Opinion by Judge NOONAN; Dissent by Judge DAVID R. THOMPSON.

Baby Tam & Co., Inc., (Baby Tam) appeals the dissolution of the permanent injunction of the district court enjoining the City of Las Vegas (the City) from enforcing Chapter 6.06A of the Las Vegas Municipal Code against Baby Tam. We hold that Chapter 6.06A is still on its face unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for re-entry of the permanent injunction.

PROCEEDINGS

This case is a sequel to Baby Tam & Co., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir.1998) (Baby Tam I). The proceedings prior to the decision are fully set out therein. In Baby Tam I we held that Chapter 6.06A failed to provide for prompt judicial review of a denial of a license to operate a bookstore and therefore was “on its face a prior restraint of speech which violates the First and Fourteenth amendments.” Id. at 1099 . We stated: “Having resolved this issue, it is unnecessary for us to decide the other issues Baby Tam raises.” Id. at 1102 . We remanded with instructions

The district court issued a permanent injunction in the terms set by the remand. The City then took steps to remedy the constitutional defect that the court had identified. The City amended section 6.06A.025 to add subsection D, which provides as follows:

The City also secured amendments to Chapter 34 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, as follows:

The City also persuaded the Eighth Judicial District Court to change its rules of practice by adding Rule 2.17, which provides as follows:

The City then applied to the district court for dissolution of the permanent injunction. On July 20, 1999, the district court held that “the deficiencies noted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had been corrected” and dissolved the permanent injunction.

Baby Tam appeals.

ANALYSIS

In Baby Tam I this court decided the case on a narrow basis, explicitly noting that Baby Tam had raised other issues which it was not necessary to reach. By winning the case on the first appeal, Baby Tam did not abandon its other constitutional objections to the facial validity of the municipal ordinance. The City is mistaken in supposing that those issues are no longer part of this case and no longer before us.

The City, the legislature of the State of Nevada, and the Eighth Judicial District Court have cooperated magnificently to eliminate the constitutional defect identified by this court. Baby Tam objects that the form of judicial review provided — • mandamus — will not be constitutionally adequate. The Nevada mandamus procedure, however, appears to provide for a reasonable opportunity to obtain a determination of all constitutional issues. As we stated in Baby Tam I, “[t]he phrase [judicial review] necessarily has two elements' — (1) consideration of a dispute by a judicial officer, and (2) a decision.” 154 F.3d at 1101 . Baby Tam may, of course, raise an objection if the ordinance is unconstitutionally applied. But on its face the judicial review appears to pass constitutional muster.

A Las Vegas council member or a Nevada legislator might think, we did what the courts said the Constitution required. Wasn’t that enough? As it turns out, it wasn’t, because this court did not take upon itself to expound all the constitutional problems in the statute or write a primer on the First Amendment. This court did give preeminence in its opinion to FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 , 110 S.Ct. 596 , 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990), citing at several places in the opinion. That case points without ambiguity to a continuing defect in the City’s ordinance. To quote the decisive language:

As a consequence, the Dallas ordinance in that case was held invalid.

The quoted language is from the plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor, concurred in by Justices Stevens and Kennedy; but the implication sometimes conveyed by “plurality opinion” is deceiving, because Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall would have gone further in holding the ordinance entirely invalid; so, in effect, six members of the Supreme Court found this kind of ordinance defective.

Section 6.06A.025 is not any different from the invalid Dallas ordinance. It reads:

Section (B) defines the Director’s duty to act “within the thirty days.” The use of the definite article “the” identifies this period as the thirty days just referred to in (A). Under (A) the thirty days begin to run “from receipt of a complete application and fees upon compliance with the requirements of this Section and any applicable provisions of Title 6 of this Code.” Other applicable provisions of the Code include “the standards of the health, zoning, fine and safety laws of the State of Nevada and ordinances of the City of Las Vegas applicable thereto.” LVMC § 6.06A.020. No time limit is set within which satisfaction of these requirements must be found. The time is as indefinite as in the invalid Dallas ordinance. The thirty days within which the Director must act may be indefinitely postponed. The ordinance fails to meet the requirements of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

In reaching this conclusion and invalidating the ordinance for this facial flaw, we do not prejudge any other issue that may arise in further litigation of this case. Baby Tam in its suit challenged the City’s “business and zoning license scheme” on several fronts. In again deciding on one issue, we do not determine whether any other defect may be found in the scheme on its face.

Reversed and Remanded to the district court with instructions to enter a permanent injunction against the City from denying a license to Baby Tam until all constitutional defects on the face of its business and zoning license scheme for adult bookstores are remedied.