dissenting:

The majority’s holding today upholds the unconditional reinstatement of two confirmed drug users to their safety-sensitive positions as pipeline crew assistants for Southern California Gas Company. Because this result directly conflicts with the clear language of the applicable collective bargaining agreement and violates firmly established public policies against such reinstatement, I respectfully dissent.

I

The following facts are undisputed. Southern California Gas Company (“Company”) hired Lorenza Wilson (“Wilson”) and Gerry Daniel (“Daniel”) in 1983 and 1984 respectively. In 1990, the Company implemented random drug testing of its employees, to be conducted pursuant to Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations. The Utility Workers Union of America, Local 132, AFL-CIO (“Union”), reserved the right to arbitrate any allegations that the random drug test policy violated DOT regulations. The Union and the Company subsequently agreed that employees shall be terminated immediately after “their first positive test, on random or for cause, with no offer of rehabilitation being extended unless the employee has 15 or more years of service with the Company. In those cases rehabilitation will be offered on a one-time basis.” The parties agree that this provision became a part of the operative collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).

In 1995 Wilson and Daniel worked for the Company as pipeline crew assistants. The position of crew assistant is safety sensitive. Consequently, Wilson and Daniel were subject to DOT random drug testing. On October 3, 1995, Wilson tested positive for cocaine metabolites pursuant to a random drug test. Daniel tested positive for marijuana, amphetamines, and methamphetamines on August 22, 1995, also pursuant to a random drug test. The laboratory analyzed both urine specimens according to proper procedures and neither Wilson nor Daniel contest the validity of the test results.

After the laboratory determined that Daniel and Wilson’s drug tests were positive, it sent the results for evaluation by *798 Gerald Barnes (“Barnes”), as required pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 40.33 (a)(1). 1 Barnes notified the Company that there was no legitimate explanation for the confirmed positive test results other than the unauthorized use of illegal drugs. As required by the CBA, the Company terminated Daniel and Wilson with no offer of rehabilitation because each of them had worked for the Company for less than fifteen years.

The Company contracted with Executive Health Group to provide MRO services. Barnes was designated by Executive Health Group to perform MRO services for the Company from mid-July to October 1995. After its contract with Executive Health Group expired, the Company contracted with Dr. Murray Lappe to perform MRO services. Approximately three months later federal law enforcement authorities arrested Barnes for impersonating a licensed physician and illegally dispensing controlled substances. 2

■ Upon learning of Barnes’ fraudulent representations of his qualifications, the Company notified the Union that Barnes was not a licensed physician. 3 The Company and the Union met to consider the steps that should be taken to remedy the problem caused by the discovery that Barnes was not qualified to review the laboratory findings. The Company and the Union agreed to the following procedure:

Dr. Lappe reported to the Company that there was no legitimate medical explanation for Daniel and Wilson’s positive drug test results other than their use of illegal drugs. Accordingly, the Company did not reinstate Daniel and Wilson.

Notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Lappe confirmed that Daniel and Wilson had tested positive for drug use, the Union insisted that the Company reinstate Daniel and Wilson. The matter proceeded to arbitration. The Union argued that Daniel and Wilson were entitled to reinstatement *799 because the drag test results were reported to the Company before the positive tests were certified by a licensed MRO. The Company countered that, in light of their confirmed drag use, Wilson and Daniel had not been harmed by the fact that Barnes was not qualified to interpret the undisputed positive results of the tests. The Company maintained that the subsequent review by a qualified MRO rendered insubstantial the alleged procedural defect caused by Barnes’ lack of a medical license.

