Opinion by Judge BRUNETTI; Dissent by Judge RYMER.

Don Hill (“Hill”), warden of the California State Prison at Tehachapi, appeals from the district court’s order granting Eddie Bell (“Bell”) a writ of habeas corpus unless the State of California schedules a motion for new trial with appointed counsel or a new trial. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , review the district court’s order de novo, see Eslaminia v. White, 136 F.3d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir.1998), and affirm.

I.

On November 6, 1990, Bell was sentenced to thirteen years in prison after a jury found him guilty of second degree robbery. Bell waived his right to counsel and represented himself during his robbery trial, but requested that the court appoint counsel to represent him for his motion for a new trial after the jury returned its guilty verdict. The state trial court, noting that California and other federal circuit courts had rejected our decision in Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir.1989) (‘We ... hold that ... an accused who requests an attorney at the time of a motion for a new trial is entitled to have one appointed”), denied Bell’s request for counsel. Bell’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and the California Supreme Court denied Bell’s petition for review.

On July 19, 1994, Bell filed his First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . Bell challenged his 1990 robbery conviction and sentence alleging, inter alia, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the state trial court refused to appoint counsel for,his new trial motion. The district court, after adopting the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, issued an order granting Bell a writ of habeas corpus unless the State of California scheduled either a motion for a new trial with appointed counsel or a new trial. The district court, via the Magistrate’s report, reasoned that, under our decision in Menefield , the state trial court’s refusal to appoint Bell counsel for his new trial motion violated Bell’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and was prejudicial per se. Hill appeals from the district court’s order granting Bell habeas relief arguing that the district court’s application of Menefield constitutes the impermissible application of a “new rule” under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989).

II.

A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief cannot benefit from a “new” court-made rule. See Teague v. Lane, 489 *1091 U.S. 288, 310 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). To determine whether a court-made rule is “new” under Teague , a federal habeas court must conduct a three step inquiry. See O’Dell v. Netherlands 521 U.S. 161 , 156, 117 S.Ct. 1969 , 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997).

Id. at 156-57, 117 S.Ct. 1969 (quotations and citations omitted). The district court’s conclusion that the state court’s failure to grant Bell counsel for his new trial motion was prejudicial per se did not constitute the impermissible application of a “new rule” under Teague because our decision in Menefield pre-dates Bell’s robbery conviction and, under Menefield , a state court considering a request for counsel for a new trial motion made at the time of Bell’s request would have felt compelled to conclude that the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent required the appointment of counsel as requested.

A.

The district court did not err under the first part of the Teague inquiry because we decided Menefield before Bell was arrested let alone convicted for robbery and it has long been established that the denial of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is prejudicial per se. See Menefield, 881 F.2d at 701 n. 7 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)). In other words, there is no issue under the first part of the Teague inquiry in this habeas proceeding because Bell is not seeking to avail himself of the benefits of a decision or rule decided or announced after his .conviction became final. See O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 156 , 117 S.Ct. 1969 ; Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 , 114 S.Ct. 948 , 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994). This is true despite the fact that Bell bases his Sixth Amendment claim specifically on Ninth Circuit precedent rather than Supreme Court precedent. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 339-44 , 113 S.Ct. 2112 , 124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 25-26 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992).

In Gilmore , a habeas petitioner sought relief on the ground that a jury instruction given at his trial violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gilmore, 508 U.S. at 335 , 113 S.Ct. 2112 . The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted the petitioner habeas relief in light of its decision in Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir.1990), a case decided after the petitioner’s conviction became final, concluding that Falconer did not announce a new rule under Teague. See Gilmore, 508 U.S. at 339 , 113 S.Ct. 2112 . The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit not because Falconer was a circuit court case but because Falconer was decided after the petitioner’s conviction became final and was not “foreordained” by Supreme Court precedent, thereby announcing a new rule under Teague. See id. at 344, 109 S.Ct. 1060 . The Supreme Court stated that “[sjubject to two narrow exceptions, a case that is decided after a defendant’s conviction and sentence become final may not provide the basis for federal •habeas relief if it announces a ‘new rule.’ ” Id. at 399-40 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 466-67 , 113 S.Ct. 892 , 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993)) (emphasis added). Gilmore , therefore, instructs that Teague bars the application of circuit court precedent that announces a new rule *1092 and post-dates a petitioner’s conviction but does not prevent the application of circuit court precedent that pre-dates a habeas petitioner’s conviction.

