated educational, religious, or other materials that may contain nude figures but are unrelated to any of the penological concerns underlying the regulation.

In upholding the regulation, the majority puts us in conflict with the Supreme Court’s teaching in Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 , 417 n. 15, 109 S.Ct. 1874 , 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989), that prisons should eschew prohibition of broad categories of publications. The Court, in Thorn-burgh, approved a regulation that permitted a federal prison warden to exclude any specific publication after the warden determined that it was “detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution.” Id. at 416 , 109 S.Ct. 1874 . Although the standard for exclusion may have seemed broad, the Court explained that it was circumscribed by the requirement that “no publication may be excluded unless the warden himself makes the determination.” Id. The Court favorably referred to other provisions of the regulation that prohibited the warden from delegating his exclusion power or establishing a list of excluded publications. Id. at 416-17 , 109 S.Ct. 1874 .

In contrast, Maricopa County’s policy places the power of exclusion far from the jail’s administrators, leaving it up to several rotating, relatively low level mail officers to decide whether a publication is impermissible. Moreover, the policy seeks to facilitate the mail officers’ detection of prohibited material by imposing an easy to administer, bright line, standard of “frontal nudity.” Consequently, the County’s policy falls squarely within the Thorn-burgh Court’s admonition that “[a]ny attempt to achieve greater consistency by broader exclusions might itself run afoul of the second Turner factor.” Id. at 417 n. 15, 109 S.Ct. 1874 .

No other court has upheld such a broad intrusion into an inmate’s First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 405 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (banning sexually explicit materials involving homosexuality, sado-masochism, bestiality, and children); Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1052 (2d Cir.1995) (banning nude or semi-nude photographs of inmates’ wives or girlfriends); Dawson v. Scurr, 986 F.2d 257 , 259 n. 2 (8th Cir.1993) (regulation prohibiting “material portraying bestiality, sadomasochism, child nudity, or child sexual activity,” and several other sexual acts).

Yet the majority appears to believe it has a regulation similar to that recently upheld by a panel majority of the D.C. Circuit in Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192 (D.C.Cir.1998), cert. denied — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 2392 , - L.Ed.2d - (1999). The Maricopa County regulation is very different. In Amatel , the court upheld a federal regulation prohibiting material that is “sexually explicit” or “features nudity.” The Bureau of Prisons adopted a definition of “features nudity” that is much narrower than Maricopa County’s standard: “ ‘features’ means that ‘the publication contains depictions of nudity or sexually explicit conduct on a routine or regular basis or promotes itself based upon such depictions-in the case of individual onetime issues.’ ” Amatel, 156 F.3d at 194 . More significant, however, is that the regulation in Amatel expressly provides for an exception to the ban on material that features nudity “if it contains ‘nudity illustrative of medical, educational, or anthropological content.’ ” Id. Accordingly, the Amatel court acknowledged that the regulation prohibited only “pornography.” Id. at 199 (“The legislative judgment is that pornography adversely affects rehabilitation.”); id. (“We think that the government could rationally have seen a connection between pornography and rehabilitative values.”). 1

*1065 Maricopa County’s regulation proscribes much more. This record demonstrates that prison officials would ban a photograph of a nude Christ painted by Michelangelo. See Mauro v. Arpaio, 147 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir.1998). The D.C. Circuit in Amatel observed that “[w]e find it all but impossible to believe that the Swimsuit Edition and Victoria’s Secret pass muster while Michelangelo’s David or concentration camp pictures fail; nor has there been any suggestion that any prison official has attempted to implement such a bizarre interpretation.” 156 F.3d at 202 . The record in this case establishes the very facts that the Amatel court found “all but impossible to believe.”

Moreover, the sole justification offered by the federal prisons in Amatel for their regulation was inmate rehabilitation. Here, however, the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee who has not yet been convicted of any crime. Just as the County has no legitimate interest in his punishment, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), neither can it have a legitimate interest in his rehabilitation. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 273 , 93 S.Ct. 1055 , 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973) (“[I]t would hardly be appropriate for the State to undertake in the pretrial detention period programs to rehabilitate a man still clothed with a presumption of innocence.”); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 , 1345 n. 11 (9th Cir.1977) (observing that a pretrial detainee can “assert his status as a shield” against jail policies aimed at rehabilitation). The majority appropriately recognizes that the County’s goal of rehabilitation is not legitimate as applied to pretrial detainees, but dismisses any concern simply by noting that the County’s jails house “a mix of pretrial detainees and convicted inmates.”