At the arbitration hearing, Daniel and Wilson denied having used illegal drugs. Instead, they alleged that their urine samples were tampered with because the laboratory left them unattended. The parties stipulated, however, that the independent laboratory that tested the specimens followed the required protocol. The arbitrator wholly rejected Wilson and Daniel’s contentions concerning the accuracy of the drag test results. The arbitrator concluded that Wilson and Daniel lied under oath when they denied their drug use, finding that there was “little doubt that both grievants had the illegal substances in question in their bodies[.]” 4 Nevertheless, the arbitrator opined that he “did not see any way around [the] clear language” of 49 C.F.R. § 40.33 (a)(1), requiring that test results be “reviewed by a qualified physician before the Company takes action.” The arbitrator ordered the unconditional reinstatement of Wilson and Daniel to their safety-sensitive positions because the Company did not strictly comply with the DOT regulations.

The Company filed a petition in district court to vacate the arbitrator’s award. It alleged that the arbitrator’s order violates public policy and does not “draw its essence” from the CBA. The district court rejected both claims, holding first that the “outright reinstatement” of Wilson and Daniel did not violate public policy. Second, the district court held that the arbitrator’s award drew its essence from -the CBA because “as employees whose drag tests were not carried out in compliance with DOT regulations, Daniel and Wilson [were] therefore not covered by the provision of the CBA providing for mandatory termination of employees with less than 15 years’ seniority who fail a drag test carried out in compliance with DOT regulations.” This timely appeal followed.

II

The district court had jurisdiction to hear the Company’s petition to vacate the arbitrator’s order pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185 . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review a district court decision refusing to vacate an arbitration award using the same standard applied to “any other district court decision finding an agreement between the parties.” First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-48 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). We must accept findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and decide questions of law de novo. Id. at *800 948 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 . “[C]ourts will set aside the arbitrator’s interpretation of what their agreement means only in rare instances.” E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57 , 121 S.Ct. 462, 466 , 148 L.Ed.2d 354 (2000). However, “an arbitrator’s award is not bulletproof.” Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers Union, Local 996 v. United Parcel Serv., 241 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2001). There are “three exceptions to the general deference to an arbitrator’s award: (1) when the award does not ‘draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement’; (2) when the arbitrator exceeds the scope of the issues submitted; and (3) when the award runs counter to public policy.” SFIC Properties, Inc. v. Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 311, 103 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir.1996). Under the undisputed facts summarized above, we are required to vacate the arbitrator’s award because it does not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and it flagrantly violates public policy in exposing members of the public to serious injury or death as a result of the conduct of drug abusing employees holding safety-sensitive positions in the gas pipeline industry.

Ill

An arbitrator’s award “must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator’s own notions of industrial justice.” E. Associated Coal, 121 S.Ct. at 466 (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 , 108 S.Ct. 364 , 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987)); United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 172 (9th Cir.1995). “The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract; but the parties having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning of the language of the agreement, a court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 . An “arbitrator’s determination must be a ‘plausible interpretation’ of the CBA.” Ass’n of W. Pulp & Paper Workers, Local 78 v. Rexam Graphic, Inc., 221 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir.2000). Plainly, “[a]n award that conflicts directly with the contract cannot be a ‘plausible interpretation.’ ” Frederick Meiswinkel, Inc. v. Laborer’s Union Local 261, 744 F.2d 1374 , 1377 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting Pac. Motor Trucking v. Auto. Machinists Union, 702 F.2d 176, 177 (9th Cir.1983)).

Here, the arbitrator’s award conflicts directly with the text of the CBA and thus cannot be considered a “plausible” interpretation. As amended, the CBA requires “termination of] employees immediately after their first positive drug test, on random or for cause, with no offer of rehabilitation being extended unless the employee has 15 or more years of service with the Company.” The evidence is undisputed that Daniel and Wilson tested positive for drug use. Therefore, Daniel and Wilson were subject to immediate termination pursuant to the express terms of the CBA. By ordering the Company to reinstate Daniel and Wilson, the arbitrator “blatantly ignored the unambiguous language” of the CBA “and fashioned a modified penalty that appealed to his own notions of right and -wrong.” Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 76 F.3d 606 , 610 (4th Cir.1996). The arbitrator lacked authority to create an exception to the “one-strike-and-you’re-out” language of the CBA.