In Parke , the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on its decision in Dunn v. Simmons, 877 F.2d 1275 (6th Cir.1989), when it granted relief to a habeas petitioner even though Simmons was decided after the petitioner’s conviction became final. See Parke, 506 U.S. at 25-26 , 113 S.Ct. 517 . The Supreme Court recognized that the case presented a Teague issue because the Sixth Circuit relied on precedent that post-dated the petitioner’s conviction not because the Sixth Circuit relied on circuit court precedent. See id., 506 U.S. at 26, 113 S.Ct. 517 . 2 Parke , therefore, further supports the conclusion that Teague does not bar the application of circuit court precedents that pre-date a habeas petitioner’s conviction. Accordingly, the district court’s application of Menefield in this ha-beas proceeding does not constitute the impermissible application of a new rule under the first part of the Teague inquiry because the district court applied circuit court precedent that pre-dates Bell’s robbery conviction.

B.

The district court did not err under the second part of the Teague inquiry when it relied on Menefield because, under our precedent, at the time when Bell’s conviction became final a state court would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel for a new trial motion. This is because prior to Bell’s conviction we had already conclusively determined that the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent requires the appointment of counsel for a new trial motion, see Menefield, 881 F.2d at 697-99 , and we are bound by that determination. See United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir.1992) (“[0]ne three-judge panel of this court cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel.”).

In Menefield , we held “that the right to counsel attaches to the motion for a new trial stage.” Menefield, 881 F.2d at 699 . To reach this holding, we relied exclusively on Supreme Court precedent addressing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see id. at 698 (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 , 101 S.Ct. 1866 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 , 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 , 83 S.Ct. 1050 , 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 , 83 S.Ct. 814 , 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 , 93 S.Ct. 2568 , 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973)), and concluded that “[u]nder Ash , although the state trial court expressed doubt as to the significance of the motion, we think there can be little question that the motion for a new trial under California law is a critical stage of the prosecution.” Id. at 699. We went on to quote the Supreme Court stating that “ [t]he presence of trained counsel at [the motion for a new trial] insures that the most favorable arguments will be presented and ‘that the accused’s interests will be protected con- . sistently with our theory of criminal prosecution.’ ” Id. at 699 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 .). Thus, in Menefield , we conclusively determined that the Sixth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent addressing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel compelled the conclusion that counsel must be appointed for a new trial motion when such counsel is requested.

We are bound by Menefield and, therefore, we cannot now say that a state court would not have felt compelled by the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent to grant Bell counsel for his new trial *1093 motion. Gay, 967 F.2d at 327 . This is true even though other federal courts and state courts have rejected our holding in Menefield because a prior decision from this court can only be revisited by a three-judge panel if it has been undermined by an intervening Supreme Court decision. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 456 (9th Cir.1994). The California courts, like other federal courts outside of the Ninth Circuit, are free to reject our decision in Menefield and persons convicted in state courts are free to petition the Supreme Court to adopt our holding in Menefield ; however, when a pre-AEDPA habeas petition like Bell’s is filed in the Ninth Circuit, we and the district courts in this circuit must follow controlling circuit court precedent like Menefield that was “foreordained” by Supreme Court precedent. See Gilmore, 508 U.S. at 344 , 113 S.Ct. 2112 . Application of Menefield in this habeas proceeding does not, therefore, offend the second part of the Teague inquiry because Menefield itself determined that a state court would have felt compelled by the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent to conclude that Bell was entitled to counsel for his new trial motion.

C.

Our conclusion that the application of Menefield in this proceeding does not constitute the impermissible application of a “new rule” under Teague is also supported by the simple fact that Menefield is a post- Teague decision. We decided Menefield more than five months after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Teague , but we did not discuss Teague in Menefield . This demonstrates that we did not view Teague as a barrier to granting habeas relief to the petitioner in Menefield . If Teague did not stand as a barrier to the holding “announced” and applied in Menefield, Teague cannot now stand as barrier to the application of Menefield the second time around in this habeas proceeding ten years later.

Finally, we feel compelled to note that at the most basic level we must give effect to controlling Ninth Circuit precedent in this habeas proceeding because the determinative issue in this pre-AEDPA proceeding is whether Bell is in state custody in violation of the constitution. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241 and 2254 (West 1994) (amended Apr. 24, by 1996, Pub.L. 104-132 ). Under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent, Bell is in state custody in violation of the constitution and habeas relief must be granted because Bell was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the state court denied Bell’s request for counsel for his new trial motion. See Menefield, 881 F.2d at 701 . If we did not affirm the district court’s order granting Bell habeas relief and circumvented our express holding in Menefield , circuit court precedent would have no precedential value in the pre-AEDPA habeas context. This cannot be the rule of law that governs habeas proceedings that come before this or any other court. The district court did not, therefore, err when it issued an order granting Bell a writ of habeas corpus unless the State of California schedules a motion for a new trial with appointed counsel or a new trial.

AFFIRMED.

. The Supreme Court did not resolve the Teague issue presented in Parke because the Commonwealth of Kentucky did not argue the Teague issue in the Sixth Circuit. See Parke, 506 U.S. at 26 , 113 S.Ct. 517 .