The County did not rationalize its reliance on rehabilitation by arguing that some of its jail’s residents are convicted inmates. Quite the contrary, the County has consistently argued to this court that the brief stay of its inmates, an average of 13.6 days, is a consideration that favors the regulation’s validity. The thrust of the County’s argument is that this regulation can rehabilitate inmates who on average spend just two weeks in its jails.

The County even stresses that its goal of rehabilitation is aimed at pretrial detainees. It explains that the regulation is intended “to prevent the introduction of sexually explicit materials into an environment where 10-20% of all inmates are facing charges involving sexual offenses.” (emphasis added). It apparently matters not to the County that inmates “facing charges” are presumed innocent and cannot be the subject of rehabilitative efforts. The fact that the County argues to this court that its regulation advances an illegitimate interest in rehabilitation merely underscores the lack of rationality behind the regulation. Furthermore, because the County in this case cannot invoke rehabilitation as a justification for the policy, Am-atel provides none of the support the majority would draw from it.

In fact, the regulation upheld in Amatel , while less intrusive than the regulation we have before us, is not itself free from constitutional doubt. That regulation prompted an eloquent dissent from Judge Wald:

Amatel, 156 F.3d at 214 (Wald, J., dissenting).

*1066 The majority assumes that prison inmates, including pretrial detainees like Mauro who have been convicted of no crime, are demeaned individuals who would prefer to see trash rather than art and whose First Amendment rights therefore will not be affected. This assumption is without precedent and diminishes our constitutional protections.

. The jail houses a mix of pretrial detainees and convicted inmates. The jail’s goal of rehabilitation is a legitimate goal only to the extent that it applies to the convicted inmates housed at the jail. It is not a legitimate goal to the extent that the jail is attempting to impose rehabilitation on the pretrial detainees housed at the jail. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 , 1345 n. 11 (9th Cir.1977) ("[A] pretrial detainee may assert his status as a shield against intrusive practices aimed solely at rehabilitation but not against practices aimed at security and discipline.”)

. In his dissent, Judge Kleinfeld maintains that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the jail's policy of excluding sexually explicit materials was imposed for the purpose of punishing pretrial detainees. This issue was not raised by the parties in their briefs before this court. The issue has therefore been waived. See Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 , 740 n. 5 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that parties waived issue by failing to raise it in their briefs).

. Although it is not required that prison officials be able to show that the prohibited materials have actually caused problems in the past, see Casey, 4 F.3d at 1521 , their ability to do so certainly strengthens their case.

. That the jail policy may exclude artistic or scientific journals does not render the policy unconstitutionally overbroad. As the Court held in Thornburgh , a prison regulation does not need to pass the “least restrictive alternative test” to withstand constitutional challenge. See 490 U.S. at 414 , 109 S.Ct. 1874 . Rather, as long as the regulation withstands the Turner reasonableness test, it will be deemed constitutional. See id.

Moreover, as the district court found:

Finally, it is interesting to note that one of the very publications that Mauro points to in support of his claim that the policy is "over- broad”-National Geographic-is available in the jail library. In fact, Mauro has been unable to document a single instance in which a prisoner's request for a copy of National Geographic, or any other "scientific” publication, has been refused because of content.

.We reject Mauro's argument that the policy is not "rationally related” because it gives jail employees "unbridled discretion.” As the Court made clear in Thornburgh , regulations which give broad discretion to prison authorities are appropriate where the regulations concern materials coming into a prison. See 490 U.S. at 416 , 109 S.Ct. 1874 . Moreover, rather than giving jail employees unbridled discretion, as Mauro contends, the policy actually grants little, if any, discretion to jail *1061 employees. Under the policy, all materials containing frontal nudity are prohibited. Thus, jail employees must simply determine whether the material in question contains frontal nudity; if it does, it is prohibited under the policy.

We also reject Mauro’s argument that the policy is unconstitutionally "vague.” By ex-eluding all materials containing frontal nudity, the policy sets out a bright-line rule. This bright-line rule not only limits the discretion available to jail employees, but also ensures consistency in the exclusion of materials. There is nothing vague about this policy.

. Mauro points to several more alternatives on appeal that were not raised in the district court. Resolution of whether these newly raised alternatives would be adequate to address the jail’s concerns would involve facts not fully developed in the record. We must therefore decline to address these new arguments on appeal. See Woods v. Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 430 (9th Cir.1996); Bolker v. C.I.R., 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1985).

. ''Pornography” is defined as ''material (as books or a photograph) that depicts erotic behavior and is intended to cause sexual excitement.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 888 (1979).