Not only did the arbitrator’s award violate the terms of the CBA, but the reasoning underlying his award makes it abundantly clear that he did not interpret the contract at all. See Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (7th Cir. *801 1987) (“As we have said too many times to want to repeat again, the question for decision by a federal court asked to set aside an arbitration award ... is not whether the arbitrator or arbitrators erred in interpreting the contract ... it is whether they interpreted the contract.”) An award that does not concern the contract at issue can hardly be considered “a plausible interpretation” of the contract. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 , 80 S.Ct. 1358 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) (“[S]o far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.” (emphasis added)).

Here, the arbitrator initially framed the issue presented for arbitration as follows: “[D]id the Company violate the parties’ collective bargaining agreement when it discharged [the grievants]?” Thereafter, the arbitrator narrowed the specific inquiry to the following question:

Without further reference to the text of the CBA, the arbitrator proceeded to dispense his own brand of industrial justice by offering an interpretation of DOT regulations that he felt best allocated the risk of an initial noncompliance with the review of drug test results by a qualified MRO.

In reaching the conclusion that reinstatement was warranted, the arbitrator relied primarily on 49 CFR § 40.33 (a)(1). Section 40.33(a)(1) provides:

49 CFR § 40.33 (a)(1). The Union persuaded the arbitrator that this regulation “requires certification of a positive test by a licensed physician (the MRO) before the Company is told and therefore before discipline is imposed.” The arbitrator also relied on the opinion of DOT Deputy Assistant General Counsel, Robert C. Ashby (“Ashby”). Ashby opined that the timing of the reporting requirement was essential to the purpose of the regulations. 5 In *802 addition, the arbitrator considered “the consequences of accepting the Company’s position on this issue.” Specifically, the arbitrator stated that:

Finally, the arbitrator rejected the Company’s substantial compliance argument on the ground that it “poses the danger of opening up other procedural requirements to a similar test which could, over time, undermine the interests those procedural requirements are designed to protect. It could also lead to wasteful disputes whenever a regulatory requirement, without any fault, was not strictly complied with.” In sum, rather than interpreting the CBA, the arbitrator examined the DOT regulations, concluding that he “[did] not see any way around” the “clear language” of 49 C.F.R. § 40.33 (a)(1).

To be sure, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he labor arbitrator’s source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law — the practices of the industry and the shop — is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it.” United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). This is because “[g]aps may be left to be filled in by reference to the practices of the particular industry and of the various shops covered by the agreement.” Id. at 580 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 . Here, however, the CBA does not leave a gap that needed to be filled under the facts of this case, nor does the CBA refer to the DOT regulations the arbitrator considered. Instead, the CBA unambiguously mandates immediate termination of an employee who has served less than fifteen years if he or she tests positive for drug use. Because there is no ambiguity in the words used by the parties to the CBA, it was improper for the arbitrator to look for clarification in the DOT regulations. This error is particularly egregious in this case because the arbitrator reached a result that directly conflicts with the plain words of the agreement of the parties.

I recognize that “[j]udieial scrutiny of an arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited[,]” Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc., Local No. 359 v. Arizona Mech. & Stainless, Inc., 863 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir.1988), and that “[ajrbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award.” Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 598, 80 S.Ct. 1358 . Surely, however, we are not required to ignore the detailed rationale an arbitrator does offer, in the name of deference to the arbitral system. Here, the arbitrator did not interpret the CBA. Instead, he concocted his own interpretation of DOT regulations. Section 40.33(a)(1) does not require an employer to ignore a positive test result after a qualified MRO has confirmed its validity simply because an earlier notification of the positive test results was reported to the employer by an unqualified MRO. The reasoning of the arbitrator’s award is as unambiguous as the text of the CBA. A comparison of the two makes clear that the arbitrator’s award did not “draw its essence” from the CBA. By upholding the arbitrator’s award, the majority extends deference to an illogical extreme, effectively rendering the arbitrator’s award impervious to review.

