Estate of Robin Grant Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., and Garlick Helicopters, Inc.

283 F.3d 1107 ESTATE OF Robin Grant KENNEDY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC., Defendant-Appellant, and Garlick Helicopters, Inc., Defendant. No. 00-35240. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted April 6, 2001. Filed March 15, 2002. Keith A. Kemper and Kristen K. Waggoner, Ellis, Li & McKinstry, PLLC; Franklin L. Smith and Susan Machler, Osborn Smith, Seattle, WA, for the plaintiff-appellee Estate of Robin Grant Kennedy. Frederick Meyers, David D. Swartling and Daniel R. Laurence, Mills Meyers Swartling, Seattle, Washington, for defendant-appellant Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. William V. O'Connor and Michael R. Daymude, Kern and Wooley, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant-appellant Garlick Helicopters, Inc. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-98-5579 (RJB). Before: WOOD, Jr., * TROTT, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge WOOD, Jr.; Dissent by Judge PAEZ WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge. 1 Robin Grant Kennedy was killed on November 5, 1996, when the helicopter he was piloting came apart in mid-air and crashed. At the time of…

Opinion by Judge WOOD, Jr.; Dissent by Judge PAEZ

Robin Grant Kennedy was killed on November 5, 1996, when the helicopter he was piloting came apart in mid-air and crashed. At the time of the crash, Kennedy was using the helicopter for aerial logging in Washington state. The structural failure in the helicopter was caused by a fatigue crack that developed in a component of the tail boom known as the left forward vertical fin spar. Kennedy’s estate (“Appellee”) filed this diversity products liability lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington against Appellant Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (“Bell Helicopter”) and Garlick Helicopters, Inc. (“Garlick”). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After oral argument on all the motions, the district court issued a ruling on February 14, 2000, in which it granted Garlick’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against Garlick based on a finding that Garlick was not the manufacturer of the helicopter and, as a result, could not be held liable under Washington products liability law. Bell Helicopter argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because all of the claims…

dissenting:

Because I believe that, in asserting jurisdiction over this appeal from a non-final order denying summary judgment, the ma *1113 jority impermissibly expands the collateral order doctrine, I respectfully dissent. Our holding today carves out a special and unwarranted exception with indeterminate boundaries, with the result that any time Congress enacts a statute of repose, defendants within the covered industry wield the added advantage in litigation of piecemeal review.

The majority expands the collateral order doctrine by erroneously interpreting the General Aviation Revitalization Act (“GARA”), 1 to confer an explicit right not to stand trial, thereby equating the purpose behind the GARA statute of repose with the policies underlying doctrines like qualified immunity and double jeopardy for which we have identified explicit grants of immunity from trial. The analogy to qualified immunity is inappropriate, however, because the social costs that justify conferring immunity from suit for qualified immunity and double jeopardy claims are not present in a GARA defense. Because general aviation manufacturers may obtain full review on appeal after final judgment, we…