concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Because I can find no instance of reversible error in the trial record to suggest that the Speedy Trial Act was violated, I must respectfully dissent from Part II of the majority’s opinion. I concur in the sufficiency of the evidence analysis in Part III which moots my Speedy Trial Act analysis as to Khachatrian.

The majority does not point to a single instance of error in any of the five district court orders continuing the trial. Instead, *345 it simply declares that the “sheer length of the delay” itself is grounds enough for finding a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, as though this excuse for reversal rises like an emergent property from the trial record. Maj. op. at 339. Examining each of these orders in detail, I conclude that district court ruled properly on each occasion. I respectfully decline to join the majority in aggregating five correct rulings into one transcendent incorrect one.

I

Let us first review the reasonableness of the individual continuances that were premised on Saccoccia’s unavailability for trial. In its March 30, 1992 order, the district court granted a continuance, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7), on the ground that Saccoccia was a fugitive in Switzerland. The majority itself cites to United States v. Tobin, 840 F.2d 867 (11th Cir.1988), a case in which the Eleventh Circuit held that an eight-month delay to apprehend a co-defendant was reasonable to apply to the appellant in that case. See id. at 869-70 . Likewise, a delay of over three months to apprehend a co-defendant was held reasonable by the Eighth Circuit. See United States v. Cordova, 157 F.3d 587, 598-99 (8th Cir.1998). Thus, the five-month delay granted to the government, continuing trial to September 15, 1992, to apprehend and to extradite Saccoccia was not unreasonable. In any event, the sheer complexity of the case and the need for foreign evidence were adequate factors upon which to validate the first continuance.

In its July 31, 1992 order, the district court found that a continuance to February 9, 1993 was necessary because Saccoc-cia was to be tried first in Rhode Island rather than California. The district court thoroughly investigated the government’s decision and the district court’s findings are compelling. First, the Rhode Island indictment was filed prior to the California indictment. It would seem strange, therefore, that the California trial should take precedence over this earlier indictment. Second, the Rhode Island indictment joined Saccoccia with other co-defendants. Thus, the Rhode Island district court would be faced with the same speedy trial issues that the Central District of California faced. In addition, three of the Rhode Island co-defendants were incarcerated pending trial. The government understandably preferred to compel to await trial the co-defendants out on bail rather than the co-defendants who were incarcerated. Thus, because the delay issues were similar in Rhode Island and in California, the government’s decision to try the Rhode Island indictment first was eminently justifiable.

In United States v. Dennis, 737 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir.1984), the Seventh Circuit held that a 144-day delay was reasonable under § 3161(h)(7) to allow for Dennis’ co-defendant to be “transported out of district on a preceding writ of habeas corpus ... for prosecution on a different charge” in a different district. Id. at 620. The court reasoned that Dennis’s co-defendant “was in custody and his whereabouts known at all times; while the government did not know precisely when [the co-defendant] could be produced, there was never any doubt that he would be produced; the delay was necessary to insure a joint trial.” Id. at 621. Similarly, in this case, once Saccoccia was extradited to Rhode Island, Saccoccia was in custody and his whereabouts were known. Furthermore, the government also knew that he would be produced eventually. Finally, the delay was necessary for Saccoccia to finish his trial in Rhode Island so that he could then be transported to California to face trial with Appellants. See also United States v. Piasecki, 969 F.2d 494, 501 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that the time taken for a co-defendant to face trial before another judge was excludable as to that co-defendant and, because the co-defendant “was an unsevered co-defendant whose time for trial had not run, this time, likewise, constituted excludable delay as to Piasecki”).

*346 The district court’s December 11, 1992 order continuing trial to May 18, 1993 was justified by the delay in Saccoccia’s Rhode Island trial. The sudden illness of Sac-coccia’s counsel caused a mistrial and a continuance of the Rhode Island trial to February 1993. Appellants argue that Saccoccia could have been transported to California to stand trial before returning to Rhode Island for retrial. The Rhode Island district judge, however, specifically requested that Saccoccia remain in his district pending retrial, a request the government “felt obliged to respect.” Compliance with the Rhode Island judge’s request was completely reasonable. First, the Rhode Island trial had started. Thus, the judge and government were fully prepared to go forward with the trial. Second, Appellants did not oppose the government’s motion for this continuance with any vigor. In fact, defense counsel “indicated that, while [they] eontinue[d] to oppose any continuance based upon the arguments [they] originally put forth in March, 1992, ... [they] recognize[d] that the reasons stated in the court’s March 30, 1992 order still applied] in this case as a basis to continue the trial.” In light of this evidence, the additional three-month delay occasioned by the court’s order was perfectly understandable.

The final continuance granted by the district court in its April 5,- 1993 order, which moved the trial date to September 1993, was justified by Saccoccia’s need to retain counsel in Los Angeles and for the new counsel to prepare for trial. This circuit has held that four months of excludable delay while a co-defendant prepares for trial can be reasonably applied to another defendant. See United States v. Butz, 982 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1993). Thus, the four-month delay to allow Saccoccia to prepare for trial was clearly reasonable especially given the complexity of the case and volume of the evidence.