IV

We are also required to vacate an arbitrator’s award if it violates public policy. *803 It is.well settled that “a court may not enforce a collective bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy.” W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 , 103 S.Ct. 2177 , 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983). “Any such public policy must be ‘explicit,’ ‘well defined,’ and ‘dominant.’ ” E. Associated Coal Corp., 121 S.Ct. at 467 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766 , 103 S.Ct. 2177 ). “It must be ‘ascertained “by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” ’ ” Id. (quoting W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766 , 103 S.Ct. 2177 ). A “courtfs] authority to invoke the public policy exception is not limited solely to instances where the arbitration award itself violates positive law.” Id. Federal regulations are a significant source for determining what constitutes explicit well-defined public policy. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d at 174 ; E. Associated Coal, 121 S.Ct. at 467 (“[WJhere two political branches have created a detailed regulatory regime in a specific field, courts should approach with particular caution pleas to divine further public policy in that area.”)

“[0]f course, the question to be answered [in this ease] is not whether [Daniel and Wilson’s] drug use itself violates public policy, but whether the agreement to reinstate [them] does so.” E. Associated Coal, 121 S.Ct. at 467 . Specifically, our task is to determine whether an explicit public policy militates against the unconditional reinstatement of employees to safety-sensitive positions who have tested positive for illegal drugs. Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 886 F.2d 1200, 1212-13 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc) (“A court ... must demonstrate that the policy is one that specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.”) Unlike the majority, I am convinced that the policies embodied in the DOT regulations require us to vacate the arbitrator’s award.

A.

First, the DOT regulations militate against reinstating confirmed drug users. DOT regulations provide that “(a) An operator may not knowingly use as an employee any person who — (1) Fails a drug test required by this part and the medical review officer makes a determination under § 199.15(d)(2).” 49 C.F.R. § 199.9 (a)(1) (emphasis added). 6 The policy behind this regulation is clear. Once an employee fails a drug test and an MRO confirms that the test is a true positive, he or she may not be used as an employee in any capacity. Both Wilson and Daniel failed a drug test and their results were reviewed by Dr. Lappe, a qualified MRO. Therefore, the policy embodied by section 199.9(l)(a) unmistakably militates against their reinstatement. 7

*804 This conclusion is bolstered by an examination of two relevant cases. First, in Eastern Associated Coal, the Supreme Court examined DOT regulations evincing a “strong public policy against drug use by transportation workers in safety-sensitive positions and in favor of random drug testing in order to detect that use.” 121 S.Ct. at 468 (emphasis added). For example, the regulations “mandate[ ] suspension of those operators who have driven a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs[,]” and “set forth sanctions applicable to those who test positive for illegal drugs.” Id. at 467-68 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 31310 (b)(1)(A), 31310(c)(2) and 49 C.F.R. § 382.605 (1999)). After reviewing all of the applicable regulations, the Court concluded that “[n]either Congress nor the Secretary has seen fit to mandate the discharge of a worker who twice tests positive for drugs. We hesitate to infer a public policy in this area that goes beyond the careful and detailed scheme Congress and the Secretary have created.” Id. at 469 (emphasis added).

In this case, the applicable regulations do much more than “mandate suspension,” or “set forth sanctions for those who test positive for illegal drugs.” Unlike the regulations at issue in Eastern Associated Coal, the DOT regulations mandate the discharge of a person employed in a safety-sensitive position after his or her first positive drug test, subject to a narrow exception not applicable in this case. 49 C.F.R. § 199.9 (a)(1).

