dissenting:

Because I can find no record of oral consent by the parties to the magistrate judge’s authority to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c), but only consent forms filed in the district court February 28, 2000 — nearly three years after the “final” judgment was entered on December 19, 1997 and two years after the notice of appeal was filed (January 5, 1998) — I would vacate the judgment, dismiss the appeal, and remand to the district court.

Local 48 first sought leave to correct a clerical error in the record by filing a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) in this court. The motion represented that the parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge, but through oversight, the written consent was not filed with the court. We construed the motion as a notice of intent to file a motion in the district court, and stayed the appeal. Local 48 then filed its motion in district court, along with the affidavits of its own counsel, Paul C. Hays, and a letter from Kofoed’s trial counsel, David J. Hollander. Hays’s affidavit avers that Hollander and he had agreed to proceed before Judge Jelderks, but that they did not reduce the agreement to writing or file a consent with the court. When Hays realized the oversight after receiving Kofoed’s opening brief on appeal, he talked with Hollander. Hays followed up the conversation with a letter dated November 4, 1999 in order to clarify Kofoed’s position. In the letter, Hays recited that he and Hollander had “shared recollections” of a conference with Magistrate Judge Jelderks in the fall of 1996 during which it was “understood” that he would take control of the Kofoed case and that “we were in agreement that he should do so.” Hays indicates that he (Hays) had a recollection of Judge Jelderks specifically inquiring as to whether anyone had any objection to consenting to him and his and Hollander’s agreement with the proposal. *1007 The letter also recounts Hollander’s belief that he had not signed a consent form on behalf of Kofoed, or filed one, because the issue was lost in the shuffle. Hollander responded to Hays’s letter by indicating no disagreement with Hays’s recollection and stating that “[i]t was always my intent to consent to Judge Jelderks as the Presiding Judge.” Kofoed and Local 48 then executed consent forms. On March 6, 2000 the district court granted Local 48’s motion, noting that counsel for both parties had previously consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge and that this consent had been confirmed with written consents.

Assuming that oral consent suffices, none was given here on the record. Cf General Trading Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1495 (11th Cir.1997) (oral consent acceptable, where proceeding was on the record). Counsel’s affidavit stops short of saying that any consent was given in court or to the court. Nor do the Rule 60(a) papers stipulate that consent had previously been given; at most they reflect counsels’ intention to do so. 1

I believe that we should require that for consent to be effective, it must be clearly and unambiguously expressed before the magistrate judge conducts any proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (e). As the statute provides, it is only “upon the consent of the parties” that a magistrate judge may conduct proceedings and order the entry of judgment. Likewise, as Rule 73 provides, it is only “when all parties consent thereto” that a magistrate judge may exercise the authority provided by § 636(c) and may conduct all proceedings in a civil case. Prior consent is plainly contemplated.

Absent clear and unequivocal communication of consent before dispositive rulings are made that a magistrate judge otherwise could not make, the parties are free to roll the dice on the outcome. This is costly to the system, for some or all of the proceedings will have to be redone if consent has not been properly manifested. By contrast, filling out and filing consent forms at the outset is not onerous. Therefore, I would adopt a clear and clean rule that consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by a magistrate judge must be given prior to the magistrate judge’s exercising civil trial jurisdiction, and that it must be communicated either orally on the record or, preferably, in written forms provided for the purpose.

In any event, I would dismiss this appeal because the only definitive consents (the written forms executed by Kofoed himself and Local 48’s counsel) came long after judgment.

. I have a further misgiving about the use of Rule 60(a) in this case. Even if in some circumstances a motion to correct the record might be a sufficient vehicle for redressing an incorrect record, I do not see how Rule 60(a) does the trick here. It allows for correction of "clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission.” Here, no clerical mistake or error in the record appears — the record quite accurately reflects the absence of consent to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction. The only "oversight” was a failure by counsel, not the court, to fill out and file the appropriate forms.