Not one of these five orders involved reversible error, and the majority opinion makes no attempt to argue the contrary. How the majority can then prestidigítate a reversal is baffling. Certainly, the seventeen-month delay in this case is significant, but as the majority concedes, this is not the longest delay the courts have found reasonable under § 3161(h)(7) of the Speedy Trial Act. In United States v. Salerno, 108 F.3d 730 (7th Cir.1997), for example, the Seventh Circuit found a seventeen-month delay between Salerno’s first trial, in which the jury could not reach a verdict, and his second trial to be reasonable. In Salerno , the delay was caused by a flurry of post-conviction motions filed by Salerno’s co-defendants. Salerno, who had not been convicted in the first trial, was not a party to any of those motions. In the end, only Salerno was tried on the additional counts not decided in the first trial. Like Appellants, Salerno’s long delay was for nought because he was ultimately not tried with the co-defendants for whom he had waited so long. The Seventh Circuit decided, nevertheless, that the delay excludable as to Salerno’s co-defendants was attributable to Salerno because the co-defendants were subject to retrial on the remaining counts along with Salerno. See id. at 736 . Likewise, in this case, the almost seventeen-month delay is long but, because it was excludable to Saccoc-cia, it was also excludable to Masino and Messer. 1

II

Let us turn next to the majority’s prejudice analysis. Regarding this element of the Speedy Trial Act, the Fifth Circuit has recently provided illumination: “With respect to the prejudice analysis, relevant considerations include whether the delay impaired the appellant’s ability to defend himself or resulted in excessive pretrial incarceration.” United States v. Franklin, 148 F.3d 451, 457 (5th Cir.1998).

*347 Appellants proffer three arguments to support their claims of prejudice: (1) the delay gave the government substantially more evidence to prove its case than was available at the original trial date; (2) the delay removed any pressure from the United States attorney in Rhode Island to plea bargain with the Los Angeles defendants; and the only argument revealed by the majority, (3) that an important witness had died before trial.

The first two arguments are devoid of merit, as the majority’s failure even to mention them suggests. Their first concern — that the government’s additional time to prepare made its case stronger against Appellants — is simply not a valid showing of prejudice. See Salerno, 108 F.3d at 738 (stating that “ ‘prejudice is not caused by allowing the Government properly to strengthen its case, but rather by delays intended to hamper defendant’s ability to present his defense’” (quoting United States v. Tedesco, 726 F.2d 1216, 1221 (7th Cir.1984))). The second claim-regarding plea bargaining ability — is impossible to comprehend because of Appellants’ inadequate development of the argument. Appellants provide no explanation of why passage of time would affect their plea bargaining ability. Nor do Appellants indicate whether they ever approached the government to initiate plea bargaining or if they would have been willing to accept a plea had the opportunity presented itself.

Like the majority, I conclude that the third allegation of prejudice is the only one worth exploring. Certainly the loss of a potential witness goes to Appellants’ ability to defend themselves at trial. Mr. Agh-abegian, however, was an outsider who would not have known the details of IMM, Clinton, and RGE. In addition, it is somewhat suspicious that the only witness Appellants would have called at trial died. Messer and Masino provided the defense’s only testimony at trial.

Furthermore, generalized complaints about the overall length of the delay are similarly weak. We must remember that Appellants were not subjected to lengthy pretrial incarceration. See Salerno, 108 F.3d at 738 (“[Defendant cannot convincingly claim that he was prejudiced by the unresolved criminal charges looming over his head. He was neither incarcerated during the seventeen-month period, nor did he seek to modify his bond conditions during that time.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc. 871 F.2d 902, 917 (10th Cir.1989) (“[W]e cannot ignore that prior to trial ... Mr. Philpot was free on bond.”). These Appellants suffered far less inconvenience than defendants incarcerated while awaiting trial.

Ill

Finally, the majority’s newly announced rule regarding severance is an unjustifiable pronouncement on this issue. See maj. op. at 340. With very good reason, courts frequently consider a defendant’s efforts to sever trial a vital factor in evaluating prejudice. See Franklin, 148 F.3d at 467 (“A defendant’s failure to move for severance, or otherwise to pursue a speedy trial in the district court, can undermine prejudice allegations made on appeal.”); Mobile Materials, 871 F.2d at 917 (“Nor can we overlook the fact that throughout the protracted history of this prosecution Mr. Philpot has never filed a motion for severance.”). Indeed some circuits have held that a defendant must make a motion to sever in order to rely on the reasonableness requirement of subsection (h)(7). See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 337 (2d Cir.1990). In this case, Appellants did not move to sever their case from Saccoccia’s and now argue that a motion to sever would have been pointless. Their decision not to do so, however, could easily' be interpreted as a tactical decision — an attempt to take advantage of the Speedy Trial Act. As the district court noted, “because the defendants were represented by able and experienced counsel, the Court can only assume that counsels’ decision not to move for severance was a *348 strategic one.” I cannot agree with the majority’s assertion that a defendant’s failure to file a motion for severance is not a critical issue in evaluating his appeal based on the Speedy Trial Act. If the defendant himself is in no hurry to proceed to trial, why should we entertain his assertions later that he was prejudiced by the wait? I respectfully maintain that we should not.

IV

While the overall delay in this case may have been lengthy, each individual postponement was amply supported by the circumstances at the time. In each case, the district court filed well-considered orders establishing the necessity and reasonableness of the continuances. The government’s and district court’s emphasis on bringing a single trial against all four defendants was entirely rational. In light of the resources involved in Appellants’ three-month trial, an unnecessary repeat performance would indeed have been a waste of judicial and prosecutorial resources. Yet, pointing to no mistakes by the district court, the majority now nevertheless orders just that.

I respectfully dissent.

. In addition, only the final twelve months of delay were attributable solely to Saccoccia's delays. The first continuances were justified by other factors.