Similarly, in Foster Poultry Farms , this circuit examined whether an arbitration award reinstating two employees who tested positive for drugs “violates the alleged public policy embodied in the [DOT regulations] mandating various forms of drug testing.” 74 F.3d at 171 . Under the applicable regulations, “any person who tests positive for drug use ... shall be ‘medically unqualified’ to operate a commercial motor vehicle.” Id. (quoting 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.95 (b) and (c), 391.97) (emphasis added). We concluded in Foster Poultry Farms that the DOT regulations “do not require an employer to terminate an employee who tests positive for drug use. The regulations only prohibit an employee from driving a commercial motor vehicle.” Id. We held that “[bjecause the DOT regulations do not make it illegal to reinstate employees who test positive for drug use, it cannot be said that the DOT regulations ‘specifically militate [ ] against the relief ordered by the arbitrator’ in this case.” Id. at 174 .

In stark contrast to the regulations interpreted in Foster Poultry Farms , the regulations here do not merely disqualify drug users from performing certain tasks. Rather, they mandate discharge. Thus, the arbitrator’s award converting Wilson and Daniel’s discharges into temporary suspensions violates DOT regulations, which effectively “make it illegal to reinstate employees who test positive for drug use.” Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d at 174 .

Second, DOT regulations militate against reinstating Wilson and Daniel without imposing any conditions upon their return to duty. The regulations provide:

49 C.F.R. § 199.11 (e) (emphasis added). This regulation provides extra assurance that a former employee who has used *805 drugs in the past will not perform a safety-sensitive function unless he or she is no longer using drugs. Here, the arbitrator did not order any return to duty testing. 8 The outright reinstatement of Daniel and Wilson violates this policy. 9

The case law does not require a contrary conclusion. In Eastern Associated Coal, the Supreme Court summarized the district court’s decision as follows: “The District Court, while recognizing a strong regulation-based public policy against drug use by workers who perform safety-sensitive functions held that [the employee’s] conditional reinstatement did not violate that policy.” 121 S.Ct. at 466 (emphasis added). 10 “The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the reasoning of the District Court[,]” and the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. In doing so, the Supreme Court made clear that the conditions imposed on the employee’s rein *806 statement were significant to the question presented:

Id. at 467 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Stead Motors, this circuit framed the relevant inquiry as follows: “[D]oes the arbitrator’s order reinstating (following a dis-ciplina^ suspension) an auto mechanic who committed a reckless act violate an ‘explicit, well defined and dominant’ public policy?” 886 F.2d at 1212 (emphasis added). Thus, neither of these cases speak to the question of an arbitral award that orders unconditional reinstatement of employees who have willfully violated federal safety regulations.

Finally, the dangerous nature of the gas pipeline industry militates against the reinstatement of employees who test positive for drug use. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power v. Local Union 204, of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 , 1428 (8th Cir.1987) (examining the “public interest in the safe operation of nuclear power plants” in affirming on public policy grounds the district court’s vacateur of the arbitrator’s reinstatement). As the Eighth Circuit has noted, “[c]ourts have rejected awards that have ruled in favor of an operator of dangerous equipment who possesses drugs,” whereas the “labor awards directing the reinstatement of employees whose acts posed no danger to public health or safety are usually upheld.” Id. at 1428-29; see also Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1216 (distinguishing Iowa Electric in dicta because the “nuclear power industry is unique both ■with respect to the magnitude of the risk that results from negligent or reckless employee conduct and the comprehensiveness of the governmental regulation.”)

Here, Wilson and Daniel’s drug use undoubtedly poses a danger to public health and safety because the gas pipeline industry, like the nuclear power industry, is extremely hazardous. In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) issued by the DOT, the Research and Special Programs Administration (“RSPA”) reviews the dangers of drug use in pipeline transportation:

53 Fed.Reg. 25892-01, 25893, 25895-96 (July 8, 1988) (emphasis added). In the commentary accompanying the DOT rules and regulations, the RSPA states:

53 Fed.Reg. 47084-01, 47087 (Nov. 21, 1988) (emphasis added). “The fact that [Daniel and Wilson’s violations of the anti-drug policy] did not result in any actual injury to public health or safety is of no consequence. [Their] willful actions could have caused a disaster.... ‘They are no longer to be trusted to work in such a critical environment when [they show] no respect for the safety implications of [their] actions and when [they are] willing to jeopardize the safety of the public.’ ” Iowa Elec., 834 F.2d at 1429.

B.

Although other policies are embodied in the DOT regulations, none is sufficient to overcome the strong policy against reinstatement here. In rendering the award, the arbitrator examined “the reasons why a positive test result must be reviewed by a qualified physician before the Company takes action.” Specifically, he noted that:

First, as the arbitrator noted, the regulations reflect a policy to protect the privacy of employees from the stigma of being labeled a drug user before the test results are verified. Section 40.33(a)(1) requires MRO review of all positive test results prior to transmission of the results to the Company. Mr. Ashby, the Deputy Assistant General Counsel of DOT, noted that “[i]f, as in this case, the employer learns of a positive result prior to such a review, then harm has occurred — the employee is labeled as a drug user and personnel consequences ensure — without an ‘essential’ prerequisite.” The DOT has made clear however, that the privacy interests of the employees are not of paramount concern:

53 Fed.Reg. 47084-01, 47085 (Nov. 21, 1988).

Moreover, the significance of privacy in hazardous industries was conclusively determined by the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Assoc., 489 U.S. 602 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). In Skinner the Court evaluated whether alcohol and drug testing of railroad employees who violate safety rules conforms with the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. At stake in Skinner was as strong a policy in favor of individual privacy as one could expect to find. “The Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.” Id. at 613-14 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 (emphasis added); see also id. at 621-22 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 (“An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.” (emphasis added)).

The Court first determined that drug and alcohol testing entailed numerous intrusions into the employees’ privacy — from “[t]he initial detention necessary to procure the evidence,” id. at 616 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , to “the collection and testing of urine,” id. at 617 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 . The Court next considered the “Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety,” id. at 620 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , noting that the employees covered by the regulation at issue were “engaged in safety-sensitive tasks.” After weighing these competing interests, the Court concluded that “the expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees.” Id. at 627 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 . By contrast, the Court determined that “the Government interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion is compelling[,]” id. at 628 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , because:

Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Court held, “the Government’s compelling interests outweigh [the employees’] privacy concerns.” Id. at 633 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 . In conclusion, the Court summarized:

Id. at 633 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 (emphasis added).

Skinner instructs that in the context of a heavily regulated industry such as the gas industry, safety-sensitive employees have a diminished privacy interest when it comes to drug testing. If the strong privacy guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are overcome by the governmental necessity to regulate safety-sensitive tasks, then certainly the lesser privacy interests protected by the MRO requirement in this ease do not outweigh the dominant policy against drugs in the workplace. See also Carroll v. Fed. Express Corp., 113 F.3d 163, 166 (9th Cir.1997) (“The regulations requiring motor carriers to maintain a drug-free workforce may produce the collateral benefit of increasing safeguards for the privacy of tested individuals, but their raison d’etre is the protection of the general public.”).

The second policy consideration the arbitrator recognized is protecting employees from being terminated for false positive test results. This is accomplished through the MRO review requirement. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 199.3 (defining “[f]ail a drug test” as “the confirmation test result shows positive evidence of the presence imder DOT procedures of a prohibited drug in an employee’s system.” (emphasis added)); 49 C.F.R. § 40.33 (a)(1) (“An essential part of the drug testing program is the final review of confirmed positive results from the laboratory .... An individual with detailed knowledge of possible alternate medical explanations is essential to the review of results.”) Undeniably, it is important to ensure that employees are not erroneously terminated as a result of faulty drug tests. This policy is of negligible significance in this case, however, because it is undisputed that the laboratory followed proper procedures in collecting and analyzing Daniel and Wilson’s drug tests. Further, the results of those tests were verified by a licensed physician acting as an MRO. It is beyond dispute that Daniel and Wilson used illegal drugs.

The only procedural error in this case was the premature reporting of Daniel and Wilson’s positive test results to the Company. Thus, the Company substantially *810 complied with the procedures. Daniel and Wilson have not demonstrated any harm or prejudice from this error and they cannot do so because their drug test results were confirmed to be positive. Cf. Frank v. Dep’t of Transp. Fed. Aviation Admin., 35 F.3d 1554 (Fed.Cir.1994) (declining to adopt view that non-compliance with drug testing procedures is per se harmful and prejudicial error sufficient to invalidate a drug test). Therefore, the concern of mistaken termination is simply not implicated in this case.

The majority implicitly acknowledges this fact when it comments that “adopting a substantial compliance standard would create a slippery-slope which could eventually have the effect of undermining the interests the procedural requirements are designed to protect.” (Emphasis added). The majority is concerned that in future cases, “[i]f a ‘substantial compliance’ standard were adopted, there would be no way to draw the line as to the circumstances under which it could be said that an employee has ‘failed a drug test’ under the DOT regulations.”

Under the facts of this case, however, a line can be drawn. As the majority recognizes, the procedural requirement of having an MRO review positive test results is designed to ensure the accuracy of the drug tests so as to prevent mistaken terminations. Although the majority takes issue with my use of the phrase “confirmed drug users,” there is simply no doubt that Wilson and Daniel used drugs and that their drug use was confirmed by a licensed MRO. The procedural requirement designed to ensure the veracity of the test results was satisfied in this case and so, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, it can be said that Wilson and Daniel each “failed a drug test.”

On the other hand, the timing of the MRO review before termination is designed to ensure the privacy of employees. Noncompliance with this requirement was the only procedural defect in this case. The diminished privacy interests of employees in safety sensitive positions do not warrant the majority’s exaltation of procedure over substance. Although the majority purports to “take very seriously” my concern over employing confirmed drug users in safety sensitive positions, it states that the question “whether the arbitrator had ‘little doubt’ about the employees’ purported drug use is neither here nor there.” I cannot accept that conclusion. The undeniable purpose of random drug testing in hazardous industries is to protect public safety. Where public safety is in jeopardy, it is that concern, not the privacy of individual workers, that is paramount.

CONCLUSION

In explaining his order, the arbitrator stated: “I am frank to admit [ ] that sustaining these grievances is troubling. I have little doubt that both grievants had the illegal substances in question in their bodies, based on the evidence presented, and I am not particularly happy about ordering them reinstated and made whole.” It is clear, then, that in ordering reinstatement the arbitrator understood that Wilson and Daniel were drug users. While the arbitrator did not explain the reason that he was troubled and unhappy in ordering reinstatement, it was undoubtedly based on his awareness that he was exposing the public to the risk of harm from drug using employees in a safety-sensitive industry.

I respectfully dissent because the majority’s opinion upholds an arbitrator’s order that does not draw its essence from the unambiguous requirement of the CBA that employees such as Wilson and Daniel must be terminated if they test positive for drug use. The arbitrator’s order is also con *811 trary to the firmly established public policy that persons engaged in safety-sensitive positions must be terminated to protect others from the harm they may cause by using drugs.

.DOT regulations require that a medical review officer ("MRO”) conduct "a final review of confirmed positive results from the laboratory .... prior to the transmission of the results to employer administrative officials.” 49 C.F.R. § 40.33 (a)(1). The regulations further provide:

49 C.F.R. § 40.33 (b)(3).

. Apparently, a real Dr. Gerald Barnes exists, whom the false Dr. Barnes impersonated. The real Dr. Barnes is not an MRO and has nothing to do with this case.

. The regulations provide in pertinent part: "MRO qualifications. The MRO must be a licensed physician with knowledge of drug abuse disorders.” 49 C.F.R. § 199.15 (b).

. The majority attempts to cast doubt on Wilson and Daniel’s drug use by characterizing the arbitrator’s determination that Wilson and Daniel had used illegal drugs as a “gratuitous[ ] ... opinion” that he was unqualified to render without medical training. Surely the arbitrator was qualified to accept the parties’ stipulation that the laboratory had followed protocol in testing Daniel and Wilson’s specimens. Moreover, as a fact-finder, the arbitrator was uniquely qualified to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and determine that Wilson and Daniel lied under oath when they denied having used drugs. Finally, Dr. Lappe’s qualifications are not in dispute. Dr. Lappe concluded that Daniel and Wilson’s test results could only be explained by illegal drug use. There is simply no question that Daniel and Wilson used illicit substances.

. The Union submitted Ashby's opinion into evidence in the form of an internal DOT memorandum written by Ashby to Catrina Pavlik, Drug Program Manager for the Research and Special Programs Administration. The Company submitted the opinion of Richard B. Felder, Associate Administrator for the Office of Pipeline Safety at DOT. Felder found “no fault with the fairness of [the] process” the Union and the Company put in place to resolve the problem caused by Barnes. In addition, the Company submitted the opinion of Harry Strahl, Acting Chief of the Utilities Branch of the California Public Utilities Commission. Strahl concluded that the process to which the Union and Company agreed “addresses our concerns for employee and public safety and that it complies with Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 40 and 199.” The arbitrator did not explain why he was unpersuaded by Felder and Strahl’s opinions on the matter.

. 49 C.F.R. § 199.15 (d)(2) provides:

. The regulations provide one exception to this rule:

49 C.F.R. § 199.9 (b) (emphasis added). Neither Wilson nor Daniel meet the three requirements of this exception, which would permit them to avoid immediate termination.

. Notably, Ashby's letter, on which the arbitrator substantially relied to reach his conclusion, states that "if the employees are reinstated, they may resume safety-sensitive duties without pursuing the return-to-duty process specified by the RSPA for employees who violate the rules.”

. The district court recognized that "the ‘outright’ reinstatement of two employees who failed drug tests to safety-sensitive positions, without return to duty testing as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 199.11 (e), would violate the’public policy requiring such testing as a safeguard.” However, based on the Union's assurances that " 'the grievants here understand and accept their (continued) (continued) obligation to submit to [return to duty] testing upon their return to duty[,]' ” the district court decided that the arbitrator did not violate this policy by unconditionally reinstating the employees. Likewise, the majority emphasizes this condition, stating that “Daniel and Wilson returned to work at the Gas Company subject to their agreement to submit a drug test before returning to duty” and that "[t]he Appellants agreed to submit to DOT drag tests before returning to duty.”

Major League Baseball Players Assoc. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 , 121 S.Ct. 1724, 1730 , 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001) (per curiam). The question presented is whether the arbitrator's award violates public policy, not whether we — or the district court — can adjust the remedy ordered by the arbitrator to comply with public policy. Cf. Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358 ("When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the [CBA], he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair resolution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies.”) Here, the arbitrator placed no conditions on the reinstatement, and that is the award we must review. In addition, I find it ironic that Wilson and Daniel concede that they are subject to return to duty testing. On the one hand, they argue that they are not covered by 49 C.F.R. § 199.9 (a)(1) because the drag test they failed did not strictly comply with DOT regulations. On the other hand, they admit that they are covered by 49 C.F.R. § 199.11 (e), which only applies if they have failed a drug test administered under DOT regulations.

.The arbitrator's first award reinstated the employee drug user “provided that [the employee] (1) accept a suspension of 30 days without pay, (2) participate in a substance-abuse program, and (3) undergo drug tests at the discretion of [the company] ... for the next five years.” E. Associated Coal, 121 S.Ct. at 466. One year later, when the employee tested positive for drugs a second time, the arbitrator: